

THE BRITISH
COMMONWEALTH OF
NATIONS

by
SIR IVOR JENNINGS,
LITT. D., LL. D.
VICE-CHANCELLOR
UNIVERSITY OF CEYLON

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Watford, Herts.

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P R E F A C E

IT may seem a little odd that this book should have been written in the youngest of the Dominions. In present conditions, however, the countries most interested in the nature of the British Commonwealth of Nations are those which border the Bay of Bengal, where indeed the subject is one of acute controversy. Nor is it wholly a disadvantage that it was written outside the United Kingdom and the older Dominions, for there may be readers in other countries anxious to learn how an Empire can disintegrate and yet bind some at least of its parts more closely together. I have indeed written on the assumption that the reader knows little or nothing of the nations with which it deals. Now that India, Pakistan and Ceylon have become Dominions the great majority of our fellow-citizens do not regard the United Kingdom as "the Mother Country".

The careful reader will perhaps discover that the main part of the book was written before India, Pakistan and Ceylon became Dominions and before Burma decided to move out of the Commonwealth, while Chapter XI was written towards the end of 1947. In these days of rapid change the way of an author is hard. I have tried to make the necessary changes in proof, but I cannot wholly have succeeded, and apologies are due for any inconsistencies.

When one has for more years studied a subject, at least in part, from other books, it is impossible to do justice to their authors. The learned reader will be aware, however, how much I owe to *The Cambridge History of the British Empire* and Professor W. K. Hancock's *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*.

W. IVOR JENNINGS.

University of Ceylon.
4th March, 1948.

CHAPTER ONE

WHERE THE SUN NEVER SETS

IN the far-flung collection of miscellaneous territories which is sometimes called the British Commonwealth of Nations and sometimes the British Empire and more recently and least happily the British Commonwealth and Empire, only a small minority claims descent from the peoples of the United Kingdom. There are two million people in Canada who cannot speak English, and many others whose forbears could not speak it. Only about half the population of twelve millions claim the British Isles as place of origin; and there are more "French" than "English". Australia and New Zealand make no attempt to classify their populations according to origin, but they are the most "British" of the Dominions. In the Union of South Africa there are nine million people of African descent and more Dutch than English among the two-and-a half million people of European origin.

When we consider the vast territories and huge populations outside the White Dominions, we find that the "Europeans" are almost an infinitesimal fraction. In the Asiatic dominions of the Crown there are nearly five hundred million people, but the Europeans cannot exceed 100,000. Of more than four hundred million people in India, only 320,000 speak English. Of some six hundred million people under the British Crown throughout the world, not more than seventy millions, of whom forty-six millions are in the United Kingdom, claim descent from the peoples of the British Isles. The English language is the *lingua franca*; but it is spoken by about seventy-five million people out of nearly six hundred millions. Nor is the Empire only or primarily Christian. In India there were recorded in 1931 less than six million Christians, while two hundred and fifty-five millions were

Hindus, over ninety-five millions were Muslims, and thirty-five millions acknowledged other faiths. Burma is 85 per cent. Buddhist, and in Ceylon there are 500,000 Christians to 4,200,000 Buddhists, 1,300,000 Hindus, and 400,000 Muslims. Malaya is divided among the Muslims, the Hindus, and the Confucians.

It is a fact to which ardent nationalists the world over did not neglect to draw attention, that complete self-government had been accorded only to those territories which are occupied by the White races, most of whom trace their descent from the British Isles, speak English, and acknowledge the Christian religion. It may, of course, be answered that Canada is only half British by origin, that two million of its people do not speak English, that the European population of South Africa is less than half British by origin, and that the remainder do not speak English as their mother-tongue (though most of them have learned it as second language). This was, however, only a partial answer; and the conferment of independence, within or without the Commonwealth, on India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma has reduced the force of the argument. The second stage in the development of the British Commonwealth, the liberation of the peoples of the Indian Ocean, has begun.

We have in fact reached the second great crisis in the history of the British Commonwealth, a crisis in which the advisers of George VI may have shown themselves wiser than the advisers of George III, who lost thirteen of the American colonies on the 4th July, 1776. Some at least of the Asiatic dominions of the Crown may possibly remain in some kind of partnership with Great Britain. The analogy is of course by no means exact. The thirteen American colonies were settlements of British people, inspired by the ideas of the homeland, and anxious only for the liberty that they would have had in Great Britain itself. India, on the other hand, is a vast sub-continent, inhabited by peoples conscious of their ancient civilizations, speaking a multitude of languages of which English is only one among many, professing religions more ancient and more complex than Christianity, and having only a recent and

fortuitous connection with Great Britain. The problem is more difficult, but it is the same kind of problem; and the earlier problem was solved after the creation of the United States of America by the invention of that odd relationship which now goes by the name of Dominion status. When the thirteen colonies were lost, Canada (then consisting of what is now Quebec and Ontario), Nova Scotia (since divided into Nova Scotia and New Brunswick), Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland were saved by self-government. Australia and New Zealand were brought into the same relationship. The two South African colonies of the Cape and Natal were eventually joined, after a bloody and (as some think) unnecessary war, with the republic of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State to form the Union of South Africa. The problem of Ireland was at last solved, at least partially, by the creation of a new Dominion in Southern Ireland, now called Eire.

It is with these that this book is primarily concerned. They form, with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, a Commonwealth of nations, related more or less closely by political, social and economic ties, though the closeness varies from Newfoundland to Eire. The problem has been solved by an independence which implies interdependence, though the extent both of the independence and of the interdependence again varies. There is union without unity, similarity in diversity, variety in uniformity. It is indeed dangerous to make any generalization about this unique relationship without immediately adding a qualification; for Dominion status has not been cut to a pattern; it is a genus of which there were six species; and how many more there will be before this century expires only the future can tell. It is the expressed policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to bring the colonies to Dominion status, but that Government carefully refrains from saying what sort of Dominion status it will be. Those who have imbibed the British tradition know that it is unsafe to generalize, that a Dominion status which suits Canada will not suit South Africa; that which befits New Zealand will not satisfy Eire;

it may be that no type can be devised to suit India and yet it may be possible to invent a relationship which meets the needs of Ceylon. A status of an entirely different kind may be necessary for the West Indies and Malaya; and even then there will be the problems of East and West Africa.

CHAPTER TWO

THE NATIONS

The United Kingdom

Two thousand years ago, when Cæsar's cohorts landed in Britain, the southern part of the Island, at least, was inhabited by a Celtic-speaking people who had at some time invaded the country from continental Europe, submerging and absorbing a dark-skinned and dark-haired people of whom there are still in Britain many survivals. Under Roman influence the Celts developed a high standard of culture, represented to-day mainly in the Welsh language and civilization. When the Romans withdrew, the Teutonic tribes descended in successive waves, the Angles, the Saxons and the Jutes, the Danes and the Norsemen. They absorbed or drove out the Celts, who thus became concentrated in the West. The last of the invaders were the Normans, who had assimilated the language and the culture of Gaul. In the course of two centuries the Normans became completely assimilated with the Anglo-Saxons, and the English language and culture which resulted was a mixture of Teutonic and Latin elements which has proved itself singularly adaptable as a world language because it is at once simple and rich. It is now spoken by over two hundred million people, and the extension of its sphere of influence is by no means at an end.

The Normans brought more than a language and a culture. They brought also administrative efficiency, and England was the first country of which it could be said that its people formed a nation, a social and administrative unit with a distinct culture. What gave it energy and initiative nobody at this stage can tell, though many partial explanations could be given. It may be, as some have affirmed, that the mixture of peoples and cultures was fruitful because it was a mixture,

because each succeeding layer added something to the layers beneath, and because no sooner was a tradition established than a new impetus came to create a new tradition. Certainly by the reign of Elizabeth, England was a force in the world, not merely because Francis Drake had circumnavigated the globe and had dispersed the Spanish Armada with his little ships, but also because it had a magnificent literature which only the ancient Greeks and Romans could rival. Economic development through the growth of the wool trade perhaps had something to do with it, but it was comparatively recent, and English law and the English system of government had already wandered into new and unexplored fields.

The religious and political controversies of the seventeenth century seemed rather to inspire progress than to retard it. Indeed it has been said that the Puritan doctrine that man served God by putting his heart and soul into the job on hand and making a success of it has had much to do with the success of the peoples of the United Kingdom. It has, it is true, helped to create the theory of *Albion perfide*, for if Great Britain finds itself making war or annexing territory or turning some other nation out of its colonies it will prove conclusively that it has done so from the best of motives. It is nevertheless true that, with all his faults, the Englishman (or his neighbour) can generally be trusted to do a job honestly, efficiently, zealously and without supervision. It is of such stuff that pioneers are made, even if they go with the Bible in the one hand and a revolver in the other.

England's greatest contribution after the Puritan Revolution of 1642-1660, however, was to invent responsible government. She had already invented representative government, or government with the assistance of a representative legislature; after 1660, or more strictly after the Revolution of 1688, the King's ministers became more and more responsible to Parliament, and the old problem that neither the Greeks nor the Romans had been able to solve, how to enable the people to govern, had been solved, in principle, by the English. It is significant that whenever the rising nations of the Commonwealth ask

for self-government it is responsible government that they demand.

By this time England was no longer alone. The Normans had made forays into Wales, but the Principality was not annexed to England until Edward I in 1282 defeated Llewellyn ApGriffith and made his infant son Prince of Wales. Until 1536 it was governed, or misgoverned, by feudal lords, but in that year it was formally made part of England and given representation in the House of Commons. Though by the same Act English became the language of the courts, no attempt was made to supersede Welsh, and the translation of the Bible into Welsh in 1582 gave the people of the Principality a means for maintaining their language and culture. To this day there are nearly 900,000 Welsh-speaking people in Wales, though 90 per cent. of them also speak English.

The accession in 1603 of James VI of Scotland as James I of England united the Crowns without uniting the countries. Not until 1702 was the Act of Union passed which created the United Kingdom. Though the manner of its passing was not wholly creditable, the commercial advantages which accrued to Scotland made it a success, and henceforth whenever there was in any part of the world an Englishman to carry the burdens of Empire, a Scot would soon appear to share the burdens and help him lay out a golf course. Sometimes, indeed, the Scot was there first. Fifty years were required to pacify the Highlands, but it was completed by the English technique of making a road and the Scots' technique (which is not by any means un-English) of carrying the Kirk into the mountains. The great Earl of Chatham, by sending the Highlanders to fight in America, wiped out the last recollections of Bonnie Prince Charlie, whose ambitions had died at Culloden in 1745. The pacification of the Highlands involved the virtual disappearance of Gaelic, and in 1931 only 136,000 people in Scotland could speak the language, while only 6,700 knew no English.

The success of the Union with Scotland was not repeated in Ireland. The great mass of the Southern Irish were Roman Catholics and, given the traditions of Great Britain since the

Reformation, it was less easy to extend to that religion the tolerance which had been freely accorded to the Scots Kirk. It was promised by William Pitt, but the obstinacy of George III made it impossible for him to carry out his promise. Perhaps if the King had been less obstinate or Pitt had been more obstinate there would never have been an Irish problem. On the other hand, Ireland could never have obtained from the Union the material advantages which at once accrued to Scotland, and it is probable that O'Connell's agitation for the repeal of the Union and the re-establishment of an Irish Parliament would have arisen in any case. Gladstone's policy of Home Rule might have solved the problem, but in 1886 he had no majority in the House of Commons, and in 1893 the House of Lords defeated the Bill. The fundamental difficulty was that the Ulstermen did not want to be governed from Dublin and that the Ulstermen provided strong support for the Conservative party while the Liberal party was ascendant in Great Britain. Mr. Asquith tried again in 1912 but was compelled eventually to acquiesce in the exclusion of Ulster, and in any case the outbreak of war compelled the postponement of Home Rule once more. In 1916 there was an abortive rebellion and in 1919 a successful one. Mr. Lloyd George tried his hand in 1920 with an Act which set up separate legislatures for Northern and Southern Ireland. Northern Ireland accepted under protest, believing that if it had its own legislature it could never be brought under a legislature in Dublin. Southern Ireland used the opportunity to elect a Republican Dail. Eventually "Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland" were agreed and ratified in 1921 in spite of opposition from Mr. De Valera and the Sinn Fein party. Ireland was to become a Dominion under the name of the Irish Free State, but Northern Ireland was authorized to contract out within a month—which it did at once—and in that case a Boundary Commission was to be established. Since, however, Northern Ireland refused to appoint a member to the Commission it has never functioned, and the boundary of 1920 was accepted in 1925.

The title of the Parliament of the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Ireland was changed in 1927 to that of the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, while the words "United Kingdom" were dropped altogether from the King's title, who became King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British dominions beyond the sea, Emperor of India. There are thus four peoples in the United Kingdom, the English, the Welsh, the Scots, and the Northern Irish; two Parliaments, the Parliament of the United Kingdom and the Parliament of Northern Ireland; and three systems of law and local government, for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Nor must it be forgotten that there are associated with the United Kingdom, but not part of it, three other territories with separate legislatures and separate systems of government. The Isle of Man is subject for some purposes to the Parliament of the United Kingdom, but it is in other respects administered with its own laws by the Court of Tynwald consisting of the Governor, the Legislative Council, and the House of Keys. The Channel Islands are the relics of the Duchy of Normandy and have been associated with the Crown of England since Duke William became William I of England in 1066. Jersey and Guernsey have their own laws and their own legislatures, consisting of the Lieutenant-Governor and the States Assembly.

The peoples of the British Isles (other than Ireland) were thus divided in 1931, when the last census was taken:

England	37,794,003
Wales	2,158,374
Scotland	4,842,980
Isle of Man	49,308
Channel Islands	93,205
					<hr/>
					44,937,444
					<hr/>

At the census of Northern Ireland in 1937 there were 1,279,745 inhabitants, while at the census of Eire (Southern Ireland) in 1943 there were 2,949,713 people. There are thus forty-six

million people in the United Kingdom, of whom about thirty-eight million live in England, two million in Wales, five million in Scotland, and one-and-three-quarter million in Northern Ireland. To describe these as English, Welsh, Scots and Irish would, however, be wrong; for movement between the parts of the United Kingdom is free and untrammelled, and there are perhaps as many people in England who call themselves Scots as there are in Scotland. Also, inter-marriage is common. Thus a recent survey of the children in the schools of the Welsh county of Denbigh showed that 41 per cent. of the parents called themselves English, 36 per cent. called themselves Welsh, and 23 per cent. were mixed. "Nationality" within the United Kingdom is not a matter of "race" or politics but of sentiment. In spite of the diversity of their histories, the controversies of the past, the varieties of culture, and even the differences of language and religion, the peoples of the United Kingdom have obtained a remarkable unity in thought and action which, though admirable in itself, renders them less capable of understanding the differences which exist in other parts of the Commonwealth. They ought always to remember, though often they do not, that they never succeeded in uniting with them the Southern Irish.

Canada

Canada's connection with Europe began, not as a British colony, but as a French colony. Though the English colonized the western seaboard of North America, it was the French who sailed up the St. Lawrence at the beginning of the seventeenth century and established the colony of New France in what is now the Province of Quebec. There was a British settlement in Nova Scotia in 1623, but there was also a French settlement known as Acadia. In the wars of the next century, the French colonies changed hands several times, but by the Treaty of Paris in 1763 Canada (New France) and its dependencies were ceded to the British for the last time. When the American Revolution broke out in 1775, therefore, there were British colonies in Canada (i.e. Quebec), Nova Scotia (which

included New Brunswick), and Isle St. Jean (now known as Prince Edward Island). With the recognition of American independence in 1783, those who insisted on remaining under the British flag poured into Upper Canada (now Ontario) and into the southern part of Nova Scotia (now New Brunswick). New Brunswick was separated from Nova Scotia in 1784, and Upper Canada from Lower Canada in 1791. Great Britain had thus lost thirteen colonies but retained six—Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Lower Canada, and Upper Canada—while the Hudson's Bay Company controlled the vast areas to the north and west. The Red River settlement was established in what is now Manitoba in 1811, but the Province of Manitoba was not established until 1870. Meanwhile, colonies had been established in Vancouver Island and British Columbia, which were united in 1866 and came into the Confederation of Canada in 1871.

Upper and Lower Canada were re-united in 1840, but the partnership worked badly and when, in 1864, the Maritime Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island decided to discuss closer relations, Canada asked to be brought into the discussions. It was decided at Charlottetown and again at Quebec in 1866 that a Confederation of all the North American colonies should be formed. In 1867, therefore, the Dominion of Canada came into existence, comprising Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec (Lower Canada), and Ontario (Upper Canada). Manitoba was brought in in 1870 and British Columbia came in in 1871. When the prairies filled up, Manitoba was divided into three Provinces, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta. Thus the Dominion of Canada comprises nine Provinces from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In 1871, the Dominion had a population of 3,700,000; by 1941 it had increased to 11,500,000, of whom over seven million were in Ontario and Quebec.

Geography and history have made the task of governing Canada one of the most difficult in the world. Though inhabited by less than twelve million people, Canada has an area only slightly less than that of Europe and over twice that

of India. It is true that a large part of this vast area is in the frozen north and is virtually uninhabited. The Yukon and the North-Western Territory occupy nearly half the area and yet contain only 17,000 people. Indeed, the frozen north comes down far into the Provinces. The limit of northern habitation may be taken roughly as the isotherm of 60° F. mean July temperature, since the economic production of cereals is not practicable north of that line. On that basis, 62 per cent. of the Province of Quebec, 18 per cent. of Ontario, 44 per cent. of Manitoba, 11 per cent. of Saskatchewan and 10 per cent. of Alberta, are uninhabitable. Even this gives an exaggerated picture, for vast areas south of the isotherm, especially in Ontario and British Columbia, are without habitation of any kind. Canada has been likened to a string of beads stretched across 3,560 miles (by railway) which separate Halifax, the capital of Nova Scotia, from Victoria, the capital of British Columbia. The beads, it has been said,¹ are not all pearls.

This is geography; but history also has taken a hand. It is an accident of history that one half of North America is outside the British Commonwealth and one half inside. Except at the Great Lakes, the International Boundary between Canada and the United States is wholly artificial. From the Lake of the Woods, where Ontario joins Manitoba, to the Strait of Georgia in the Far West, a distance of over 1,200 miles, it runs straight across country along the forty-ninth parallel. Economically and geographically the Maritimes and Southern Quebec are part of New England. The north banks of the Great Lakes are not essentially different from the south banks, and Ontario is dependent on Pennsylvania for its coal and iron. The Provinces are a continuation of the Middle West. British Columbia is separated from the rest of Canada by the Rockies, and is geographically and economically a continuation of Oregon and Washington. It is clear that, if either the British or the American flag had flown over the whole of North America, the development

¹ Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Vol. I.

would have been from south to north and not from east to west. The beads would not have had a string, but would have been knobs projecting from a North American instrument.

The population of Canada is not so cosmopolitan as that of the United States. Slightly less than one half claim to be of British descent. Over 30 per cent, or three-and-a-half million, claim to be of French descent, and the other 20 per cent., come from many countries. In Canada, unlike the United States, however, there are two official languages. Twenty per cent. of the population do not speak English, the great majority of them, of course, being French-speaking. Only 13 per cent. speak both the official languages. The French Canadians are to be found mainly in the Province of Quebec, but they have spread also into Northern Ontario and New Brunswick. The three Prairie Provinces contain comparatively few claiming French origin, but they also contain a much larger foreign element. In 1936 less than one-half claimed to be of British descent. The national origin of a Canadian national is, of course, of no importance for governmental purposes provided that he regards himself as Canadian. To the difficulty of governing a "string of beads" must nevertheless be added the difficulty that the beads are not at all uniform. Quebec differs from the rest of Canada in language, customs, traditions, culture and religion. The Prairies are cosmopolitan and still contain substantial pockets of unassimilated immigrants. Finally, it must be remembered that the principal cultural influences upon Canada are neither British nor Canadian, but American. The "beads" are strung across the continent only slightly to the north of a line south of which is a great nation of one hundred and forty million people. The frontier is open, and Canadians and Americans interchange freely. The Canadians read American books and magazines, see American films, and listen to the American radio. Their educational system, outside Quebec, owes more to the influence of the United States than to that of Great Britain. The American citizen considers Canada to be "foreign" in spirit and atmosphere; yet even Victoria, which claims to be

"a little bit of Old England" seems to the Englishman to be largely American.

These are the difficulties that Canada has had to face in making itself a nation. The first task was to string the "beads" together, and this was done by providing, at very heavy expense, two transcontinental railways and inducing trade to flow along them instead of southwards into the railway system of the United States. By heavy tariffs on both sides of the "line", and by manipulation of freight rates, the aim has in large measure been attained. The Maritimes have never regained the prosperity which they enjoyed in the days of the windjammer, but Halifax and St. John, not New York and Boston, are the normal outlets for Canadian winter trade. In summer the produce of the prairies is poured into Fort William and thence to Europe via the Great Lakes, or over the Rockies and away by Vancouver and the Panama Canal. Ontario has established an industrial system dependent on the United States for coal and iron, but largely supplying the rest of Canada behind tariff walls and with the assistance of favourable freight rates. The process of working out these national policies is by no means easy, for they are mutually contradictory. The interests of the Maritimes is served by low tariff walls or none at all. They depend primarily on shipping and the export trades. The Prairies require low costs of production in order that they may sell their wheat abroad on advantageous terms, and therefore dislike tariffs. British Columbia also is primarily dependent upon its exports of lumber, newsprint, minerals, fish and fruits. On the other hand, Ontario and, to a less degree, Quebec require high tariff walls; and the whole scheme of Canadian national economy depends upon the fostering of inter-Provincial trade behind those walls. The contradiction is not, however, so violent as it appears. In normal years Canadian wheat, lumber, newsprint, fruit and minerals have no great difficulty in competing in the world markets, in spite of the high costs of production due to tariffs. Though possessing less than 1 per cent. of the world's population, Canada ranks sixth among the leading world traders, first among debtors, fifth among creditors, third.

or fourth among security dealers and first in tourist trade. In 1929 (before the drought) it had the second highest national income per head of population.

These conditions make for national unity by giving the whole of Canada a common economic interest, though there are at the same time fissiparous elements. The great task of Sir John A. Macdonald, the chief architect of the Dominion, after 1867 was to create a nation-wide party in which all sectional interests would be represented. Against the Conservative party thus established a nation-wide opposition party, the Liberal party, was formed, and it achieved power under Sir Wilfred Laurier in 1896. It is no easy matter to maintain the unity of a party which must appeal to the exporting traders of the Maritimes, the peasants of the St. Lawrence valley, the mixed farmers, miners and industrial workers of Ontario, the wheat farmers of the Prairies, and the fruit farmers, traders, lumbermen and miners of British Columbia. It is not surprising that in trying to be all things to all men, the two parties have tended to look very like each other and to differentiate themselves rather by personnel than by policies. The Liberals supported free trade and yet increased tariffs; the Conservatives supported the Imperial connection and yet led the movement for Canadian autonomy. At intervals, too, special interests have organized themselves and broken away from the larger parties—nationalists in Quebec, farmers on the prairies, supporters of "social credit" in Alberta, and so on. In spite of these great difficulties, and in spite of the drain on man-power caused by the attractions of the United States (Canada's largest export has been said to be "brains"), the Dominion has been able to find men able at the same time to govern a heterogeneous people and to manage a heterogeneous party. The one or the other of the two great parties has governed Canada since 1867, and the issues of politics have been national rather than sectional.

Sir John Macdonald would have preferred a unitary Constitution, but the attitude of Lower Canada made a federal constitution inevitable. The assent of Lower Canada was due to the assumption that, in matters which affected its

peculiar culture, it would be autonomous. It did not desire to extend the system of United Canada by incorporating or amalgamating with the Maritimes; it wanted to break up United Canada so that Lower Canada, without making itself a prey to the advancing secular civilization of the United States, could nevertheless remain a separate cultural unit. Standing alone it would be too weak; incorporated in the Dominion as a unit it could share the protection of the Dominion and yet remain essentially distinct. In Dicey's phrase, it wanted "union but not unity".

Nevertheless, the Dominion Constitution was intended to be very different from that of the United States. It was to be "similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom". It was to be a Cabinet system, a system in which Canadian ministers were responsible to a Canadian House of Commons. Also, the Dominion was to have wider powers than those of the United States. The Provinces were not to be "sovereign states" brought together for common action on a narrow range of functions. The emphasis was laid on the Dominion. The Provinces were to have those functions which were necessary to provide for Quebec's cultural autonomy, and all the remaining powers were to be vested in the Dominion. By the irony of history, the position has been reversed. It has been found that, in modern industrial conditions, the United States' power to regulate "trade and commerce between the States and with foreign countries" is a power to regulate the whole American economy, for there is hardly any trade that does not extend beyond the bounds of a single state. On the other hand, the power conferred on the Dominion, "the regulation of trade and commerce", is by no means so wide, chiefly because a Province has power to legislate on "property and civil rights in the Province". By 1900 it had been decided that the really important powers of social regulation remained with the Provinces, and in the present century legislation similar to that of the American "New Deal" enacted by the Dominion, has been declared invalid. The supremacy of the Dominion was sought to be obtained in 1867, not only by the wide powers which were, it was thought, conferred by the constitution on

the Dominion Parliament, but also by the power of the Dominion Government to appoint the Lieutenant-Governor of a Province, to instruct him to refuse assent to Provincial legislation, and to disallow such legislation when he had given assent. The powers of reserving Bills for Dominion assent and of disallowing Provincial legislation were frequently exercised in the early years of Confederation. They were, however, negative powers. They could prevent a Province from carrying out a Provincial policy, but they could not compel it to carry out a Dominion policy. When it was found that the Provinces, and not the Dominion, had the essential powers of social regulation, their value diminished considerably, and they have been used sparingly in the present century.

The consequence of these developments has been that, in spite of the intention of the Fathers of Confederation, the Province plays a larger part in the life of a Canadian national than the State plays in the life of an American citizen. Though many difficulties arise—as when unemployed from the stricken Prairies pour into British Columbia—the result is not entirely out of accord with the intangible elements which make for good government. Quebec's demand for *notre langue, nos institutions et nos lois* is as insistent as ever, and is likely to remain insistent so long as the Province depends on a peasant economy and renders allegiance to the Church of Rome. Quebec is the key to Canadian politics, and Quebec demands provincial autonomy. This demand has nevertheless not prevented Canadian statesmen from pressing centralization as far as, or even a little further than, Quebec has desired. Canada is not a collection of nine fragments. It is a unit diversified in its parts. As the oldest, the most populous and the richest of the Dominions, the Dominion in fact which invented the name, it has led the way along the path of Dominion status.

Newfoundland

Newfoundland was discovered by John Cabot in 1497, but its main attraction was its fisheries which brought not merely English but French, Portuguese and Spaniards. English and French settlements were established in the seventeenth century, but the French settlements were ceded to Great Britain by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. Though larger than Ireland and only slightly smaller than England, it had, in 1940, about 300,000 inhabitants. There are no towns of any size except the capital, St. John's, which has a population of 43,000. The other 257,000 people are spread almost entirely around some 6,000 miles of sea coast and are mainly dependent upon the fishing industry. The population is almost entirely English or Irish by descent, but it is divided denominationally into three almost equal parts, Roman Catholic, Church of England, and United Church of Canada (Methodist). This denominational division is far more important politically than is customary in Christian countries. There is a transinsular railway running from St. John's northwards to Grand Falls and then westwards to Port-aux-Basques, whence it connects with the steamer to North Sydney in Nova Scotia. There are also branch lines in the east, but most of them have been closed owing to the heavy losses sustained by the railway as a whole and these branches in particular. The problem of governing a population so small in an island so large is inevitably considerable. The decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1927 that Labrador belonged to Newfoundland and not to Quebec has not eased the situation. Rich though the potential resources may be (and they are almost entirely unknown), the addition of 110,000 square miles of territory with a coastline of 1,000 miles and a population of 5,300 (1,300 of them Esquimaux) to an Island of 42,000 square miles with a coastline of 6,000 miles and a population of 300,000, does no more than add to the problems that the Newfoundlanders have to solve.

The difficulty of governing Newfoundland is increased by the fact that the Dominion is essentially dependent on the fishing industry. Its forests are extensive and there has been

some development of the newsprint industry. There are also mineral resources, though they have not been substantially worked. But at the last census the great bulk of the population was dependent on fishing and the export of fish. Fishing is a hazardous occupation, whose success depends in the first instance on uncontrollable factors, the movements of fish in Newfoundland waters, the vagaries of wind and weather, the occurrence of varying icy conditions, and the uncertainty of the supply of bait. To these hazards must be added those which have to be faced by any country which depends upon a staple export, such as the rise of competition in world markets (in this case mainly from Iceland and Norway) and general economic conditions which affect both demand and prices. The depression of 1929-32, for instance, hit Newfoundland hard. The demand for its fish dropped substantially and the fall of prices may be described without exaggeration as catastrophic. Between 1929-30 and 1932-33 the quantity of salt codfish was reduced by less than 10 per cent., but the value fell from nearly \$12,000,000 to just over \$5,000,000. This was due not only to the fall of prices in the export markets, but also to the fact that Newfoundland currency consisted of Canadian dollars while it received payment for exports in depreciated sterling—a difficulty which disappeared, however, when the Canadian dollar was devalued. The fishermen had been encouraged to grow their own food, especially vegetables, but few had done so on any substantial scale. For their food, clothing and household articles they depended on imports. The Government of Newfoundland depended for its finance on customs duties on imported articles. The heavy fall in the price of fish compelled expenditure on relief which had to be met mainly by increased customs duties, thus putting up the cost of articles of ordinary consumption and adding to the distress.

There were undoubtedly special factors operating in the depression of 1929-33, but it is obvious from the general circumstances of the Dominion that the task of government must be difficult. At intervals there has been discussion of the possibility of incorporating Newfoundland in the Dominion of Canada. It had been assumed that it would be incorporated

at the same time as the Maritime Provinces. Newfoundland was represented at the Quebec Conference in 1866, but not at the London Conference of 1866-67. Negotiations with Canada were resumed in 1868, and a delegation was sent to Ottawa in 1869, where tentative agreement was reached. The Federal Party was, however, decisively defeated when the question was put to the people. Financial difficulties in 1895 caused the question to be reopened and a delegation was sent to Ottawa. Canada was unable to offer sufficiently attractive terms and the negotiations broke down. Had the island been incorporated in the Dominion of Canada, it is probable that the growing financial difficulties which led to the suspension of the constitution would not have occurred. The economic difficulties were serious enough, but they were aggravated by political action. On this subject the Royal Commission of 1933 did not mince its words:

Politics in Newfoundland have never been such as to inspire wholehearted confidence in the ability of the people to govern themselves wisely, but there is general agreement that a process of deterioration, which has now reached almost unbelievable extremes, may be said to have set in a quarter of a century ago.¹

As a general statement, it is not too much to say that the present generation of Newfoundland have never known enlightened government.²

Newfoundland was given responsible government in 1855 and for a few years it enjoyed great prosperity. In the 'sixties, however, poor fisheries and other natural causes left a legacy of pauperism from which the island has never really recovered. The situation was improving when Newfoundland was called upon to decide whether to join the Canadian Confederation, and it is probable that that improvement played some part in the decision not to join. There followed a comparatively quiet period, during which an attempt was made to diversify the island's economy. In 1892, however, a

¹ Cmd. 4480, p. 81.

² *Ibid.*, p. 82.

violent storm caused heavy loss of life among the seal fishermen and later three-quarters of St. John's was devastated by fire. Before the people had had time to recover from these blows there was a bank crisis which destroyed the whole currency system and brought business to a standstill.

The distrust engendered in the confused conditions of this period has never been wholly dispelled. The effect on the morale of the people, unlettered and educated alike, was deep and permanent. Newfoundland has enjoyed her years of prosperity in the present century but never have those with capital, large or small, shown any marked desire to invest it within the confines of their own country, whether by the purchase of Government securities or otherwise.¹

The years from 1895 to 1914 were a period of promise, "marred, in its initial stages, by a lack of statesmanship which came near to mortgaging the future of the island and, in its final stages, by a programme of public expenditure which . . . was economically unsound".² The building of a railway had been begun in 1890. The new Government which came into power in 1897 made a contract for extending it which virtually handed over to the contractor all the island's means of production—railways, lands (4,120,000 acres), coal-bearing areas, steamer services, dry dock and telegraph system. The Opposition urged the Governor to refuse his assent to the Bill, and the Governor asked for the advice of the Secretary of State. Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, who held that office, drew attention to the undesirability of the contract, but stated that, if the Ministers, after fully considering the objections, pressed for the Governor's signature, he "would not be constitutionally justified in refusing to follow their advice". The Secretary of State refused to interfere:

Whatever views I may hold as to the propriety of the contract, it is essentially a question of local finance, and

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

² *Ibid.*, p. 30.

as Her Majesty's Government have no responsibility for the finance of self-governing colonies, it would be improper for them to interfere in such a case unless Imperial interests were directly involved.¹

The Bill became law, but the Government was defeated in 1900. The contractor had requested permission to transfer his rights to a limited company and the new Government was able to use this request as a means for securing a modification of the contract, but at a cost of \$2,500,000.

Under the new Government there was definite progress. Sir Robert Bond was Prime Minister from 1900 to 1908. "He left behind him a reputation of far-sighted devotion to the interests of the island and is generally regarded as the most statesmanlike figure in the line of Newfoundland Prime Ministers. To-day (1933), a disillusioned people, looking back on the past, single out the years of his Premiership as a period of orthodox finance and sane government when the fortunes of the island were at their zenith; there was almost unanimous agreement among witnesses that the present period of misfortune might be regarded as having originated with his fall from power in 1908."² Partly, no doubt, the circumstances were propitious. An iron-ore mine at Bell Island began to be worked in 1895. The Anglo-French Convention of 1904 put an end to French fishing rights in Newfoundland in return for territorial concessions in Africa. In 1905 the wood-pulp industry was established in the island. The fisheries dispute with the United States was settled, on British insistence, by an arbitration award in 1911 which was largely in favour of Newfoundland.

The new Ministry in 1908 embarked on a policy of expansion "designed to appeal to the electorate".³ Funds were raised by borrowing for the building of railways which never even paid their working expenses and whose construction diverted employment from the fishing industry and the

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34; Keith, *British Colonial Policy*, Vol. III., pp. 105-108.

² *Report of the Newfoundland Royal Commission*, 1933, Cmd. 4480, p. 37.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

coastal trade into uneconomic channels. The war of 1914-1918, however, was financially profitable. War loans caused an increase of \$13,000,000 in the island's debt, but this was more than balanced by the high prices for fish and the consequent high profits. This period of easy money led to a post-war policy of expansion on borrowed funds. In 1920 the debt was \$43,000,000. In 1933 it was \$101,000,000. "The twelve years, 1920-1932, during none of which was the budget balanced, were characterized by an outflow of public funds on a scale as ruinous as it was unprecedented, fostered by a continuous stream of willing lenders. A new era of industrial expansion, easy money and profitable contact with the rich American Continent was looked for and was deemed in part to have arrived. In the prevailing optimism, the resources of the Exchequer were believed to be limitless. The public debt of the island, accumulated over a century, was in twelve years more than doubled, its assets dissipated by improvident administration; the people misled into the acceptance of false standards; and the country sunk in waste and extravagance. The onset of the world depression found the island with no reserves, its primary industry neglected and its credit exhausted. At the first wind of adversity, its elaborate pretensions collapsed like a house of cards. The glowing visions of a new Utopia were dispelled with cruel suddenness by the cold realities of national insolvency, and to-day a disillusioned and bewildered people, deprived in many parts of the country of all hope of earning a livelihood, are haunted by the grim spectres of pauperism and starvation."¹

By agreement of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Dominion of Canada, and the Island of Newfoundland, and on their advice, the King in February, 1933, appointed a Royal Commission "to examine into the future of Newfoundland and in particular to report on the financial situation and prospects therein". In November, 1933, the Commission recommended that responsible government be suspended until such time as the island became self-supporting again;

¹ *Ibid*, pp. 43-44.

that a special Commission of Government, presided over by the Governor, be set up and vested with full legislative and executive authority under the control of the Government of the United Kingdom; that the Government of the United Kingdom should assume general financial responsibility for the finances of the island until such time as it became self-supporting again, and in particular should make arrangements for the reduction of the burden of the public debt; and that, as soon as the island's difficulties were overcome and the country was again self-supporting, responsible government, on request from the people of Newfoundland, should be restored. The Government of the United Kingdom agreed, subject to the approval of Parliament, to accept these recommendations if they were also accepted by the Government and Legislature of Newfoundland. The Legislative Council and Assembly of Newfoundland then passed a joint resolution petitioning the King to suspend the Constitution, and this was done by Imperial Act in 1933. Government by Commission remains in operation in Newfoundland and bears witness to the fact that though good government may not be a substitute for self-government, self-government is not necessarily good government.

The war of 1939-45 again brought prosperity to the island. Its revenue rose from \$ 16 million in 1940-41 to \$ 24½ million in 1944-45, and every year there has been a surplus. Its public debt in 1941 was about \$100 million, while in 1943 it was £20 million and \$4½ million. Soon, no doubt, self-government will be restored.

Australia

There had for centuries been a legend of a *Terra Australia*, but the Australian continent was really discovered by the Dutch in the early years of the seventeenth century. English explorers appeared towards the end of the century, but it was not until 1770 that Captain Cook took possession of the eastern coast in the name of King George III. The whole of what is now Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania was

annexed in 1788, most of South Australia in 1825, and Western Australia in 1827. By 1829 the whole of Australia was British territory. It was divided eventually into the six colonies named, which became States of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1900. The Northern Territory, which was originally part of South Australia, was transferred to the Commonwealth in 1911.

Australia has a population of about seven and a quarter millions in an area of nearly three million square miles. Of this vast area, however, only about 717,000 square miles are climatically suited for agriculture. Dr. Griffiths Taylor estimates that of the remainder, 600,000 square miles are desert, 660,000 square miles are sparse, and some 1,000,000 square miles are suitable for pastoral lands. Thus Australia's "vast open spaces" do exist, but they are more spacious than open, and few of them are fit for intensive cultivation. Over one-third of Australia has an average annual rainfall of less than 10 inches, and over two-thirds have an average annual rainfall of less than 20 inches. Nor do averages provide an adequate test, for they do not indicate the variations from year to year, nor the extent of evaporation. One very wet year does not compensate five years of drought, and light rains do not replenish the wells. In fact, the replenishment of Artesian water has not kept pace with consumption and waste. It is further to be noted that tropical cultivation requires more water than temperate cultivation, and that nearly 40 per cent. of Australia lies within the tropics, this figure including over 53 per cent. of Queensland, over 37 per cent. of Western Australia, and over 81 per cent. of the federal Northern Territory.

Thus water is the fundamental problem, and it is water which concentrates the population along the eastern and south-eastern strip and in the south-western corner. New South Wales, which is only 10 per cent. of Australia in area, has nearly 40 per cent. of its population. Victoria has 3 per cent. of the area and 27 per cent. of the population. Thus, two-thirds of the population of the Commonwealth is in two States occupying only 13 per cent. of its area. Even this does not give an adequate picture, for the greater part of the population of

New South Wales is south-east of the rising diagonal formed by the Murray River. With two exceptions, however, the population is mainly concentrated in a continuous strip from the eastern end of the Great Australian Bight in South Australia (roughly where the average annual rainfall is 15 inches) up through Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland to Cairns and Georgetown. The two exceptions are Tasmania, which is separated by the Bass Strait, and the more populous corner of Western Australia, which is separated by over 1,000 miles of desert from the populous area of South Australia. Since the Bass Strait is only 140 miles wide, it follows that one of the main problems of government is to maintain contact with Perth, which is 1,400 miles from Adelaide, while all the other capital cities are within a triangle whose largest side is about 1,000 miles. Western Australia was, in fact, the last State to be developed, the last to enter the Commonwealth, and the first (and indeed the only one) to ask to leave it.

One major problem Australia has avoided: its population is in very large measure culturally homogeneous. It is commonly said to be 98 per cent. of British origin, but statistics are no longer kept because of the difficulty of tracing origins in a country where endogamy is not practised. In 1933, 99.2 per cent. was stated to be of full-blood "European birth". Also, 86.33 per cent. were native Australians; and 10.7 per cent. of the remaining 13.7 per cent. were born in the British Isles. British culture, British social conventions, and the English language thus dominate the Commonwealth. The trade relations, too, are in large measure with the United Kingdom. In 1938-39, nearly 55 per cent. of the exports went to the United Kingdom and nearly 42 per cent. of the imports came from the United Kingdom. Other parts of the British Commonwealth sent nearly 18 per cent. of the imports and took 15 per cent. of the exports. Australia in substance exchanges her surplus agricultural produce for textiles, machinery and manufactured articles made in the United Kingdom.

Neither geography nor race divides Australia; nor, in the

long view, does history. The separateness which divided the six States so seriously that the Commonwealth was not established until 1900, and which maintains a federal system to this day, was due to causes which will appear, in the long run, insignificant. The distances are great, but not in an age accustomed to air travel; the differences of origin have long since disappeared; and the Australian thinks of himself primarily as an Australian, not as a citizen of his State. The seven legislatures and governments are of the same type, for, though the Commonwealth Constitution was modelled more closely on that of the United States than was the British North America Act, its essential characteristics are British. The political parties are national, like the trade unions which have given such strength to the Australian Labour Party. Moreover, the Labour Party has adopted, and seems likely to maintain, the policy of strengthening the Commonwealth at the expense of the States. It is true that so far the result has been small, for of the proposals for constitutional amendment which have been submitted to referenda in accordance with the Commonwealth Constitution, only three have been passed, and only one of these increased Commonwealth powers. Nevertheless, when one party consistently adopts a policy it must in due course influence the development of ideas, above all when it accords, as in this case, with the general sociological trend. The requirement for a successful referendum is high; there must be a majority in the Commonwealth and a majority in a majority of the States. Since more than half the electors are in New South Wales and Victoria, a good deal more than half is required for a favourable verdict. Meanwhile the powers of the States are more extensive than those of the Provinces of Canada, and difficulties of co-ordination inevitably arise.

New Zealand

New Zealand was discovered by the Dutchman, Abel Janszoon Tasman, in 1642, but the coast was explored in 1769 by Captain Cook, who showed that these were separate

islands and not part of Australia. Captain Cook took possession in the name of the British Crown, but in spite of this and various other hoistings of flags, it was not formerly annexed until 1840, when the British settlers entered into the Treaty of Waitangi with the Maori chiefs. For the next year New Zealand was a dependency of New South Wales, but in 1841 it became a separate colony. It was represented at the early conferences on Australian federation, but it did not join the Commonwealth, and in 1907 it was proclaimed a Dominion.

New Zealand looks so small on the map of the Pacific Ocean that one is apt to forget that it is over one thousand miles from tip to toe—North Cape to Stewart Island. South Island has roughly the same area as England and Wales and a population roughly the same as that of Sheffield. North Island is half as large again as Scotland and has a population roughly the same as that of Birmingham. The whole Dominion is slightly smaller than the British Isles, but its population is only about one-and-a-half millions. Of these some 82,000 are Maoris, people of Polynesian origin whose forbears were in occupation of the Islands when the Europeans arrived. There were fewer than 100,000 when the Europeans came, but the Maori wars, European disease, and the sale of lands reduced the number to 42,000 in 1896. The establishment of a definite Maori policy, a high birth-rate, and a substantial decline in the death-rate have produced a much greater rate of increase among the Maori than among the Europeans. There is some racial discrimination, but no colour bar in the South African sense. Inter-marriage, which began in the early days, has continued, and the proportion of pure-blooded Maori is likely to decline. The half-caste who lives as a European votes in the same constituencies and on the same basis as the European, while the pure-blooded Maori are represented by four elected members in the House of Representatives.

Apart from the Maori, the racial stock is almost entirely British. Moreover a large part of its population consists of recent immigrants, whose ties with "Home" remain strong. Not until 1925 did a native New Zealander become Prime Minister. This comparatively recent settlement means also

that New Zealanders as a body have no recollection of the difficulties of the early and middle parts of the nineteenth century. Happy is the land that has no history. New Zealand became aware of itself just when Great Britain was becoming aware of its colonies and was developing an Imperial sentiment. British-born New Zealanders found that they were not treated as raw and troublesome "colonials" but as equals returning home from another world where they had "made good". The patriotic sentiments which they had nourished as exiles found a response at "Home". They returned to their far-off Dominion confirmed in their faith.

Their constitution started in 1852 as a disjointed collection of isolated provinces, but the New Zealanders adapted it more and more closely to the British model. The Legislative Council is nominated by the Governor and functions much like the House of Lords. The House of Representatives is a small edition of the House of Commons, with its Government, its Opposition, its Speaker and its Whips. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet function much like their models. This is, indeed, the baby sister, proud of its big and successful brother, cherished as baby sisters often are. Nobody ever quarrels with New Zealand, and New Zealand never quarrels with anybody. As Professor Morrell has said,¹ a Prime Minister who sets out for an Imperial Conference, as in 1930, with "no complaints and no demands", is safe in feeling that he will be welcome.

New Zealand is not 'loyal to the Empire' because of any peculiar national virtue. Her stock is wholly British; her ways of life are British; the tone of her society is conservative; her short history has been one of close and friendly relationship with Great Britain. The spirit of criticism which in other Dominions occasionally leads politicians and exiles to put up Imperialist ninepins for the sake of knocking them down has had no grievances, substantial or sentimental, on which to feed. The general feeling of loyalty to the Imperial idea finds vent in an enthusiastic attachment to the Imperial Crown.

¹ *New Zealand*, p. 340.

The New Zealander's loyalty is not, however, pure sentiment. It is also good business. The climate is moist and temperate, with a small annual range of temperature which enables sheep and cattle to be pastured in the open all the year round. Its main products, therefore, are meat, wool, and dairy products, whose principal market is the United Kingdom. In a bad year, such as 1932, 90 per cent. of its exports go to the United Kingdom, while even in the best years the United Kingdom takes 75 per cent. If Australia and other Empire countries be included, the proportion varies from 82 per cent. to 94 per cent. In return New Zealand takes some 50 per cent. of its imports from the United Kingdom, and over 70 per cent. from the Empire as a whole. New Zealand is thus economically dependent on the United Kingdom, for its great farming industries would collapse if there were no overseas market. Its overseas trade was £70 per head in 1929 and more than £39 (New Zealand currency) even in 1932, while before the war it had returned to nearly £70 per head. There are, it is true, secondary industries, but they are essentially dependent upon a high standard of living maintained by the export trade.

South Africa

The British connection with South Africa began as part of the process of protecting India against the French. In the winter of 1794-5 the Netherlands were occupied by French troops and a Batavian Republic was proclaimed under French domination. It was clear that unless early action were taken the Cape would fall into French hands and the route to India be obstructed. With the authority of the Stadtholder, who had fled to England, British troops were sent to the Cape; but the Court of Policy there refused to recognize the Stadtholder's authority, and it had to be taken by force. It was retained until 1802 and restored to the Dutch by the Treaty of Amiens. Four years later, during the Napoleonic War, it was again taken, and for the same reason; but this time it was never returned, and was formally ceded to Britain by treaty in 1814.

It had been a Dutch colony since Jan van Riebek arrived in Table Bay in 1652. Cape Town itself was a cosmopolitan city to which Huguenots and German mercenaries had added their quota. With the British occupation came British settlers also, but they tended to stay in or near the coast.

With the British occupation, too, came British ideas. The conscience of the British people had been smitten by the treatment meted out—often, of course, by British people—to the people of Africa by the slave-traders and slave-drivers. Sierra Leone had been occupied in 1788, and had for its capital a town significantly named “Freetown”, in order to provide a refuge for emancipated slaves. In 1807 the slave trade was forbidden to all British subjects, and in 1833 the compulsory emancipation of slaves was effected by Imperial legislation and at the expense of the British taxpayer. The economic organization which the Dutch had established in Cape Colony was, however, based on slave labour.

Nor was this all. Great Britain had no desire for new colonies and did not propose to spend large sums in pushing British jurisdiction into the hinterland. Without doing so, however, it could not protect the Cape farmers in the frontier districts from cattle-raiding by the Bantus. Such raids were regarded by the Bantus as just retaliation for the taking of their tribal lands. The Bantus were accustomed to roam about the cattle-lands at their will. The area effectively occupied at any given time was necessarily small; and when the Cape farmer saw good grazing land unoccupied, he naturally thought that he could occupy it. His occupation, however, differed fundamentally from that of the Bantu. He fenced it and stocked it and kept out intruders. Even where Bantu tribal chiefs had permitted white men to use their tribal lands, the tribesmen necessarily regarded such action as encroachment. For many years the Government tried to prevent contact between the settled areas and the Bantus, but a small colony could not police such vast areas. In 1835 a mass movement of the Bantus in retaliation for a severe commando raid was followed by a decision to expel them; but the Governor's decision was reversed by the Imperial Government as unjust to the tribes

and the Governor himself was recalled. Not until 1846 was the land annexed, and then it did not form part of Cape Colony, but was administered by the chiefs under the Governor as High Commissioner and "Paramount Chief".

All this was quite contrary to colonial notions, especially those of the Boers, as the Afrikaner frontiersmen were called. They wanted land, and they hated all government. Above all, "starting with an endowment of the late seventeenth-century Calvinism and brought up for generations among slaves or Bushmen and Hottentot serfs, and latterly barbarians, they (Boers) held as firmly as any politician in the Carolinas that there was a divinely appointed gulf between themselves and such as these".¹ They therefore had no sympathy whatever with a Government which would not let them take land, insisted on governing, and even insisted on protecting the "natives". These causes produced the Great Trek, which led to the foundation of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. It led also to the conclusion that these States should hate the country which had taxed them, emancipated their slaves, cut off their cheap Bantu labour, protected their Hottentot servants, and generally acted the philanthropist to inferior peoples. The fundamental cause of the Great Trek was land-hunger; but British philanthropy also played a part.

Between 1834 and 1840 ten thousand men, women and children, mainly of Dutch extraction, braved the Chaka, the Matabele and the Zulu and trekked into the vast interior. The main body of the Great Trek moved down into Natal, where there was a small British settlement which the British Government, anxious to limit its commitments, had consistently refused to recognize. The coming of the Boers stirred up the Zulus and compelled Cape Colony to take action. The British Government at last consented to the recognition of the Natal settlement and its incorporation into Cape Colony. In 1844, however, it became a separate colony.

Meanwhile Jan Moeke, leader of the Boers north of the Orange River, had declared a republic in 1842, thus disturbing the Griquas on the west and the pre-trek farmers on the east.

¹ *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, Vol. VIII, p. 319.

In 1843 some of the latter petitioned to be included in the Natal settlement, but the Cape Governor did no more than conclude treaties with the tribes by which, in return for subsidies, they undertook to maintain order. By implication, the Colony undertook to give protection, and in 1845, when the usual trouble broke out with the Boers, a British force had to be sent to protect the tribes. In 1846-47 a new Kaffir war broke out, and as a result the boundaries of Cape Colony were taken up to the Orange River and the Governor became Paramount Chief of British Kaffraria. He also tried to persuade the Boers to return to Natal, but as they refused, British jurisdiction was proclaimed over the Orange River Sovereignty.

The position in 1850, therefore, was that there was a British colony at the Cape, partly English and partly Boer; another colony in Natal with a small British population; a third colony known as the Orange River Colony, but almost entirely Boer so far as its European population was concerned; and a state of anarchy in the Transvaal, where Boer sovereignty had been proclaimed but never made effective. Another Kaffir war in 1850 compelled Great Britain to reconsider the position. At the Sand River Convention in 1852 the independence of the Transvaal was recognized. At the Bloemfontein Convention of 1854 the British Government went even further and recognized the independence of the Orange Free State. These decisions did not imply only that the Boers were given two independent States; they also implied that Great Britain gave up the "Quixotic philanthropy" of trying to protect the tribes against the Boers hundreds of miles from Cape Town. "The grant of unequivocal independence to the Boers of the Transvaal and of the Orange River Territory abandoned a large native population to the attacks of land-hungry farmers who, intolerant of any form of equality between white and black, proceeded either to dispossess the natives of their land and to absorb them as servants, or to confine them to inadequate areas, substituting a nervous military control for the tribal government which the shock of contact with the Europeans had seriously and inevitably weakened."¹

¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. VIII, p. 392.

It is now clear that, in surrendering the Orange River Sovereignty, a mistake was made. Great Britain could not evade its responsibility by dividing South Africa. Though the tribes were different, the native problem was one from the northern boundary of Zululand to Basutoland on the east and Griqualand on the west. Any movement in or against the one travelled south or north and affected the other. Unrest in Zululand, stimulated by the Transvaalers, inevitably affected Natal directly and, by its repercussion in Basutoland, the Cape indirectly. The ideal of the Colonial Office was a naval base at Simonstown and a small British colony, with responsible government, at the Cape. It could not work. South Africa had become an indivisible whole through the spread of the whites, and Great Britain had either to accept direct responsibility or to create a self-governing colony from the Cape of Good Hope to as far north as white people might percolate.

It is to the credit of Sir George Grey, Governor of Cape Colony from 1854 to 1861, that by 1858 he had realized the position. When he was asked in that year to assist the Free State against the Basutos he refused to do so; but he sent home a despatch in which he insisted that the solution was a federation of the two colonies and the two republics with a form of government remarkably like Dominion status. The Colonial Office would have none of it. It thought that the proposal involved "either enormous expense or the independence of South Africa". The Colonial Office was, of course, quite correct. It had to choose between imposing its own native policy on the whole of South Africa, at enormous expense, or letting the South Africans combine and impose their own very different native policy. In the end the latter was chosen after nearly fifty years of conflict, involving two unfortunate, expensive and unnecessary wars.

Opinion in Great Britain had, in fact, changed by 1868. It was then seen that the policy of "limited liability" would not work. The only way to enable Great Britain to get rid of its responsibility was to confer responsibility on a federated South Africa. This, of course, involved allowing the South

Africans to determine native policy. The solution appeared, however, to be inevitable. The accession of the third Napoleon and the rising power of Bismarck's Germany compelled Great Britain to "look to her moat" and to withdraw as far as possible from imperial commitments. In 1867 the North American colonies had not only settled their differences but seemed likely to relieve Great Britain of her responsibility for defence. Local conditions in South Africa seemed to lead to the conclusion that a federated South Africa should follow the Canadian example. Cape Colony had a conflict between the English East and the Dutch West much as the Province of United Canada had been divided. The Orange Free State was on the verge of bankruptcy and the Transvaal had never got out of the state of anarchy created by the disputes of the Boers after the Great Trek. There were, besides, the perennial problems of native policy. Something had to be done about Basutoland because the activities of the Free State frontiersmen threatened a Basuto rising which would affect Cape Colony. Something had to be done about Zululand because the activities of the Transvaalers threatened a Zulu rising which would engulf Natal. In addition to all this, diamonds were discovered in Griqualand, which was no-man's-land so long as it was mostly arid waste, with a few wandering Griquas and a few frontiersmen at the springs. With the discovery of diamonds, a motley crowd of adventurers, mainly British, poured in. The Transvaal and the Free State claimed portions, while the tribes claimed British protection and the diggers clamoured for annexation.

This series of problems, combined with the growing menace in Europe, converted the British Government to Grey's policy of a South African federation, with responsible government, which of course carried the corollary that the South Africans—and not Great Britain—would determine native policy. The first step was the annexation of Basutoland in 1867-68, taken with much hesitation after the Basutos had twice appealed for annexation because of their war with the Free State. Basutoland was placed under the Governor of Cape Colony as High Commissioner, however, not as Governor;

that is, the Imperial Government and not the Cape Government assumed responsibility. When the problem of the diamond fields arose, the Colonial Office was prepared for annexation only if Cape Colony assumed the responsibility for government. Unfortunately, the Colonial Office was badly served by its local representatives. The new policy required that the two colonies should establish friendly relations with the two republics so that all four might join a self-governing federation. Sir Henry Barkly was sent as Governor in 1870 because he had had experience of colonial self-government in Australia. Concentrating on the issue of self-government for Cape Colony, he had too narrow a vision to make certain that the Griqualand problem was solved in such a way as to lead to, or at least not interfere with, South African federation. He secured a narrow majority for Cape self-government in 1872, but meanwhile he had estranged the Free State and caused the Transvaal to move closer to the Free State.

The Griqualand problem is involved. Its essence is that the Free State claimed part of Griqualand as its territory. The claim was ultimately found by a British court to be good, but meanwhile it looked bad. The claims of the tribes which appeared to be good, and which Great Britain therefore supported, were found to be based upon forged documents. The Free State eventually agreed that it did not want the diggings, which were occupied mainly by a British population, but compensation had to be paid. It is not that the annexation was bad policy, but that Barkly's manner of effecting it was bad policy. In fact, he went directly contrary to his instructions, for Griqualand West was not accepted by Cape Colony and had to be made into the third colony of South Africa. More important is the fact that the Free State was justifiably angry and that the Transvaal, having withdrawn its own claims, had supported the Free State. The dispute was part of the process by which, while the Colonial Office was developing the idea of a self-governing South Africa under the British flag, the Afrikaners developed the idea of an Afrikaner South Africa by which the British could be pushed into the

sea. Henceforth the native problem took second place and the essential difficulty of South Africa was the conflict between English and Dutch.

It is unnecessary to tell the tale of the next thirty years. The British annexation of the Transvaal in 1877 possibly saved the Transvaalers from annihilation by the Zulus, but the Zulu War nevertheless broke out, and the Transvaalers doubted whether they had been saved. Possibly an immediate grant of self-government would have brought the Transvaal willingly into the federation. It was delayed; and self-government was granted, not as elsewhere, willingly and freely, but after the Boers had rebelled and had defeated a British force at Majuba Hill. The Transvaal war completed the work of the Griqualand annexation by making the Afrikaners conscious of themselves as Afrikaners. There was a strong movement for "a united South Africa under our own (i.e. the Afrikaner) flag". Fortunately, the Cape produced statesmen who resented the tendency to split South Africans along racial lines. Just as, in Canada, Baldwin worked with Lafontaine and John A. Macdonald with Cartier, so in the Cape, Cecil Rhodes worked with Jan Hofmeyer, who realized that "the independence of South Africa was at the mercy of any Power which held the command of the sea"¹ and that there was never any question of turning the British out of the country. Accordingly, he concluded that South Africans of either descent must work together. Though Cecil Rhodes, for his part, was an "imperialist", he thought of South Africa, not as a colonial dependency of Great Britain, but as a nation in its own right. This nation could not be wholly Anglo-Saxon by race, and he therefore co-operated with the Afrikaners. Thus Hofmeyer the Afrikaner imperialist and Rhodes the British imperialist collaborated, until the Jameson raid, in the development of a united South Africa.

The way was certainly hard. Leaving aside the historic suspicions of the Transvaalers, which were reinforced by the Transvaal war, and the new suspicion of the Free State after the Griqualand incident, each of the four entities thought in

¹ *Ibid*, Vol. VIII, p. 308.

terms of its own narrow interests. The Transvaal taxed colonial produce and the Cape retaliated by taxing Transvaal tobacco. Natal began a tariff and railway war against the Cape. The coastal colonies refused to give tariff rebates to the Free State and the Transvaal. The Cape would not agree with South African free trade; President Kruger of the Transvaal wanted federation with the Free State, but would have nothing to do with the British Government or British traders; Natal flirted with the Transvaal to get trade through Durban. Rhodes did get, in 1888, a partial Customs Union with the Free State, and in 1889 a railway agreement. The final blow, however, was the outbreak of the Boer War. The discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand in 1886 converted the Transvaal from a poverty-stricken agricultural community to a wealthy State with a large urban population. Through Kruger welcomed the wealth, he did not welcome the Uitlanders. As in the Griqualand diamond mines, they were almost wholly British in sentiment, though many were South Africans from the Cape and Natal. They were not treated as Transvaalers, they were refused the franchise, and yet they were conscripted into the commandos. In other words, they had genuine grievances, though whether those grievances need have led to the Boer War is a matter on which historians dispute. The damage was done, actually, by the Jameson raid. The Rhodes-Hofmeyer combination was broken at the Cape; Natal, which had at last voted for responsible government in 1893, decided against South African federation; everywhere Afrikaner opinion was consolidated and the union of the two sections of the people broken.

The Boer War was the cause of much suffering in South Africa. It did, however, solve the country's major problem. After 1902 there was no doubt that union or federation must come, and under the British flag. Whatever may be thought of Lord Milner's imperial policy, he and his "young men" did an excellent piece of social rehabilitation. The main work was done, however, by the leaders of the Boer commandos, especially Botha, Smuts and Hertzog. They were fortunate in that the Liberal Government of 1906, coming into power

on a wave of reaction to the Boer War, had no doubt that self-government and federation were the solution. Self-government was granted immediately to the Transvaal and Orange River Colony (1906-1907). The main issue, the relations between these territories and the older colonies, having been settled, events moved quickly. The British had wanted a federal, self-governing South Africa since the 'seventies. The Dutch saw that in a union they would have a majority. The war had not settled the problems of customs and railways. With the pacification of the tribes, their growing preference for money wages in place of cattle, and the break-up of the tribal system, the native problem was much less insistent, but it existed still. There was, in fact, a rebellion in Natal in 1906 and martial law had again to be proclaimed in Zululand in 1907.

The immediate causes of union were, however, the problems of customs and railways. The railways of the Transvaal and the Orange River were operated as a unit, and customs barriers had been abolished in 1903. There were still many difficulties to be overcome. Agreements about railways were reached at a conference at Pretoria in 1905, but the only resolution with which all four colonies eventually agreed was that unification was the solution. The new Transvaal Government also denounced the customs agreement and another conference was summoned to meet in Pretoria in 1908. This conference failed to reach agreement, except on a resolution that an early union under the British Crown was essential and that the legislatures be asked to send delegates to a National Convention. This Convention met in Durban in October, 1908, the Cape being represented by twelve members, the Transvaal by eight, and Natal and the Orange River by five each. Southern Rhodesia sent three delegates with a "watching brief". The delegation from Natal was wholly British and that from Orange River wholly Afrikaner. Taking the twenty delegates from the Cape and the Transvaal together, there were twelve Afrikaners and eight British. The Afrikaners were thus in a majority; but it made no difference, for it does not appear that divisions were on racial lines. The British knew that

the union or federation must be predominantly Afrikaner, and the Afrikaners that they could not get along without the British. Moreover the Transvaal delegates came to the conference with an agreed scheme drawn up by General Smuts.

The proposals made since 1856 had generally envisaged a federal South Africa, a federal State in which each of the four colonies would retain its identity. There was a strong section of opinion, however, which wanted union. This section thought that in the United States the federal authorities had not had sufficient powers, and that sectionalism had led to the Civil War. Lawyers like Sir Henry de Villiers (afterwards Lord de Villiers and Chief Justice of the Union) and General Smuts disliked the legal controversies which had arisen in Canada and had resulted in numerous appeals to the Privy Council. The weight of opinion in the Transvaal favoured union. The Cape was equally strong for union, once its franchise—which admitted the coloured people—was protected. The smaller colonies were much more reluctant. Orange River Colony came round when it was assured of equal representation in the Senate and a minimum representation for ten years in the House of Assembly. Natal, with its huge coloured population and its wholly English tradition, held firmly to federation, not wishing to be swamped by the burghers of the Cape and the Transvaal and not desiring to learn Afrikaans. In the end, however, it accepted the decision, rather than be left out and lose the gains to be derived from railway traffic from the Transvaal. The four colonies thus became provinces of the Union with powers larger than those of municipalities, but subject always to the legislative supremacy of the Union Parliament.

Whereas Canada and Australia had no reason to fear opposition from Whitehall, there was doubt in the case of South Africa. The settlement required Parliament to enact the colour bar, a requirement for which there was no precedent. The Cape franchise was protected by the rule that it could not be altered except by a two-thirds majority—by which it was in fact altered when the South Africa Party under General

Smuts formed a coalition with the Nationalist Party under General Hertzog. In the other provinces, however, a purely white franchise was established. Much as this was disliked in Great Britain, there was no alternative. Self-government in South Africa implied that the South Africans would determine native policy. The South Africans had insisted upon the colour bar but had accepted a careful compromise over the Cape franchise. The British Government could do no more than accept likewise.

The problem was not quite so difficult in relation to the Imperial territories which had not been incorporated in the colonies because they were kept as reserves for the tribes—Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. The British Government insisted that special provision be made for them if and when they were handed over. They never have been handed over, and control is vested in a High Commissioner. The South Africa Act was passed by Parliament in 1909 and took effect in 1910, when General Botha of the Transvaal became Prime Minister.

The Union of South Africa was thus the only Dominion which had not an "English" majority. It is also the only Dominion in which the great mass of the people, the non-Europeans, take no effective part in the government. It is estimated that in 1944 the population was eleven million, of whom 2,300,000 were European. Of the Europeans, 60 per cent. are probably Afrikaner, though all the younger people are bilingual. Afrikaans, the language of the Afrikanders, is a variety of Dutch; but, having been cut off from close relations with Holland for 140 years, it has developed on lines of its own and has a distinct, though small, literature. The system of law is Roman-Dutch, which has long since disappeared in Holland itself, but South African law has been strongly influenced by English law especially in matters of evidence and commerce.

History supplies the Afrikaner with no sentimental reasons for desiring to maintain a connection with Great Britain. He has, however, loyally accepted the settlement of 1909, whereby the Union became a Dominion under the Crown, and

the maintenance of this settlement prevents politics from becoming a conflict between the English and the Afrikaner. Just as the French in Canada provide the balance of power, so the English minority in South Africa determines which section of Afrikaners shall govern the Union. The economic relations with Great Britain and the rest of the Commonwealth, too, are close. In 1939, 42 per cent. of the imports came from Great Britain and 37 per cent. of the exports went there. If the rest of the Commonwealth be included, the percentages are 53 and 53 respectively. The Union is not only within the "sterling area"; it is indeed one of its most important units, for it is one of the great gold-producing areas of the world. In Simonstown and Durban, too, are great naval bases used regularly—and above all when the Mediterranean is closed—by the Royal Navy.

Southern Rhodesia

Rhodesia was the territory in central Africa, north of the Transvaal, controlled by the British South Africa Company. That part of it south of the Zambezi River is, however, suitable for white settlement, and in 1922 its white inhabitants voted for responsible government. Accordingly, the country was annexed to the Crown in 1923 and responsible government, subject to certain limitations on native policy, established. Its population in 1941 consisted of nearly one-and-a-half million people, of whom 69,000 were European. The Roman-Dutch law of the Union of South Africa is the basis of its legal system, and most of its trade is with the United Kingdom, the Union of South Africa, and Northern Rhodesia.

Southern Rhodesia is a self-governing colony and not a Dominion. It is not a Dominion for two reasons: first, because it is so small; and, secondly, because Great Britain desires to retain some control over native policy. The colony exhibits once more the dilemma of South Africa. Either the Imperial Government must retain control until, in the distant future, the "natives" are capable of sharing in the government of

the country or it must give self-government to white inhabitants who, in self-protection, prevent the natives from receiving that development which would enable them to take control. In the Union the second solution was eventually chosen. In Southern Rhodesia, which is really an extension of the Union, much the same policy is being followed.

The limitations on complete self-government are as follows:

- (1) The following classes of Bills must be reserved for the royal assent (which means that the Imperial Government decides whether or not they shall become law:)
 - (a) any law, save in respect of the supply of arms, ammunition or liquor to natives, whereby natives may be subjected or made liable to any conditions, disabilities or restrictions to which persons of European descent are not also subjected or made liable;
 - (b) any law repealing or amending the Constitution;
 - (c) any law constituting a Second Chamber;
 - (d) any law altering or amending or inconsistent with the Land Apportionment Act, 1930.
- (2) Acts passed by the legislature may be disallowed by the King (i.e. the Imperial Government).
- (3) A restriction similar to that in (1) (a) is imposed on subordinate legislation, unless the previous consent of the Secretary of State for the Dominions has been obtained.
- (4) No Act of the legislature may amend the provisions above—except that in (2)—as any of the provisions relating to native administration, which is dealt with in full detail.

Eire

The origin of the Irish Free State, now called Eire, has already been described. Unlike the others, it became a Dominion at one fell swoop by Act of Parliament giving effect to "the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland". The Constitution which resulted was approved both by Dail Eireann and by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, the latter approving in the Irish Free State (Constitution) Act, 1922. This Constitution provided for its own amendment, but no such amendment could alter the "Treaty", which was made part of the Constitution. According to the Irish interpretation, the Irish Free State Constitution took its legal authority from Dail Eireann. According to the British interpretation it took its authority from the Imperial Act. When the Statute of Westminster empowered a Dominion to amend Imperial legislation, however, the Irish interpretation veered round, for the British interpretation now authorized Dail Eireann to amend the "Treaty". It thus became possible for Dail Eireann, with the consent of the people at a referendum, to enact a new Constitution which took no account of the "Treaty" at all.

The Constitution of Eire, which came into operation in 1937, is essentially republican in form. It declares that "Ireland is a sovereign, independent, democratic State". It establishes a national flag and declares that Irish and English are the national languages. (In 1936, 14 per cent. of the people spoke Irish and 99.4 per cent. spoke English.) There is no mention of the King or of British nationality. It is declared that "the sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State is hereby vested in the Oireachtas: no other legislative authority has power to make laws for the State." Further, war shall not be declared and the State shall not participate in any war, save with the assent of Dail Eireann. There is, however, an indirect reference to the British Commonwealth of Nations in Article 29(4)2°:

For the purpose of the exercise of any executive function of the State in, or in connection with its external relations,

the Government may to such extent and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be determined by law, avail or adopt any organ, instrument, or method of procedure used or adopted for the like purpose by the members of any group or league of nations with which the State is or becomes associated for the purpose of international co-operation in matters of common concern.

The law in question is the Executive Authority (External Relations) Act, 1936, which provides in section 3 (1) as follows:

It is hereby declared and enacted that, so long as Saorstát Éireann is associated with the following nations, that is to say, Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand and South Africa, and so long as the King recognized by those nations as the symbol of their co-operation continues to act on behalf of each of those nations (on the advice of the several Governments thereof) for the purposes of the appointment of diplomatic and consular representatives and the conclusion of international agreements, the King so recognized may, and is hereby authorized to, act on behalf of Saorstát Éireann for the like purposes as and when advised by the Executive Council so to do.

The same Act provided for the abdication of Edward VIII and the succession of George VI as if Edward VIII had died unmarried.

The legal problems of Éire can be solved quite simply if it be remembered that there are two systems of law involved, that of Éire and that of the United Kingdom. By the law of Éire, an Irish citizen is an Irish citizen and nothing more; by the law of the United Kingdom he is (almost invariably) a British subject also. By the law of Éire the Parliament of the United Kingdom cannot legislate for Éire; by the law of the United Kingdom it can, though in accordance with section 4 of the Statute of Westminster it would not do so except at the request of Éire. There is some doubt about a declaration of war, but it is probably true that, according to the law of the

United Kingdom as well as that of Eire, the King can declare war on behalf of the United Kingdom without declaring war on behalf of Eire. This conflict of laws, where it arises, may cause difficulties, but they can usually be solved by the exercise of a little tolerance. So far as Eire is concerned, the United Kingdom may be the source of all the wrongs since the Saxons landed in Britain; but she is also Eire's first line of defence and her best customer. Before the war she took some 75 per cent. of her exports and supplied Eire with 50 per cent. of her imports. The total value of exports was over £22 million, and no other country took as much as one million pounds. The Irish pound, too, is "tied" to sterling.

CHAPTER THREE

RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT

IT is sometimes assumed that, having lost the thirteen American colonies, Great Britain sat down in sackcloth and ashes, confessed her sins, resolved to be good ever after, and conferred responsible government on everybody. She did nothing of the kind. Indeed, the American colonies had not asked for responsible government. They knew nothing of it, though they knew a great deal about the corrupt Cabinet system of George III. Responsible government was first asked for in Canada after the Reform Act of 1832 had established responsible government on a firm basis in Great Britain. The device is simple, though it is not quite so simple in its operation. The conduct of affairs is vested in a Cabinet whose leaders are chosen from, and remain members of, the majority in the elected assembly. The King, or the Governor-General, sends for the leader of the majority and invites him to form an administration. He chooses colleagues who have the "confidence" of the assembly and, so long as they keep their majority, executive and legislature act in sympathy, the one supporting the other. It was for this that Canada asked over a hundred years ago; it was for this that Ceylon asked a few years ago.

The person who introduced it to the colonies, however, was the fourth Earl of Durham, "Radical Jack", the emissary of the Whig Government which was just dying a slow death when he issued his famous Report in 1839. Of that great galaxy of documents enshrined in the British Parliamentary Papers, the Durham Report was undoubtedly the most pregnant. It was the bible of the new imperialism, the imperialism which discovered that colonies could govern themselves and yet remain colonies. "Radical Jack" was sent to Canada in 1837 because, though Canada had been divided

in 1791 and both parts given representative legislatures, the system was working badly. There was a minor rebellion in Lower Canada (Quebec) and a skirmish by a wild politician and a handful of men in Upper Canada (Ontario). "Radical Jack" was given power to put things right; but he was soon at cross-purposes with the Home Government and resigned after five months. Meanwhile he had written, or supervised the writing of, his famous Report.

His first propositions remind us of more modern problems. The difficulty in Canada, he asserted, was the conflict of races. The British policy had sought to divide them, though he said at once that the policy had not been carried out. Instead of keeping Lower Canada wholly French, English settlers had been allowed to establish themselves there. His policy was to swamp the French by the English, and for this purpose to unite the two Canadas. Constitutional reforms would not settle the matter: "At the root of the disorder of Lower Canada, lies the conflict of the two races . . . until that is settled, no good government is practicable; for whether the political institutions be reformed or left unchanged, whether the powers of the Government be entrusted to the majority or the minority, we may rest assured, that while the hostility of the races continues, whichever of them is entrusted with power, will use it for partial purposes". Nevertheless, all the North American Provinces had very similar constitutions, and they all terminated in "pretty nearly the same result". There must, therefore, also have been some defect in the form of government common to all.

That defect was that "the natural state of government in all these colonies is that of collision between the executive and the representative body. . . . The Government is constantly proposing measures which the majority of the Assembly reject, and refusing its assent to bills which that body has passed." At this point it becomes important that the Earl of Durham was "Radical Jack", and the envoy of a Whig Government. Had he been a Tory he might have advised "strong measures". Being a Radical, he produced all the Whig prejudices against "irresponsible government". "Since the

Revolution of 1688, the stability of the English constitution has been secured by that wise principle of our Government which has vested the direction of the national policy, and the distribution of patronage, in the leaders of the Parliamentary majority." That is not history, though it may be Whig history; but it is certainly Whig politics. "It is difficult to understand how any English statesman could have imagined that representative and irresponsible government could be successfully combined." Of course, it depends on the statesman. Even Disraeli, who began as a Radical, had recently written a pamphlet extolling the "mixed" constitution in which the powers of the irresponsible and irremovable Crown were set out in all their glory. The views of "Radical Jack" would not have been accepted by the statesmen, if they can be called so, who let George III lose America. Still, the way of the reformer is to pretend that he is stating the obvious. Responsible government was urged by Lord Durham in pained surprise that anybody should think anything else was possible.

Nevertheless—and this point is generally forgotten—Lord Durham did not suggest that all powers of government should be exercised by the Governor on the advice of responsible Ministers. There were substantial limitations. The Imperial Government should determine "the Constitution of the form of government—the regulation of foreign relations, and of trade with the mother country, the other British Colonies, and foreign nations—and the disposal of the public lands. . . . A perfect subordination, on the part of the Colony, on these points, is secured by the advantages, which it finds in the continuation of its connection with the Empire." In other respects, the policy of the colony must be determined by the colonists:

The colonists may not always know what laws are best for them, or which of their countrymen are the fittest for conducting their affairs; but, at least, they have a greater interest in coming to a right judgment on these points, and will take greater pains to do so, than those whose welfare

is very remotely and slightly affected by the good or bad legislation of these portions of the Empire. If the Colonists make bad laws, and select improper persons to conduct their affairs, they will generally be the only, always the greatest sufferers; and, like the people of other countries, they must bear the ills which they bring on themselves, until they choose to apply the remedy.

There, in a paragraph, is the case for colonial self-government.

A proposal so radical might easily have passed into the limbo of the forgotten. The major proposal, after all, was to unite the Canadas and swamp the French; and if this alone had been proposed, the Durham Report would have gone into the history books as a futile document; for the union of the Canadas was a failure and the French have never shown the slightest sign of being swamped. It happened, though, that a change of colonial policy was on the way. The colonies had been tied to the mother country by strict commercial regulations which gave Great Britain a monopoly of much of their trade, though at the same time they had a preference in the British market. Adam Smith had shown sixty years before that neither monopolies nor preferences paid. He had suggested that complete commercial freedom be given to the colonies. Slowly his ideas were accepted by the politicians. From the beginning of the nineteenth century there were relaxations. In 1846 the Corn Laws were repealed and Canada lost her preference over American wheat. In 1849 the last of the monopoly laws was repealed. It is no coincidence that between those dates the North American colonies received the responsible government that Lord Durham had advised.

There were difficulties about it. The doctrinaires could not see how the Queen could be advised by two sets of Ministers. Suppose her British Ministers decided one way and her Canadian Ministers the opposite? However, there was a slow development from 1839. In 1847 the new Lieutenant-Governor of Nova Scotia was quietly instructed to put into

operation "that system of parliamentary government which has long prevailed in the mother country". The new Governor-General of Canada had even more positive instructions. So responsible government went to North America, by a phrase in a Governor's pocket. The change of atmosphere was immediate. In his election address Baldwin, who became in effect the first Prime Minister of United Canada, said:

"We shall have no more representatives of the sovereign making the doctrines of the Charleses and the Jameses the standard by which to govern British subjects in the nineteenth century . . . henceforth their viceregal governments will be distinguished by adherence to the principles acknowledged by all parties in England—principles which will relieve Her Majesty's representative from the invidious position of the head of a party and will render him . . . a living spirit, and the connecting link which binds this great colony to the parent state in affectionate and prosperous union."

It is nevertheless true, as Lord Durham had pointed out, that political devices do not destroy fundamental conflicts. Responsible government was no doubt the Canadian answer to everything from 1837 to 1847, but from 1854 to 1864 it was shown not to be an answer at all. Responsible government requires responsible men, men who will subordinate sectional interests to material advantages. Canada had much to learn, and Canada learned eventually, when John A. Macdonald of Canada West (Ontario) joined Etienne Cartier of Canada East (Quebec) to form the Liberal-Conservative party which eventually created the great Canadian Dominion. It is a commentary on Lord Durham's plan to swamp the French that the decisions were taken in Quebec with a French-Canadian presiding and an Anglo-French coalition leading the discussions.

When Great Britain accepts a policy, there is no further hesitation about it. During the 'forties there were numerous

controversies in Australia. There were constitutional discussions in which attempts were made to draw a distinction between "local interests" and "Imperial interests". They ended in 1855 when Tasmania, New South Wales and Victoria received constitutions which implied responsible government; South Australia followed in 1856; and Queensland became a colony with responsible government in 1859. Western Australia made no request until 1887; but in 1890 it, too, received responsible government. In New Zealand, matters went even more quickly. In 1840 it was annexed, in 1856 it had responsible government. In South Africa it was the British Government which pressed because it wished to limit its commitments. Cape Colony at length accepted responsible government in 1872 and Natal in 1893.

A new Empire had been founded, an Empire of a new type, an Empire in which Her Majesty the Queen had not one responsible government but, at her Jubilee in 1887, no less than seventeen—United Kingdom, Newfoundland, the Dominion of Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, British Columbia, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, Queensland, New Zealand and Cape Colony—and it was at the Jubilee that the British people became aware of the fact and decided that they were fine fellows after all. To-day there are twenty-four; for though Newfoundland and Cape Colony must be removed from the list, the Commonwealth of Australia, Western Australia, the Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Eire, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Northern Ireland must be added.

The Conditions of Success

"Patriotism," said Edith Cavell, "is not enough." Nor is responsible government. It is characteristic of all colonies that demand responsible government that, so long as it is withheld, Great Britain is the major enemy. She is, indeed, a very convenient enemy, for the hostility towards her which develops

more strongly as the demands become more vociferous serves to mask the conflicts of opinion and the divergencies of interest among those who shout the loudest. The essential problems of a colony are not its relations with Great Britain, but the social and economic conditions of the colony itself. Self-government provides no bread-and-butter or rice-and-curry; it is not true, as is often alleged, that communal differences disappear when "the third party", as Gandhiji called her, is out of the way; the leopard does not lie down with the sambhur when the rogue elephant leaves. This is no reason for refusing self-government; it is indeed a reason for advancing it. The very fact that Great Britain becomes the enemy makes it to Britain's advantage to shorten the period of tutelage; the fact that attention is diverted from social and economic problems by attacks on Great Britain makes it desirable that the irrelevancy should be removed. As Lord Durham himself said, the colonists must bear the ills that they bring on themselves until they choose to apply the remedy. They cannot apply the remedy until they realize the ills from which they suffer.

It is no doubt true that good government is not a substitute for self-government, but most colonies have discovered also that self-government does not necessarily produce good government. Twice in the British Commonwealth responsible government has broken down completely. Of Newfoundland enough has been said: there can be no greater degradation than for a Dominion to request Great Britain to withdraw self-government. Malta's experience was shorter and stormier. Responsible government, subject to immaterial restrictions, was conferred at Malta's request in 1921. Its Constitution was based on the best precedents. By 1927 the two Chambers were in conflict; by 1929 the Government was in conflict with the Holy See; by 1930 it was attacking the Supreme Court; later in the same year the Constitution was suspended and a Royal Commission was sent out. An amended Constitution was brought in in 1932, but a new conflict arose over official languages, a conflict which was at once a conflict of nationalism and a conflict of classes. By November, 1933, the Constitution

was virtually suspended; and since 1936 Malta has enjoyed—if that is the word—Crown Colony government. It was not that the Maltese were incapable of self-government; it was only that responsible government implied a set of conventions governing the relations between opposing parties that they were not willing to adopt. In England there was a time when a defeated Minister risked impeachment; now we give him the title of Leader of the Opposition and a pension charged on the Consolidated Fund. We have learned in the course of three hundred years that the Opposition also is part of the parliamentary system of government.

These precedents from Newfoundland and Malta serve as warnings. There are others to serve as examples. United Canada welcomed self-government in 1847; but from 1854 to 1864 it showed that responsible government was not enough. The English had taught the French to form parties, but had not themselves learned that parties are merely groups of patriotic people aiming at the same ends by different means. French Canada remained more French than Canadian, and as a consequence some of the men in English Canada became anti-Catholic and anti-French. Baldwin, of Canada West, found wild men on his right; Lafontaine, his partner in East Canada, and his successors found wild men on their left. Eventually John A. Macdonald of Canada West and Etienne Cartier of Canada East formed the great Liberal-Conservative party; but even that combination could not solve the problems arising from the uneasy partnership of French and English Canada. The solution was found in a federated Dominion stretching from sea to sea, including French-Canadian Quebec as one of its autonomous Provinces. Thirty years later, the Dominion of Canada had a French-Canadian Prime Minister.

The solution to the Canadian problem was the exact reverse of Lord Durham's, the recognition that the French-Canadian demand for *notre langue, nos institutions, et nos lois*, had to be met. Provided that was done, no conflict need arise between French and English Canada; and when it was done it became possible for Dominion politics to be based not on race,

religion or language, but on issues on which the French as well as the English would divide. Lord Elgin, the first Governor-General under responsible government, tried to teach the English-Canadians the lesson that unless they won Quebec they could not govern Canada, but it was John A. Macdonald ten years later who learned the lesson, and it is now fundamental to Canadian politics. Once only has a party won a majority in Canada without winning a majority in Quebec. Yet Quebec alone is not enough: it is the majority of the French in combination with some English-speaking sections which wins the Dominion.

Australia, too, has had her troubles. The Australian colonies had no real political parties capable of working responsible government as it was worked in Great Britain. There were "leaders" who had "followers" who collectively were called "parties", but they argued about personalities and not about principles. The result was instability. Between 1856 and 1900 South Australia had forty-two Ministries, New South Wales had twenty-nine, and Victoria twenty-eight. There were no Lord Elgins to help them through their teething troubles and no John A. Macdonalds to bring in a larger vision. It was only with the establishment of the Commonwealth, when wider issues were necessarily brought before the combined electorate, that responsible government settled down. Even so, there were thirteen Ministries in the first seventeen years and ten Ministries only in the next twenty-five. The rise of the Australian Labour Party, in fact, put Australian politics on a firm economic basis.

The Union of South Africa shows most clearly, however, how responsible government depends on the men who operate it. What Rhodes and Hofmeyer did for Cape Colony through their realization that the Colony could be governed only by mutual toleration of British and Boer has already been emphasized. They could not and did not prevent the Boer War. The Liberal Government in Great Britain in 1906 fortunately realized that the only hope for South Africa lay in the South Africans themselves, and at the Durban Convention of 1907 the Boer generals sat down with the politicians

of the Cape and Natal to hammer out a unitary constitution in which Boer and Briton could combine. The generals proved that they were also statesmen, and Generals Botha and Smuts—rebel generals according to English law—were among the ablest leaders that the British Commonwealth has thrown up. In 1917 a British Prime Minister summoned a Boer general to help win the war as a member of his War Cabinet.

It must not be thought, however, that the wise generosity of 1906 had removed all sense of grievance or fused the British and the Afrikaner into one people. Animosities do not die so easily, especially when witness is borne to them every day by differences of language. The internal problem was necessarily mixed with the external problem, for the forms of Dominion relationship suggested a subservience to the Britain which had, after many defeats, won the last victory as Britain has a habit of doing. Fortunately the external problem proved easy of solution; and General Hertzog, who had been carried to power in 1924 on the tide of Afrikaner sentiment, declared himself satisfied after the Imperial Conference of 1926. The internal problem became more acute almost immediately, however, because of controversy over the creation of a Union flag. Nevertheless, statesmanship prevailed, and the Union now flies the national flag as the symbol of national loyalty, and the Union Jack as the symbol of membership of the Commonwealth. Nor was this the last evidence of the spirit of compromise. The economic difficulties of 1933 created a Coalition Government with General Hertzog as Prime Minister and General Smuts as second in command, which not only saw the Union through the great depression, but also settled the constitutional issues in the Status of the Union Act, 1934, and, later, the old controversy over native policy. There are still controversies in South Africa, and the old animosities have not been completely forgotten: but the Union has made such a success of responsible government as nobody in 1906 would have dared to prophesy.

Responsible government is not easily worked, even among a people so homogeneous as the English, the Welsh, the Scots

and Ulstermen have become. It works only because of mutual tolerance and understanding, and because it is realized that sectional interests have to be submerged in the larger patriotism. Where these sectional interests are strengthened by ancestral loyalties, differences of religion, and varieties of language, it becomes even more difficult; yet it can succeed even then. Malta failed, but Canada and South Africa have succeeded; and perhaps now that Malta has been through the valley of the shadow and emerged triumphant, she too will learn from the great Dominions that responsible government spells tolerance and compromise. The great test of responsible government will come, however, farther East, in India and Pakistan and Ceylon, where civilizations are older, religions more diverse, and languages more numerous.

The Extension of Responsible Government

Lord Durham thought of responsible government as applying to internal matters only. He excluded from it all external relations and he mentioned particularly the form of government, the disposal of public lands, the relations of trade, and the conduct of external affairs. When one responsible government has been established, however, its area tends inevitably to become enlarged. It is not practicable, as the British Government pointed out to the Australian colonies in 1850, and as Malta showed in 1930, to divide internal from external affairs. They react the one upon the other. Even language policy, as Malta proved, can create diplomatic controversies. The control of tariffs, as Canada pointed out in 1871, is an essential part of internal economic policy. The control of immigration is essentially a matter of external policy, but it is equally a part of internal economic policy. It has therefore proved impossible to maintain Lord Durham's distinction; and all aspects of policy, external as well as internal, have gradually come under Dominion control.

Control over constitutional machinery disappeared very

soon. When new Constitutions were given to the colonies of Australia and New Zealand in the 'fifties, they were given power to amend them subject, in some cases, to reference to Great Britain. The Canadian Constitution of 1867 contains no power of amendment and all efforts to find an agreed process have broken down owing to the reluctance of Quebec to allow a Canadian majority—which may be an English-Canadian majority—to modify its provincial autonomy. Canada, therefore, has still to ask the Parliament of the United Kingdom to enact amendments of the Canadian Constitution. The Commonwealth Constitution of 1900, however, provides for its amendment in Australia, and no reference need be made to Great Britain. The few limitations which existed in South Africa and Eire in 1930 were swept away by the Statute of Westminster. These were special cases, however, and all colonies with representative legislatures have had power of constitutional amendment since 1865, provided that amending laws are passed in such "manner and form" as may be required by the Constitution.

The problems of tariff control became easier when Great Britain accepted the principles of free trade. Control of customs legislation was conceded generally in 1857, and when free trade Britain protested against Canadian tariffs in 1871 it was very properly rapped over the knuckles. Control over immigration was allowed to the Australian colonies by 1862, even though Great Britain could not approve of the "White Australia" policy which they wished to apply and that policy might lead to international difficulties. Australia's economic problems compelled Great Britain to give up control over Crown lands before 1870. By 1911 responsible government really included everything except defence and external relations and certain matters, including British nationality and merchant shipping, which were covered by Imperial legislation. By 1914 the Dominions could, in fact if not in form, make their own commercial treaties, and by 1920 all aspects of policy, external as well as internal, had come under Dominion control.

In 1926, therefore, Great Britain and the Dominions were able to lay down a general proposition in the famous Balfour Declaration:

They are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Like most general statements, this Declaration asks more questions than it answers. It was admitted, too, that there were many relics of past subordination. Some of them, indeed, subsist in some Dominions to this day. The task of removing these relics, where they were felt to be an impediment to Dominion nationalism, was undertaken between 1926 and 1931, and the legal powers necessary for their removal were conferred by the Statute of Westminster in 1931. The extent to which those powers have been used, however, varies from Australia and New Zealand, where they have not been used at all, to Eire, where they have been used in the fullest measure. Before these variations are considered, however, it is necessary to ask a more fundamental question, why the Dominions should remain within the British Commonwealth of Nations at all. If they are autonomous communities, how can they be part of an Empire, and why should they remain associated, even freely?

We may note in passing the confusion of terms. "Empire" like "Colony" has become a word of sinister connotation. Even in Great Britain itself to be an "imperialist" is to raise suggestions of Colonel Blimp and Poona wallahs. Elsewhere it is frankly a term of abuse. When the ardent nationalist runs short of arguments he accuses his opponent of being an "imperialist". Words are the missiles of politics, and "imperialist" is constantly being thrown in the most unlikely directions. There is thus a tendency for "Empire" to be superseded by "British Commonwealth of Nations"; but

nobody knows exactly whether this includes only Great Britain and the Dominions or all the associated territories from Hong Kong to St. Helena as well. Mr. Churchill made confusion worse confounded by combining the two phrases into "British Commonwealth and Empire", which implied, in some environments at least, that it was a Commonwealth for the seventy-five million "Europeans" and an Empire for the other five hundred millions.

CHAPTER FOUR

FREE ASSOCIATION

MAN cannot live by bread alone, but he finds it difficult to live without cereals. At the other extreme patriotism is not enough, but it is difficult to maintain a political entity without it. Sentiment and material interest commonly go together, and nothing is more difficult than to separate motives. It might be said that the Scot became a good Briton because it paid him, whereas the Irishman did not because it did not; or it might be said that the Scot possessed a larger patriotism while the Irishman's affections could not cross the Irish Sea. What can be said with truth is that the peoples of the United Kingdom, as at present constituted, have attained in the course of centuries a unity of purpose, a common loyalty, and a tradition of national service which is hardly surpassed in any other country. Whatever controversies be raging, at the first sign of danger the ranks are closed; however wide be the divergencies of racial origin, of cultural tradition, and even of language, we all know that we can rely on our own people; however broad our sympathies and international our outlook, it is assumed that the first duty is to the nation.

This patriotic sentiment is, of course, deliberately fomented. It has, strangely enough, few of the insignia of nationalism. Though nearly everybody speaks English, the first people in the British Isles to declare that English was an official language were, by an irony of history, the Irish. There is, strictly speaking, no national flag; for the Union Jack is merely a flag to be flown, in certain circumstances, by the ships of the Royal Navy. On the one hand it is a flag which any British subject may very properly fly; on the other he may fly any other flag (subject to some limitations) he pleases. If he wishes to show his particular loyalty to England or Wales or Scotland or Eire or South Africa or India, nobody raises objections.

Then, too, we have no national anthem. It is true that the hymn *God Save the King* is sung wherever British subjects are gathered together, but it says nothing whatever about Great Britain or the United Kingdom. It is true also that *Rule Britannia* and *Land of Hope and Glory* are sometimes sung, but they have less official status than *Land of our Fathers*, or *O, Canada*, or *Advance Australia*. We have, indeed, no name for a citizen of the United Kingdom. The Americans call him a "Britisher", but he calls himself nothing at all. He may be an Englishman, a Welshman, a Scot or an Irishman; or he may be a British subject—but this may also include a Canadian, a South African, a Bengali, a Malay, or a Fijian.

There is significance in all this. On the one hand there is no country in the world that can surpass the national tradition of the United Kingdom; on the other hand the citizen of the United Kingdom shares that tradition with British subjects wherever they may be and whatever be their race, creed, language, colour, class or caste. There are five hundred million British subjects, every one of whom may, if he pleases, fly the Union Jack, sing the National Anthem, seek the protection of the officials of the Crown, carry a British passport, become a candidate for election to the House of Commons, or aspire to a peerage. There are occasions when the law differentiates between a person resident or domiciled in the United Kingdom and a person not resident or domiciled in the United Kingdom; but in principle no distinction is drawn. There is no British race, no British language (in the British Isles themselves six languages are spoken), and no British religion (the Church of England is "established" in England and the Church of Scotland in Scotland, but no Church is established elsewhere, even in Wales). There is, however, a British nationality shared by five hundred million people of all races, languages, and religions.

The extent to which these five hundred million British subjects share the patriotic sentiments of the forty-six million people of the United Kingdom, however, varies enormously. In the United Kingdom itself these sentiments are nourished by all the instruments of propaganda, official and unofficial.

The children are taught to be citizens of the world, but as subjects of the King. Large parts of English literature, and not least the plays of Shakespeare, ring with patriotic fervour. In times of stress, the appeal to patriotism never fails. The United States of America have shown that these sentiments do not go very deep, for British emigrants have become good American citizens as quickly as what Kipling called "lesser breeds without the law". Nevertheless, in the right environment the national tradition is handed down from generation to generation; and indeed British emigrants who acquire no new and competing national tradition tend to be more demonstrative in their patriotism than those who stay at home. Big Ben "thrills" in the outposts of Empire far more than in the City of Westminster.

When British people settled in colonies, therefore, they took with them, and have retained through generations, the patriotic sentiments which flourished at home. Usually, too, they kept some at least of their contacts with the mother country. It is easier now, when London calls the world over the air; but even in the days of the windjammer they read or heard the news that came, directly or indirectly, from home. In the schools their children have been taught the sort of pacific unaggressive nationalism that is taught in the schools of the United Kingdom. Immigrants from other countries have acquired in the course of a generation the same patriotic sentiments. In due course, however, the content began to vary. "Oh to be in England now that April's there" has force only to one who has been in England, while Loch Lomond and Killarney become merely words in songs. The national beauties of Great Britain are replaced by the local beauties, perhaps grander and more exotic than those at "Home". There grows up, too, a set of traditions—stories, verses, poems—which eventually becomes a full-fledged literature. In the British tradition, games play a great part in stimulating patriotism. "Collapse of Australia" refers only to a cricket match; but there are many for whom that word "only" is almost a national insult. In short, there grows up in a settled colony a nationalism within a nationalism, a Canadian, New-

foundland, Australian, South African and New Zealand nationalism, which is nowhere inconsistent with the wider British nationalism and is indeed part of it because British nationalism is so wide. The Australian can be a good Australian and yet a loyal British subject, just as the Welshman or a Scot can be a good Welshman or Scot.

The exact relationship varies somewhat from place to place. Canadian nationalism is affected partly by the French-Canadians and partly by close contacts with the United States. In Australia there has been a larger growth of what is usually described as left-wing opinion, which tends to suspect any institution which passes under the description of "imperial". New Zealand, on the other hand, has maintained an intense affection for the mother country. South Africa is necessarily affected by Afrikaner sentiment and by the native problem, on which Great Britain begs to differ. In any event, all this applies only to those of British descent and to those who have been fully absorbed into communities sharing the British tradition. It cannot apply to the French-Canadians, the Afrikanders, or the indigenous peoples of Asia and Africa. Nor does it apply to the southern Irish. Each of these need to be treated separately.

The French-Canadians lost all contact with France over 150 years ago. They have, indeed, little sympathy with anti-clerical, Revolutionary France. They are intensely Canadian, and they call themselves the *Canadiens*, while the other Canadians are to them the English. Under the British flag, however, they have attained autonomy, tolerance, freedom to organize their lives according to their own laws, civil and religious, liberty to use their own language. They distrust, as the English-Canadians do not, the influence of the great American republic. They are isolationist and nationalist and yet they cherish the link with the British Crown in whose name they twice defended Canada long ago. On the one hand, therefore, they strengthen Canadian nationalism; on the other hand they are at least as eager to retain membership of the British Commonwealth, though they are less eager than their fellow-countrymen to accept obligations on its behalf. So

Canada has been able to develop as a nation under the British flag, speaking English in eight Provinces and French in the ninth, proud of her differentiation both from "the Old Country" and from the United States.

Loyalty to Canada is learned in Canada as loyalty to Wales and Scotland are learned. The Canadians are less than half British by descent, but their loyalty to their own country includes a remoter loyalty to King and Commonwealth. That remoter loyalty, too, has been strengthened by the sacrifices which Canadians have made on its behalf: for it is true of nations as of individuals, that it is not gratitude but service that binds. In two successive wars—it is unnecessary to include the Boer War—Canadian forces have crossed the Atlantic to help defend "the Old Country". In the sad days of 1940 Canada, foremost among the Dominions, supported "the Old Country" when, apart from the Dominions, she stood alone facing a relentless and victorious foe. There was no question even of "Lease-Lend"; it was an outright gift of men, munitions, warships, food and raw materials. There were no difficulties over dollar exchange so long as they were Canadian dollars. If the need had arisen, there would have been, in Canada, an asylum for the King and his Ministers of the United Kingdom until, as Mr. Churchill put it in his famous "never surrender" speech, "in God's good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the Old". Canada in those days proved herself not only a nation, but also a nation with courage and initiative. Because her assistance was so effective and perhaps, decisive, there can be no suspicion in the mind of any Canadian that membership of the Commonwealth implies any subordination to Great Britain: and it is fear of that implication which might break the Commonwealth, for the nationalism of the Dominions is stronger than the sentimental link which binds them to King and Commonwealth, and if there is any inconsistency between them it is the link that will break.

History provides no cause for the Afrikaner to nourish sentiments of affection for the Commonwealth. One of the

purposes of the Great Trek was to escape from British jurisdiction, and the Boer Wars were not brotherly contests. Great Britain, through her administrators at the Cape, probably made more mistakes than usual. On the other hand, the Afrikaner has no loyalty to any country other than South Africa, for his contacts with Holland have been too long broken to leave more than insignificant traces, while his language is not Dutch but Afrikaans and his law is the Roman-Dutch Law of old Holland, not the law of the modern Netherlands. South Africa is his motherland and he has therefore developed an intense nationalism which, in the extreme case, causes him to think of her as the Afrikaner country. The majority have realized, however, that it can never be so, for the Afrikaners are only 60 per cent. of the white population, and the white population is less than 20 per cent. of the whole population. If exclusive rights go by the counting of heads, it is Bantu country, not Afrikaner. The Boer generals have proved as able leaders in peace as in war, and have adopted the principle that only by the collaboration of British and Afrikaner can South African nationalism be established. The mistakes of the nineteenth century have not been repeated in the twentieth, and the Afrikaner has found that through membership of the Commonwealth South Africa has obtained not merely the material advantages presently to be discussed, but also the full co-operation of the South Africans of British descent.

Eire is, as always, a special case, but it is an interesting case because, to all appearances at least, there is no sentimental attachment to the British Commonwealth at all. Centuries of history have produced, at least among many, exactly the opposite sentiment. Even Fine Gael, the Opposition Party which has been out of office since 1932, supports membership of the Commonwealth on the ground mainly that it is to Eire's interest to remain, while Mr. De Valera's Government does not break the last thread merely because it is impolitic to do so. It has created what is virtually a republic in a monarchical Commonwealth, a republic which remained ostentatiously neutral while Great Britain was threatened with invasion, and

denied to the Royal Navy the use of Irish harbours while Irish lives were being lost and Irish food was being sunk off the Irish coasts. It is true that hundreds of thousands of Irishmen joined the armed forces of the Crown, but they did so against the wishes of their own Government. Eire in fact showed how important is the sentimental attachment in the Commonwealth as a whole. The other Dominions were as free to remain neutral as Eire. Their national interests might have been enhanced had they done so; they suffered no such provocation at German hands as Eire suffered; they declared war because they considered the war inevitable and because they thought that they ought to carry their share of the burden.

It may be noted, on the other hand, that Great Britain has never treated the Irish as foreigners. In law they remain British subjects whether they come from Northern Ireland or from Eire. Citizens of Eire who leave their own country find themselves treated almost as Englishmen or Scots are treated, and such differences as there are arise not out of any sense of discrimination but out of Eire's status as a Dominion. There were complaints in Parliament about Eire's attitude; Eire would have had an easier and perhaps more profitable war had she been belligerent; but the reactions were against the Government of Eire and not against her people. Generally it may be said that the attitude to the Irish is that they have an odd sort of Government but they are one of the British peoples. The vigour and intensity of Irish nationalism is as little understood in Great Britain as it was in the Home Rule days. Perhaps it would be less exclusive if it were better appreciated, for it is in the nature of immature nationalism that it must be assertive. The Englishman does not need to insist upon his superiority because he has been accustomed to the notion for centuries, and if others do not recognize it they merely show how superior he is—an attitude which is apt to annoy those others intensely. To treat an Irishman as if he was merely "one of us" and his Government as if it were merely one of those Irish jokes is to wound Irish nationalism where it is most susceptible.

The same attitude is doing immense damage in Asia, but

it does not apply to the other Dominions. The people of the United Kingdom became aware, late in the nineteenth century, that their white colonies were no longer colonies, but nations. During the past forty years the lesson has been driven home with increasing vigour. Sir Wilfred Laurier and Sir Robert Borden of Canada, Mr. Deakin and Mr. Hughes of Australia, Mr. Seddon and Mr. Ward of New Zealand, and Generals Botha and Smuts of South Africa, could not be treated as "one of us". The slightly contemptuous implication of "colonial" disappeared as "Dominion" became the rule. This change has helped enormously in the establishment of a Commonwealth sentiment, for the Dominions sought equality of status not merely in legal form but in social fact. Their peoples were proud of their successes as pioneer nation-builders. They desired not patronage but recognition.

The legal forms have, however, shown themselves singularly adaptable to the creation of nations within a Commonwealth. The fundamental change has been a clear differentiation between the King and the Government of the United Kingdom. The common loyalty is not to the United Kingdom but to the King, the symbol of free association as the Balfour Declaration calls him, or the symbol of co-operation as Eire calls him (Mr. De Valera said that he did not mind "association" but that he was not sure that in all cases it was "free").

The existence of the monarchy has enabled the several Governments and peoples to separate as autonomous entities and yet to remain associated. The citizens of those Dominions which wished to emphasize their nationality have been able to become Dominion nationals and yet to remain British subjects—subjects of His Majesty. The Governor-General is no longer a symbol of subordination because he is appointed by the King on the advice of the Dominion Ministry. When the King acts personally—as he does when he is in the Dominion and in certain aspects of foreign affairs—he acts on the advice of Dominion Ministers without the intervention of British Ministers. Even some of the trappings of monarchy have been found to be easily adaptable. The Royal Standard is not the flag of the United Kingdom but may be flown only

by the King himself, so that each Dominion may establish its own flag, or adapt the Union Jack, without any implication of insult to the King. The National Anthem is not a national anthem but a royal hymn which may be sung wherever the King's writ runs in association with *O Canada* or *Advance Australia* or *De Stem van Zuid Afrika*. It may even be sung, if any Indian wishes it, in the same programme as *Bande Mataram*.

The British Commonwealth is not a State. It is a collection of nations associated for a few purposes but dissociated for most. It is a new sort of entity that was not in the books. It was not a British invention; it was, if responsibility can be allocated, a Canadian, South African and Irish invention. Sir Wilfred Laurier of Canada, Generals Smuts and Hertzog of South Africa, and Mr. De Valera of Eire, have been its chief architects, though they were odd architects who built without a plan. A French-Canadian, two Afrikanders, and a Spanish-Irishman share the major part of the credit, if there be credit, because they were concerned essentially with the problems of the Commonwealth from the peculiar angles of their peoples. The British contribution has been tolerance and an infinite capacity for acting the father where necessity is the mother.

CHAPTER FIVE

A DIGRESSION ABOUT LAWS

It is the function of a lawyer to make certain that the politicians get what they want. What the politicians wanted in the British Commonwealth was to convert a colonial Empire into a Commonwealth of free peoples. It was a responsible task, for Empires have been lost over lawyers' quibbles. Though some have asserted the contrary, an English lawyer would be bound to say that the American Declaration of Independence was a recital of bad law, whatever be its merits as a political manifesto. Fortunately, since 1783 the principle has been established that law was made for man and not man for the law, and that if law stood in the way the simple solution was to ignore it until it could be changed.

The Americans contested the principle that the Parliament of the United Kingdom could make laws for a colony. Great Britain stood firm, too firm, and the American colonies were lost. Thenceforth, however, Parliament made laws for the colonies with due discrimination. Generally, it did no more than provide them with representative Constitutions and enact laws of general concern. With the acceptance of free trade in Great Britain the temptation to regulate their trade by Imperial legislation disappeared; and indeed Parliament looked on with the pained surprise of an eager convert when they decided to regulate it themselves. Even the Imperial preference that Canada freely offered was regarded almost with disapproval, as if a burglar had offered 5 per cent. of his takings to charity. However, the rule that Parliament could legislate for a colony was maintained and it was reaffirmed in the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865, where it was provided that any Act of a colonial Parliament which was repugnant to an Imperial Act applying to the colony was void and inoperative. It is true that after 1911 no Imperial Act was applied to a

Dominion unless it asked for it—as for example in matters of common concern like British nationality, the recognition of bankruptcy decrees and other orders of courts, the surrender of offenders, merchant shipping, and so on. The Parliament of the United Kingdom thus became at once the legislature of the United Kingdom and the legislature of the Commonwealth on matters of common concern. Once the principle had been established that the Dominion must be consulted, there was no hardship in it, but there was older legislation still in operation; and in any case, since the United Kingdom could legislate for a Dominion and the Dominion could not legislate for the United Kingdom, there was no equality of status.

Accordingly, the Statute of Westminster in 1931 repealed the Colonial Laws Validity Act in so far as it applied to the Dominions and authorized the Parliament of a Dominion to repeal or amend Imperial Acts applying to the Dominion. It further enacted—though as a matter of law its value is very doubtful—that an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom should not extend, or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of the law of that Dominion, unless it was expressly declared in that Act that that Dominion had requested, and consented to, the enactment thereof. This provision was supported by a declaration in the preamble—which operates as a sort of gentleman's agreement—that no law made by the United Kingdom Parliament should extend to any Dominion as part of the law of that Dominion otherwise than at the request and with the consent of that Dominion.

These provisions gave rise to difficulties. The King held his throne by virtue of an Act of Parliament, the Act of Settlement, 1701, which applied to the Dominions as part of the laws of the Dominions. If the Dominions could repeal Imperial legislation could they not establish their own King, and so break up the Commonwealth? Accordingly another gentleman's agreement was inserted in the preamble. Any alteration in the succession to the Throne or the royal style and titles was to require the assent of the Parliaments of all the Dominions as well as of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. So there was

to be one King, but the succession was to be arranged by concurrent legislation.

The problem became real sooner than anybody had anticipated. On the 10th December, 1936, Edward VIII executed an "instrument of abdication". The Parliament of the United Kingdom was in session and His Majesty's Declaration of Abdication Bill was read a first time. The Canadian Parliament was in recess and could not be summoned, so the Canadian Privy Council gave Canada's "request and consent". On the 11th the Australian Parliament met and passed resolutions assenting to the Bill, which was passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom the same day, reciting the "request and consent" of Canada and the "assent" of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Since the provisions of the Statute of Westminster had (at their request) not been applied to Australia and New Zealand, no "request and consent" was legally required from them, but the New Zealand Parliament subsequently approved. When the South African Parliament next met, it passed legislation retrospectively to alter the succession from the date of abdication, i.e. December 10th, 1936. The Oireachtas of the Irish Free State passed the necessary Act on December 12th. So, George VI has, legally at least, reigned in South Africa since December 10th, in Eire (or, strictly, in relation to Eire) since December 12th, and elsewhere in the Commonwealth since December 11th. Such are the legal complications of a Commonwealth containing seven (or eight) nations.

There were other difficulties. The Constitutions of all the Dominions except Newfoundland were in Acts of Parliament. If the Dominion Parliaments could repeal or amend Acts of Parliament they could repeal or amend their own Constitutions. The Canadian Provinces did not wish the Dominion Parliament to alter the Canadian Constitution, and so, at the request of Canada, a provision was inserted to prevent such amendments. Australia could amend her Constitution, but only in a specified manner, and the "preliminary clauses" which provide for federation could not be amended at all; and so at the request of Australia it was provided that

no such amendment should be made. Certain provisions of the New Zealand Constitution could not be amended unless the Bill was "reserved" for the King's personal assent; and so at the request of New Zealand it was provided that no amendment should be made except under the existing law. In fact, Australia and New Zealand did not then want the powers of the Statute. They had never asked for them, but they acquiesced because South Africa and the Irish Free State wanted the Statute enacted. The application of the main provisions was therefore suspended in relation to Australia, New Zealand and Newfoundland until they were "adopted" by the Parliament concerned. So far, they have been adopted only by Australia.

There were other limitations on legislative power. No Dominion could enact legislation outside its own territory unless it was necessary for the "peace, order and good government" of the Dominions. It could not, for instance, deal with offences committed by Dominion citizens in other countries. The Parliament of the United Kingdom, on the other hand, had an unlimited legislative power. Accordingly, the Statute of Westminster empowers each legislature to legislate "extra-territorially".

Every Dominion Constitution, again, empowered the Governor-General to "reserve" a Bill for the King's personal assent. This used to mean that the Bill did not become law unless the Secretary of State for the Dominions advised the King to assent. It was agreed in 1926 that the "advice" should be not that of the Secretary of State but that of the Dominion Ministers, and in 1930 it was agreed that the necessary amendments could be made to remove the power altogether. It has been removed in South Africa and Eire, but no action has been taken in other Dominions. Again, every Dominion Constitution except that of the Irish Free State enabled the King to "disallow" Dominion legislation; i.e. to declare it null and void. It was agreed in 1926 that the King should act only on the advice of his Dominion Ministers, and in 1930 that any Dominion could secure the removal of the clause from its Constitution. In fact, however, only South Africa has done so.

The formal legal equality sought to be obtained by the Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 1930 and the Statute of Westminster has really resulted in a wide variation in "Dominion status" in the legal sense. Eire used the powers of the Statute to bring into operation what is virtually a republican Constitution. South Africa used it to produce a formal equality between South Africa and the United Kingdom; and indeed it was General Hertzog who pressed for its enactment. Canada has used it to give the Dominion and Provincial legislatures power to amend Imperial legislation and to empower the Parliament of the Dominion to legislate extra-territorially. Australia, New Zealand and Newfoundland have not used it at all. Dominion status now is not merely, as it was before 1931, an expression stating a customary or conventional relationship. When India, Pakistan and Ceylon became Dominions formal enactments, applying the Statute of Westminster, were required. But Dominion status, analysed closely, is a generic phrase which means anything from the position of Eire to the position of New Zealand.

In the British tradition, the nature or extent of legal power is less important than the manner of its exercise. Blackstone long ago drew attention to the vast prerogatives of the King and, though they have been diminished by legislation, the volume of statutory powers has increased. When we examine the legal content of the so-called liberties of the subject, we begin to wonder whether they exist at all, so vast are the powers for interfering with liberty. The fact is that the British Constitution everywhere assumes that powers will be exercised, if at all, reasonably and tolerantly. The Dominions had, in 1926, reached the stage where none of the formal legal powers remaining in the hands of Great Britain could be exercised save in consultation with the Dominion concerned. Australia and New Zealand have been content to leave it so. Canada took just sufficient power to prevent inconvenience from arising from the old rule of the supremacy of Parliament. South Africa was the self-conscious Dominion which wanted the relics of past subordination swept away. General Hertzog pressed for the Statute of Westminster. His Government

proceeded, in 1934, to the enactment of two Acts, the Status of the Union Act, 1934, and the Royal Executive Functions and Seals Act, 1934, which gave effect to South Africa's equality of status. To those who think more of the substance of liberty than to its legal form, the mountain of labour which began in 1926 and ended in 1934 will appear to have produced a mouse. No doubt it was not a mouse in South Africa; for when a mouse becomes the subject of political controversy it soon develops into a big bad wolf. The Afrikaner thought that his prestige was lowered by a formal subordination to Great Britain, and therefore it was right for the statesmen at the Imperial Conferences to take steps to sweep it away. It was of no advantage to anybody, and it was a political embarrassment in South Africa. It was, however, the Irish who profited, for the Statute of Westminster gave Fianna Fail, when it came into office in 1932, power to revoke unilaterally the agreement of 1921 on whose basis the Irish Free State had been established. The danger was foreseen in 1931, but it was rightly put aside, for if the Irish intended to repudiate the agreement the mere absence of legal power would not stop them.

Such an entity as the British Commonwealth of Nations cannot rest on laws; it can rest only on "free association". A community that is built on laws is built on shifting sand. What laws can do is to support buildings which have firmer foundations or, to drop the metaphor, to give formal expression to the needs and aspirations of peoples.

CHAPTER SIX

DEFENCE

THE history of the Commonwealth is so closely associated with sea-power that it is impossible to separate cause and effect. England acquired an Empire because her life was on the ocean wave; having an Empire, she found that her battle-line was more than ever the deep. Canada was acquired in the defence of the American colonies. Cape Colony and Ceylon were taken from the Dutch in order to defend India against the French. Gibraltar, Malta, St. Helena, Singapore and Hong Kong became units in a vast scheme for the protection of lines of communication. The grant of responsible government to the colonies enabled Great Britain to press upon them the need for providing their own land defences and militias, but for the whole of the nineteenth century the Royal Navy kept the seas. The withdrawal of the United Kingdom forces from the self-governing colonies was not pressed by the colonies; it was insisted upon by Great Britain. She accepted the obligation of defending the colonies, but she also insisted that, behind the Royal Navy, the colonies themselves must provide the next line of defence.

What is more, when the rise of aggressive nationalism in Europe and the development of the power of Japan made the burden of armaments greater, Great Britain called for assistance even in respect of naval defence. The need was stressed at the Colonial Conferences of 1887 and 1897, and the Australian Colonies, Cape Colony and Natal agreed to make contributions. At the Colonial Conference of 1902 the Admiralty presented a long memorandum on Imperial defence, and Mr. Joseph Chamberlain renewed his plea of 1897. "The weary Titan," he said, "staggers under the too vast orb of its fate. We have borne the burden for many years. We think that it is time that our children should assist us to

support it. . . ." The solution found in the end, however, was not a single Royal Navy provided by Great Britain and subsidized by the Dominions, but separate navies and, in due course, separate air forces too.

The problem of defence does not stand alone. It is an aspect of the problem of foreign policy. The Dominions, as we shall see, now have their own foreign policies. It would, however, be wrong to regard defence as entirely subordinate to foreign policy. Though it is true that Great Britain would not be anxious to give armed support to a Dominion if it was carrying out a foreign policy of which it disapproved, and even more true that a Dominion would not help Great Britain in a cause which it regarded as unjust, it would be very difficult for either to stand aside if there were real danger. Certainly the people of the United Kingdom would feel bound to give all possible aid to a Dominion that was being attacked, while Australia and New Zealand would stand by Great Britain at war and wait till the danger was over to argue about causes. Canada and South Africa have been somewhat more discriminating. Sir Wilfred Laurier said in 1900 that he claimed that "Canada shall be at liberty to act or not act, to interfere or not interfere, to do just as she pleases, and that she shall reserve to herself the right to judge whether or not there is cause for her to act". In the same speech, however, he quoted an earlier remark of his, that "if England at any time were engaged in struggle for life and death, the moment the bugle was sounded or the fire was lit on the hills, the colonies would rush to the aid of the mother country". South Africa would claim equally emphatically a right to discriminate and would perhaps state less emphatically—because there might be differences within the Union—her anxiety to assist if Great Britain were in danger. It is, however, *Eire* that proves the case. In 1939 she proclaimed her neutrality and made not the slightest effort to assist in those dangerous days of 1940 and 1941 when the slightest assistance would have been of immense value. The explanation is that the obligation, if it can so be called, is purely sentimental. It arises from mutual sympathy between the Dominions and the mother country. In *Eire* the

official attitude, at least, was one of lack of sympathy: therefore there was no help.

There are, however, other factors. For defence purposes Great Britain and the Dominions can be of immense help to each other, and it is politic for them to help each other. Let us look at the matter from the selfish angle of each in turn.

In normal times 30 to 40 per cent. of British trade is with the other parts of the British Empire. This trade is fundamental to her economy, and she relies upon it especially for her food and raw materials. If there is war in Europe, the proportion may be substantially increased. Thus in 1940 all sources of supply in continental Europe, except Spain and Portugal, disappeared. Her lines of communication with the Dominions and with India are, however, long and vulnerable and she requires assistance for their protection. Moreover, some of the Dominions can assist in the protection of other lines of communication. Canada and Newfoundland can give enormous assistance in the protection of trade with the United States of America. All lines of communication by sea outside Europe pass Ireland. If the Mediterranean is closed to British shipping, the Cape route becomes of fundamental importance.

The assistance which the Dominions can give may take the purely passive form of sea and air bases. Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Newfoundland are essential to protect the western half of the Atlantic. In certain circumstances (especially the closing of the Mediterranean), Simonstown and Durban in South Africa became important naval bases. Australian bases are essential in a Pacific War. Active assistance is even more valuable. If Canada can look after the western Atlantic, South Africa the south Atlantic, India the Indian Ocean, and Australia and New Zealand the Pacific, the strain on the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force is immensely relieved.

Nor is this all. Great Britain usually needs man-power. She is a comparatively small country of forty-six million people and may have to wage war simultaneously against several major powers and in several parts of the world. The Dominions,

and the colonies also, can provide valuable reserves of men and women, trained and untrained. Great Britain, too, needs equipment and munitions of war, much of which can now be manufactured in the Dominions. It may be noted that most of this has to come by sea, so that the importance of keeping the sea communications is greatly increased.

It is not too much to say that assistance given by the Dominions and India between 1914 and 1918 and between 1939 and 1945 may have made the difference between victory and defeat. Between May, 1940, and July, 1941, the British Commonwealth alone fought the whole might of victorious Germany and her satellites. Great Britain was under air bombardment and threatened with invasion, and the Mediterranean was virtually closed. There were German submarine bases from Bordeaux to Narvik. The Battle of Britain was fought with the aid of the Dominion air forces; the Battle of the Atlantic, the most difficult of all, could not have been won without Dominion, and especially Canadian and Newfoundland, assistance. South African, Australian, New Zealand and Indian troops and air forces helped to drive the enemy out of Africa and start the attack on Europe. Canadian troops were among the first to land in Normandy. Australian, Indian, Burmese and African troops helped to defeat the Japanese. The naval and air forces of the Dominions were ubiquitous, and a very large part of the air forces were trained in Canada.

Canada has the advantage of living under the shadow of the United States, and it is American policy, expressed in the Monroe Doctrine and its subsequent extensions and interpretations, that an attack on any part of the American continent is an attack on the United States. The Canadian-American frontier itself is unguarded, and neither side fears aggression from the other. Accordingly, Canada is not under danger of attack except of the "hit-and-run" type, though, of course, warfare in the atomic age may be wholly of a hit-and-run character. But Canada also is a great trading power, whose trade with the rest of the Empire in normal times may exceed £150,000,000 a year. Her lines of communication across the Atlantic and the Pacific cannot be protected by Canada alone

and she requires the assistance of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, and perhaps of Australia and New Zealand also.

Australia and New Zealand are remote; they have large areas to defend and small populations to defend them. Their trade with other countries, and especially with the United Kingdom is essential to their economic life. Australia takes over 40 per cent. of her imports from and sends from 40 to 50 per cent. of her exports to, the United Kingdom; and if the rest of the Empire be added the percentages rise to 60 in each case. In the case of New Zealand the percentages are even greater. These Dominions could not defend themselves on their own, and their lines of communications depend on the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. What is more, their own forces need bases in colonial territory if they are to operate at long range.

South Africa has a small white population in a large continental area. It is arguable, and some of the Afrikaners use the argument, that attack on her is unlikely: but most South Africans agree that her position is vulnerable and that she must be concerned with any conflict that may arise anywhere in Africa. Also, she has European neighbours in the Portuguese colony of Mozambique and the French colony of Madagascar. About half of her trade is with the rest of the Commonwealth, 40 per cent. of her trade being with the United Kingdom. Accordingly, she must rely in very large measure on the assistance of Great Britain and the Dominions.

Eire is really the most vulnerable of all the Dominions. She is an obvious target in a war in which Great Britain is involved, because an enemy in Eire could virtually strangle Great Britain. It follows, of course, that Great Britain must defend Eire in her own interest; but defence which is improvised when attack actually develops is unlikely to be very effective. Also, Eire depends on Great Britain for 50 per cent. of her imports and sends Great Britain 75 per cent. of her exports. She has practically no shipping of her own and clearly cannot defend her lines of communication. It follows that an agreement about defence would be in Eire's interest; but here sentiment interposes and some at least are prepared to run the

risk of invasion and occupation rather than agree with the ancient enemy.

It will be seen, therefore, that the British Commonwealth is not merely a mutual admiration society or an association of bosom friends. It is also a mutual protection society. It would be impossible to draw up a balance sheet, because one can never say what history would be if history were different. What, in fact, has happened, is that the Dominions, other than Eire, have twice come to the assistance of Great Britain in the past thirty years; and very valuable the assistance has been; but nobody can say what dangers the Dominions might have run if Great Britain and the Dominions had not been ready to defend each other. The mutual protection society has been a fact of history, and every potential aggressor knew that any attack on any Dominion was *ipso facto* an attack on the whole Commonwealth. Nor is this all: in a world which depends, in part at least, on power the fact that behind every Dominion has lain the whole power of the British Commonwealth has been of major importance.

To a person of normal intelligence the idea that any set of politicians should use the power of their country to wage aggressive war on other peoples is the height of absurdity. The notion that human beings should use the resources of Nature to attack or enslave other human beings is so repugnant that many of us cannot believe it to be possible. Yet it has been possible for a psychopathic specimen like Hitler to use the power of a great people to introduce the practices of the jungle to human relationships. Nor, indeed, can one truly say that British politicians during the past couple of centuries have always waged warfare according to the principles of elementary morality. What is more, we must bear our share of the responsibility for the fact that the anarchy of the jungle is possible in international affairs. If the peoples of the world had even a modicum of common sense we should long ago have established an international organization based on an international morality which would render any discussion of "defence" unnecessary. As it is, we have to be realists and to assume that somebody or other, we know not who, may attack

somebody else, we know not why, and kill, maim, enslave and render destitute millions of our fellowmen. It is an atrocious idea, but we and the Dominions employ millions of people on the assumption that it is a possibility.

One thing is reasonably certain; that no part of the Commonwealth will attack any other part. There are, unfortunately, people who think that their political aims can be attained only by violence and who are prepared to use such violence to attain those aims. Since anarchy would result if any such group could use force without being met by force, we are compelled to acquiesce in the use of violence to maintain law and order. Accordingly, we may have a pitched battle anywhere from Piccadilly Circus to Hong Kong; but it is inconceivable that any organized unit of the British Commonwealth would wage warfare on any other organized unit. Even in 1941, when bases in Eire would have saved thousands of lives, public opinion would not have supported an attack. This is not because of any formal agreement; it is an implication from the circumstances.

It does not follow that the United Kingdom and the Dominions will wage war together. The fact that the United Kingdom is at war does not necessarily involve the Dominions in war. They have claimed successfully the right to stay neutral; and if they wage war they decide for themselves where and how. In 1939 Australia and New Zealand, true to their traditions, declared war on Germany the day that the United Kingdom declared it. In South Africa, however, General Hertzog, as Prime Minister, wanted his country to remain neutral. His Cabinet disagreeing with him, he advised the Governor-General to dissolve Parliament. Since the Governor-General considered that another Government would have the confidence of the House of Assembly, he refused the dissolution and commissioned General Smuts to form such a Government. The new Government met the House of Assembly and secured its sanction to a declaration of war: but the Union was neutral for four days while the United Kingdom was at war.

Nor was it certain that Canada would declare war. Mr.

Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister, had always declared that the Canadian Parliament would decide. Moreover, Quebec is the key to Canadian politics, and a Canadian Government, above all a Liberal Government, would hesitate to declare war if Quebec were against it. Canada could give all kinds of assistance short of war, especially with the United States neutral. Only when it was seen that Canadian unity would not be substantially affected did the Government make up its mind, and with the unanimous consent of the Dominion House of Commons advised the King to issue a proclamation of war on behalf of Canada. The Dominion was thus neutral for a week while the United Kingdom was at war. Eire provided the test case, however, for she declared her neutrality immediately and resisted all temptations to break it. The neutrality was recognized not only by Germany and the United States but also by the United Kingdom.

With most of the Commonwealth at war the several units determine their contribution by agreement just like other allied powers. The fundamental difference between Commonwealth powers and allied powers, however, is that the former know in time of peace that they will be allies and not enemies. They can, therefore, standardize the equipment and training of their armed forces and co-ordinate their strategy. A Canadian battalion can form part of an Anglo-Scottish brigade because it has the same organization, uses much the same weapons and equipment, speaks the same language (unless, of course, it is French-Canadian), uses the same words of command, and manœuvres in the same way. In the naval forces these elements are even more important. A Canadian crew can take over a British destroyer almost as quickly as it can run up the flag of the Royal Canadian Navy. It would take months to teach a Canadian crew to handle an American destroyer. Moreover there is a psychological element. In Great Britain, Canadian troops are "ours", while the Canadians consider themselves, if not exactly at "home", at least in "the old country". A Canadian officer in a British mess, or a British officer in a Canadian mess, is indistinguishable from his fellows save by his accent and the flash on his shoulder. An

allied officer is a stranger, a guest in whose presence the mess must be on its best behaviour.

All this is, so to speak, arranged beforehand. Senior British officers are invited to advise the Dominion Governments on their defence arrangements. Dominion officers attend war courses in Great Britain. British training manuals are used. British patents are made available so that equipment may be produced on the British pattern. Ships and aircraft are built in Great Britain for the Dominions, or are built in the Dominions according to British specifications. In short, the Dominion navies, armies and air forces are quite distinct units under Dominion commands, but they bear a remarkable likeness to the Royal Navy, the British Army, and the Royal Air Force. Though they generally go into battle as units, they are completely interchangeable with the forces of the United Kingdom and with each other.

What is more, strategy is co-ordinated. At the highest level this is an aspect of foreign policy, for it depends on the relations between the Commonwealth nations and foreign powers. Given those relations, however, there is room for agreement at the staff level. If certain events happen and the Commonwealth nations agree to deal with them by joint action, what dispositions of forces would there be, how should they be controlled, and what strategy should they follow? If, for instance, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand were at war with Japan, the three Commonwealth fleets should not be used independently but should form part of a single Commonwealth naval force, using the same bases, having the same sources of supply, and so on. In peace-time the fleets could be disposed accordingly; the Royal Navy could organize the China and East Indies Fleets on Hong Kong, Singapore and Trincomalee on the assumption that, if war broke out, they would be assisted by the Royal Australian and Royal New Zealand Navies, and indeed by the Royal Indian Navy also. Each of these Navies would have co-ordinated plans for their immediate action. The Royal Navy would not, for instance, need to convoy British ships in Australian waters, for that function would

immediately be assumed by the Royal Australian Navy. That Navy, on the other hand, would not need to protect Australian interests north of Singapore, for the Royal Navy would assume the responsibility without further negotiations or orders.

The nature and detail of the arrangements depend, and must depend, on the Dominion attitude. There have never been arrangements with Eire because her Government always assumed that it would be neutral. Australia and New Zealand, on the other hand, were prepared for staff agreements on a very detailed basis, partly because they always assumed that they would enter the war with the United Kingdom, and partly because their isolation put them in urgent need of assistance from the United Kingdom. South Africa was never prepared to assume that she would be at war; but if she was she would assume some responsibility for the defence of Africa and its southern waters and would allow the Royal Navy to use Simonstown. The Canadian attitude was very similar. It was never assumed that Canada would necessarily be at war when Great Britain was involved, and the Dominion could rely on the Monroe Doctrine. Her defence arrangements before 1940 were, in fact, very scanty. Canada was therefore prepared to do no more than co-ordinate training and equipment and agree to the use by the Royal Navy of her naval bases at Halifax (Nova Scotia) and Esquimalt (British Columbia).

The fundamental assumption of all the arrangements was, however, that the Dominions would take their own decisions both in peace and in war. Up to 1907 the United Kingdom pressed for unity of command, which of course meant command from London. In that year, chiefly under the influence of Lord Haldane, the British attitude changed. Henceforth, what was sought was co-operation and co-ordination. In 1909 the general principle was laid down that "each part of the Empire is willing to make its preparations on such lines as will enable it, should it so desire, to take its share in the general defence of the Empire". The system proved its success in the war of 1914-18, and was continued afterwards with even greater efficiency because there was no longer any conflict of principle

and the great value of co-operation had been amply demonstrated.

It would be inaccurate to describe the Commonwealth as a defensive alliance. Each of the nations decides whether to declare war and, if it does so, what its contribution shall be. When, after the Chanak incident in 1922, Mr. Lloyd George appealed to the Dominions for help, only Australia and New Zealand responded at once, and Australia was not very eager. Canada replied that its Government could not commit the Dominion without parliamentary sanction. South Africa did not reply until the crisis was over, and then accepted the Canadian thesis. An alliance creates obligations, and there are no obligations in the British Commonwealth. On the other hand an alliance depends on a "scrap of paper", and there are no scraps of paper in the British Commonwealth. Whatever help the nations of the Commonwealth give to each other—whether it be in a war, a famine, a drought, an earthquake or an economic depression—it is given freely and willingly. It is not a case where one nation says to another, "We think you ought to help"; on the contrary, the second says to the first, "We think we ought to help". The obligations are imposed not by one nation on another, but by each nation on itself. Nor are the obligations mutual. Though Eire failed to help the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom would undoubtedly help Eire, partly because it would be in her own interest, but partly also because sentiment would insist on it. The British Commonwealth is rather like an old boys' association: "Old Chip's up against it; let's rally round and help him". Old Chips may or may not be grateful, but the old boys certainly convince themselves that there is nobody like an old boy and no place so worthy as the old school.

CHAPTER SEVEN

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

IT is typical that nobody regards the relations between the United Kingdom and the Dominions, or between one Dominion and another, as "foreign affairs". To a British subject, wherever he may be, other British subjects are not "foreigners". There are, it is true, cases where nationalist opinion has become so strong that an exception must be made, particularly in South-East Asia. As a general proposition, however, it holds good. There may be prejudice against some British subjects because of their colour—a prejudice, be it added, which now operates both ways—but even then a distinction must be drawn between those who are British subjects and those who are not; and the prejudice is far less strong in Great Britain itself than it often is in British communities overseas. This problem does not arise, however, in relation to the older Dominions. The relations between Great Britain and a Dominion are regarded as matters of domestic concern. Foreign affairs relate to foreigners, and Dominion nationals are not foreigners. There are some odd manifestations of this practice. An Englishman who finds himself in trouble in Seattle or Chicago or New York or Lorenzo Marques or Tahiti calls on the British Consul; but there are no consuls in Vancouver or Toronto or Halifax or Durban or Sydney. It may be noted, too, that the Canadian or South African or Australian calls on the same consul; but he cannot call on a consul in Bristol or Liverpool or Glasgow because there is none. There are Dominion High Commissioners in London and British High Commissioners in the Dominion capitals, but their functions are essentially political. They correspond to ambassadors rather than to consuls. There is a sort of understanding, never formally expressed but essentially implied in the situation, that a British subject is always at home wherever he may be in the British Commonwealth.

This attitude is of great political significance; for it follows that, though Great Britain and the Dominions are quite independent nations, negotiating with each other as such, there is a different spirit in the negotiations. It would be derogatory for Great Britain to demand her pound of flesh from Canada and certainly Canada never demands a pound of flesh from "the Old Country". Hard bargaining, especially on economic issues is often in order; and yet there is a feeling that within the Commonwealth a somewhat more friendly and accommodating spirit is demanded. The House of Commons would agree to a preference for Canadian over American goods simply because they were Canadian. In Ottawa and Canberra and Wellington, and perhaps even in Pretoria and Dublin, there is a prejudice for anything marked "British". Naturally the local product is preferred, whether in men or goods or policies, but the rest of the Commonwealth comes second. It is quite impossible to exclude the sentimental factor.

Another factor of importance is the common interest in defence. The idea that one British nation will attack another is a hypothesis which can be excluded. On the other hand, if one of them is at war with a foreign power most of the others will almost certainly be involved. The defence services, as we have seen, are closely co-ordinated. It is necessary, therefore, that there should be some co-ordination of foreign policy. It is not possible for each of them to go entirely its own way, for if its policy leads ultimately to war the rest, or most of them, will certainly be involved. Foreign policy being conducted, absurd though it may be, under a constant though implicit threat of war, the nations of the Commonwealth are compelled to keep their external activities more or less on parallel lines.

The lead is of course taken by the United Kingdom. Having interests, political, commercial and strategic, all over the world, any event of major importance in any part of the world is of concern to her. There are British subjects and British investments literally from China to Peru. There are British ships in nearly every port and a British community in

nearly ever large town. She has responsibilities as well as interests in most parts of Africa and Western and South-Eastern Asia. Britain is in other words a "great power", one of the four or five which have to be consulted whenever international relations get tangled. For two hundred years and more she has accepted leadership, occasionally alone, but more often in concert or conflict with others. The Dominions, on the other hand, tend to fall into the second rank. Having, in every case save that of Eire, a substantial foreign trade, they are concerned with international problems everywhere, but with far less intensity than Britain. In this respect they are not unlike the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. Unlike them, however, they are also concerned by a sort of reflection from Britain. If Britain is seriously affected, they also are affected, not only because Britain is almost, if not quite, their best customer, but also because if her difficulties lead to war they also are likely to be involved. In other respects, however, they have a more localized interest—Canada in North America, Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific, and the Union in the whole of Africa south of the equator.

Until 1914 the foreign policy of the Empire was a unit and was conducted by the United Kingdom alone. The fiscal autonomy of the Dominions often compelling special commercial arrangements with foreign powers on their behalf, such arrangements were made by the Dominions themselves, though with the formal sanction of the Government of the United Kingdom. For the same reason it became the practice to exclude the Dominions from British commercial agreements, though they were empowered to adhere, and thus secure the rights and undertake the duties under the agreements. There was, too, an inevitable tendency for other matters within the exclusive cognizance of the Dominions to be settled by direct negotiation. Thus, Canada negotiated directly with Japan on the question of Japanese immigration into British Columbia; and the International Joint Commission which regulated boundary questions between Canada and the United States was exclusively a Canadian affair, though the treaty was made between the United Kingdom and the United States.

The war of 1914-18, however, brought the Dominions directly into the realm of foreign politics. As belligerents, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa took their seats at the Peace Conference of Paris and became original members of the League of Nations. It is true that they joined on a slightly different footing, for the British Empire was also a member, and it was not settled for some years that the British Empire did not include those parts which had separate representation. India also was a member, though its foreign policy was determined by Great Britain. The British Empire, the Dominions and India were in fact grouped together, and it was not clear to the foreign observer that whereas "British Empire" and "India" as members were in reality the United Kingdom, the Dominions were separate nations. In the United States in particular, where the tradition that the Dominions were colonies exploited by the descendants of George III died hard, it was assumed that the arrangement was a device whereby the United Kingdom exercised six votes as British Empire, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and India. The theory began to wear a little thin when the Irish Free State was admitted to membership in 1923. Moreover, Canada had taken the initiative to get the Covenant amended so as to make it more acceptable to American opinion, and there were other matters on which the Commonwealth members were not of one mind and did not vote as a *bloc*: but prior consultations tended to reduce the area of difference and so to perpetuate the notion that the decision really lay with Great Britain. However, the situation gradually became clearer, and in 1927 Canada was elected as a non-permanent member of a Council which already included the British Empire as a permanent member.

That there should be consultation and, so far as might be possible, co-operation among the Commonwealth nations was implicit in the international situation. The Dominions had been involved in the war of 1914-18 without their express sanction, though they had been fully informed at the Imperial Conference of 1911 of the dangers in the international situation. Whether they could be neutral in a war in which the United

Kingdom was involved was an unsettled question until the event actually occurred in 1939. It was however clear that, directly or indirectly, they would be involved and that most of them would feel bound to give assistance to the United Kingdom. It followed that they were deeply interested in that country's foreign policy. A boundary dispute in Eastern Europe, for instance, might compel far-off New Zealand to mobilize her man-power and pledge her resources. It is true that majority opinion in New Zealand might be content to trust the mother country and to rush aid to her if she needed it: but even in loyal New Zealand there were substantial groups who had little faith in the Lloyd George and Baldwin Governments and, at a later stage, still less in that of Neville Chamberlain.

There was even the possibility of the situation being reversed and the action of a Dominion involving the United Kingdom in international difficulties. The possibility was remote, however, for none of the Dominions had shown any desire to follow a policy which would be likely to lead to conflict. New Zealand was so remote that her contacts outside the United Kingdom and Australia were few and unimportant. The "White Australia" policy had become so firmly fixed that it was unlikely to create trouble with Japan and China. Australia's other problem, the encroachment of other nations upon her sphere of influence in the Pacific, had been virtually settled by the surrender of the German colonies. There were French, Dutch, Portuguese and Japanese colonies there also, but between the wars nothing shook the unruffled calm of the South Pacific. The Union had no special interests so long as no trouble developed in the Portuguese colonies in South Africa. Canada and the United States had settled their frontier problems on a basis so admirable that it might well have provided the example for the rest of the world, while Canada and Japan had a gentlemen's agreement about immigration which would cover the matter so long as both sides behaved like gentlemen. Even the problem of the Newfoundland fisheries, which had caused trouble before 1914, was no longer an international issue.

The problem, therefore, was to enable the Dominions to keep watch on British policy. They did not desire to accept responsibility for it, because they wanted a free hand, to help or not to help if difficulties arose, and to decide what help if they felt compelled by honour or self-interest or sentiment to do so. But they knew that in practice events had a habit of forcing their hands. Moreover, the Dominions were far more concerned with their internal problems than with foreign affairs. Each of the Governments had its political difficulties at home and did not want to be bothered with the odd complications which seemed to spring up like mushrooms all over Europe—and often in Asia, too. The peoples of the United Kingdom were necessarily involved in the wider issues of the world, but the peoples of the Dominions wanted only to be left in peace.

One solution was frequent Imperial Conferences, and such conferences were held in 1921, 1923, 1926, 1930 and 1937. The lengthening intervals are significant. To get the Dominions Prime Ministers away from their internal problems for a month or two months at a time was in itself a task of very great difficulty. It assumed that internal politics were simultaneously quiescent in Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, Pretoria and Dublin. It assumed, too, that in the four corners of the Commonwealth no question was arising that could not be settled over the telephone. Since the nations of the Commonwealth operate the parliamentary system of government, the sun never sets on political controversy. Where there was something of great moment to be discussed, it was possible to bring about a meeting; but a Prime Minister would not travel half-way round the world in order to listen to expositions on foreign policy. The intervals between conferences, therefore, became longer; and because the intervals became longer the conferences became less useful in this respect. If foreign policy is laid down in general terms it becomes almost a series of platitudes which in the actual practice of diplomacy are singularly fruitless. If the policy goes into detail it is almost invariably obsolete before the Prime Ministers have reported to their colleagues. What is more, if there are six or seven

Governments there are also six or seven Oppositions; and though there is a theory about the continuity of foreign policy it is not invariably put into practice when Governments change. Electors in the Dominions do not take their cue from the mother of Parliaments or change their Governments when a new Government takes office in London. In Britain itself it became almost a rule that the Government which attended the Imperial Conference should be turned out within a year; the Coalition Government of 1921 was replaced by the Conservative Government of 1922; the Conservative Government of 1923 was replaced by the Labour Government of 1924; and though the Conservative Government of 1926 remained in office until 1929, the Labour Government of 1930 was replaced by the National Government of 1931. The Labour Government of 1924 took up this question of a change of Governments, but its suggestions that Imperial Conferences should represent Oppositions as well as Governments was welcomed nowhere, and positively rejected by Canada.

Though it is true that there are long-term trends in foreign policy, accepted by all parties and implicit in the conditions of international affairs, the administration of foreign affairs consists in sending telegraphic answers to telegrams. If, to take one example of many, Hitler decides to march into the Rhineland, it is not possible to put the question down for discussion at the next Imperial Conference and meanwhile do nothing, for doing nothing is itself a decision on policy. Nor, indeed, is it very easy to ask the Dominions for their views and to co-ordinate them, particularly when it is remembered that the Prime Minister of Australia may be making a political speech in Perth and the Prime Minister of Canada may be fishing in Northern Ontario.

The Imperial War Conference of 1917 had agreed upon the necessity for continuous consultation in all important matters of common concern and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several Governments might determine. The Imperial Conference of 1921 went even further in stressing a "deep conviction that the whole weight of the Empire should be concentrated behind a united

understanding and common action in foreign policy". Nevertheless, when the Chanak incident occurred in 1922 the Dominions did not even know that a crisis was impending in the Near East, and Mr. Lloyd George's request for troops came as a bolt from the blue. Fortunately the crisis passed away as quickly as it had arisen, but it proved that common action, based on consultation, was impracticable, and that even consultation was not easy. "Common action", in fact disappeared at the Imperial Conference of 1923. There were no flowers; indeed there was no funeral. Like an old soldier, it just faded away.

What really happened was that the foreign policy of the British Empire suffered a sea-change into something less rich and strange, the foreign policy of the Government of the United Kingdom. The Dominions, including Eire, became more or less isolationist. They were to be kept fully informed, but they neither accepted nor rejected British foreign policy. From 1924, all Cabinet documents relating to foreign affairs were passed to the Dominions as a matter of routine. If a Dominion chose to protest, full consideration would be given to its point of view, though eventually the decision would be that of the United Kingdom alone. On the other hand, there are matters in which prior consultation is possible, so that the United Kingdom and the Dominions can take, not common action, but parallel action. In 1924 the Labour Government recognized the Soviet Government in the U.S.S.R. without consulting the Dominions; but in 1931 the Dominions were consulted before the Provincial Government of the Spanish Republic was recognized. When the problem of sanctions against Italy was raised in 1935-36, however, the Dominions were informed but not consulted. The Hoare-Laval Pact, which was subsequently repudiated by the United Kingdom Government, was wholly a British initiative, and produced the same reactions in all the Dominions as in Great Britain itself. Again in 1938-39 the policy followed in Europe was a British policy. The United Kingdom did not ask the Dominions to agree with the Munich Agreement, nor to join in the obligations of the Anglo-Polish Treaty. When

war broke out, therefore, the Dominions were free to declare war or proclaim neutrality. The Dominions (other than Eire) have joined the United Nations Organization and are taking part in the peace negotiations, not as members of the Commonwealth but as belligerents.

It is not easy to describe the situation resulting from this evolution. It is clear enough that there is no common foreign policy. Each nation of the Commonwealth has its own policy, based upon its national interests, the ideas of international morality which prevail among its citizens, and the political complexion of its parliamentary majority for the time being. It would, however, be wrong to assume that the attitude of the Dominions to British foreign policy is the same as, let us say, that of the Netherlands. Self-interest dictates close association with the United Kingdom, which is not only their best friend but also their best customer. There has been, for instance, a significant movement of opinion in South Africa since 1934. The settlement of the constitutional issue made it possible, and perhaps it can be said that the intense dislike of Britain by some sections has tended to subside: but far more important was the fact that the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the growth of German power by sea and air called attention to South African isolation. Canada similarly has become much less isolationist as air power developed—a development parallel with that in the United States.

It must be remembered, too, that on major international issues the peoples of the Commonwealth are apt to think remarkably alike. They have similar parliamentary institutions and they share a common democratic tradition. The Dominions have set up house for themselves, but they are still daughters of the Mother of Parliaments. The divisions which appear at Westminster have almost exact parallels in Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, Cape Town, and even Dublin. The news which they receive is coloured in much the same way, for most of it comes from London. The substance of what is said in the House of Commons one evening is known in Canada and South Africa next morning and in Australia and New Zealand next evening. The views of the London leader-writers come

over the tape in a few hours. This is due not merely to the mechanics of newspaper production—among which must be mentioned specially cheap cable rates—but also to personal factors. History has given the Dominion citizen a greater interest in what is said in London than in what is said in Washington or Paris.

This, of course, works both ways. If any strong opinion is expressed in a Dominion it is soon known in London; and because of the close relations subsisting between the United Kingdom and the Dominions it has more effect than a similar opinion expressed in the Hague or Rio de Janeiro. It would be difficult to maintain a foreign policy against a strong Dominion opinion, particularly because a section of opinion in Great Britain is almost certain to agree with it. It would be even more difficult for a Dominion to follow a policy which was violently contrary to British opinion. In other words, though Britain and the Dominions are independent countries having each its own policy, those policies tend not to be fundamentally different. At international conferences, indeed, an attempt is often made to co-ordinate them by consultation outside the conference room. Australia may be found leading the smaller nations against the predominance of the great powers, among which are the United Kingdom; Canada may be more American than British on a particular issue; South Africa and India may be in conflict over the colour bar; and yet there will be evidence of a British Commonwealth *bloc*. The United Kingdom and the Dominions tend to be “fellow-travellers” partly because they generally follow the same road but also because they try to keep together.

CHAPTER EIGHT

WIDE OPEN SPACES

REGARDED from crowded England—and still more certainly from crowded India—the older Dominions appear to consist of a few fairly large towns and a large number of wide open spaces. Canada is symbolized by her prairies, South Africa by the veldt, and Australia and New Zealand by their sheep runs. There is indeed a great variation in the density of the population, as the following figures will indicate:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Area in sq. miles</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Density</i>
United Kingdom	94,623	46,894,000	558
Eire	27,000	2,890,000	107
Canada	2,995,189	11,507,000	4
Australia	2,974,581	7,230,000	2.4
New Zealand	103,410	1,574,000	15
South Africa	472,494	10,708,000	23
India	1,581,410	388,997,000	246

The figures are somewhat misleading. Much of Canada consists of the frozen North and much of Australia is waterless desert. Making the necessary allowances they still give the impression that the Dominions contain vast tracts of land waiting to be peopled. Sometimes, indeed, Dominion statesmen themselves give that impression. South Africa, with her large coloured population and her problem of "poor whites", has always been somewhat modest; but Australian statesmen have assumed that one day the Commonwealth would hold one hundred million people, and even New Zealand has claimed twenty millions. They have nevertheless discovered in recent years that the real problem is not to put people on the land but to provide them with means of sustenance. The economic unit depends upon the use to which the

land is put. An industrial worker needs only a cottage in a small garden and a stand in a factory; a family engaged in mixed or "subsistence" farming needs at least five acres; the wheat farmer of North America or the sheep farmer of Australia needs hundreds of acres. Also, if he is supplied with water and fuel the industrial worker can live in a waterless desert, but the mixed farmer and the wheat farmer need much rain and the sheep farmer requires grass. It is, however, useless to set people to produce something that others do not wish to buy. Wireless sets and gramophones could be produced in the Australian desert, but at a price which nobody would be prepared to pay. There is ample oil in Alberta but (until 1939 at least) it did not pay to bore for it. Canada for years before 1939 was producing more wheat than the world was willing to buy. In 1919 Australia settled many of her returned soldiers on the land to produce fruit. They did produce fruit, but could not sell it.

Successful migration depends upon several factors. First, there must be people willing and able to emigrate. During the nineteenth century, Europe was able to send millions of men and women to people North America, South Africa and Australasia. It is estimated that between 1812 and 1914 nearly fourteen million people from the United Kingdom alone emigrated to the United States, and nearly seven millions to the Dominions. They were probably among the most enterprising of her sons and daughters, because it requires energy and initiative to become pioneers in a new land. For the same reasons most of them would have been comparatively young, thus reducing the potential birth-rate in the mother country and increasing it in the United States and the Dominions. Nobody would advocate a similar drain in the present century. Already there are prospects of a declining population in Great Britain, and the loss of millions of men and women of child-producing age would be a burden that the country could not afford. If the Dominions required migrants of British stock, therefore, it is extremely unlikely that they would get them. Most of Europe is in a similar plight, and the real source of migrants would have to be Asia.

That brings us to the second factor: the migrants must be of a kind acceptable to the Dominion concerned. They have to be absorbed into and indeed assimilated with the existing population. With almost all sections of Europeans no great difficulties arise: the United States has shown that assimilation can be effected within a single generation. With Asiatics the position is different because physical differences prevent easy and rapid assimilation. Not only is the first generation different from the rest of the population, but so are subsequent generations. Intermarriage is rare because there are prejudices on both sides. Indeed such intermarriages are rare in Asia itself, where by long tradition marriage is not merely within the "race" but within the caste also. Even where there is intermarriage, however, the progeny are not easily assimilable. This again is as true of Asia as it is of the white Dominions. Though Ceylon has been free of Portuguese for 300 years, there is still a group, known somewhat absurdly as "Portuguese Burghers", drawn from marriages between Portuguese and Sinhalese, and culturally separate from the rest of the population. The Dutch Burghers of Ceylon and the Anglo-Indians of India are treated, by the Ceylonese and the Indians respectively, as quite distinct "communities"; and they themselves have conventions which distinguish them sharply from the rest of the population.

There are, too, economic motives for differentiation against Asiatics. European communities like those from Eastern Europe soon adapt themselves to the higher standard of living of the Dominions. Though (like the Irish in Liverpool and Glasgow) they may for a short time undercut the local labour, they soon cease to do so. Most Asiatics, on the other hand, not only live in groups and maintain their own social conventions, but also raise only slightly their standard of living. What is more, most Asiatic employers employ Asiatics—often bringing their relatives to the new territory for this purpose. Consequently, when an Asiatic group has a firm footing in a particular economic field (like the Japanese in the greengrocery trade in British Columbia) they tend to monopolize it.

The result is that both capital and labour now agree that Asiatic immigrants ought to be kept out. The Australian colonies began to exclude Chinese in the 'fifties, and soon extended their prohibition to Indians as well. Great Britain raised objections because of international repercussions, but eventually an educational test was found to be at once effective and comparatively non-controversial, and it was adopted by New Zealand as well as Australia. Canadian legislation has been even more circumspect, though equally effective. Natal, on the other hand, imported Indian labour under the system of indenture, which led to abuses wherever it was tried and was ultimately abolished by the Government of India itself.

Indians did not object violently to exclusion, as practised by Australia and New Zealand; what they objected to was discrimination, and especially to the discrimination which treated Indians as "coolies". At Imperial Conferences, indeed, the Indian representatives recognized the right of each Dominion, as Sir S. P. (afterwards Lord) Sinha put it in 1918, to "enjoy complete control of the composition of its own population by means of restriction on immigration from any of the other communities". On the other hand Indians claimed, very reasonably, that when Indians have been admitted they should be treated like other people. They have therefore sought to remove the discrimination against Asiatic residents practised in some of the Dominions and have reacted fiercely to the imposition of increased restrictions in South Africa.

In these respects also, Asia has followed the example of the older Dominions. Ceylon and Burma, under self-governing Ministers, sought to impose restrictions on Indian immigration. India, though burdened with a rapidly growing population, has not raised serious objections: indeed Indian immigration to Ceylon is restricted by India, not by Ceylon. What India has claimed is that Indians who have made their homes in Ceylon or Burma should be treated as Ceylonese or Burmese. Malaya, on the other hand, shows the disadvantages of uncontrolled immigration. The Chinese and the Indians have not become assimilated with the Malays,

with the result that the constitutional problem of Malaya is almost unsolvable.

It should not, however, be assumed that immigrants are necessarily suitable if they belong to the right "race". What the Dominions have required (perhaps wrongly) were immigrants who could settle on the land and engage in primary production. Unemployed factory workers cannot be turned into successful farmers by a voyage across the Atlantic or the Indian Ocean. Canada found that the best immigrants were the farmers from the "dust bowl" of the Middle West and the peasants from Eastern Europe. It is true that an increase in primary production results in increased employment in ancillary trades. Where there are successful farmers there are also successful carpenters, builders, wheelwrights, plumbers, mechanics and the rest. As the farms became more numerous and more prosperous the towns grew in size and wealth. It is, however, extraordinarily difficult to maintain a balance when immigrants are pouring in. Also, the workers of the towns are highly organized into trade unions which not only dislike the flood of cheap labour which comes with each wave of migration, but also usually have sufficient political influence to prevent it.

The third factor in successful immigration is capital. There is rarely real shortage of labour in any of the Dominions, and what they seek are immigrants who will add to the volume of production. South Africa specifically requires immigrants to have enough capital to establish themselves. Australia and New Zealand have been prepared to find the capital. India, Ceylon and Burma have a prejudice against imported capital because it results in what they call "exploitation"—that is, the payment of interest by means of a surplus of exports. The Dominions, on the other hand, stress the additional avenues for employment which imported capital provides and therefore welcome it. Until 1939, at least, Great Britain has been able to export large capital sums, often by reinvesting the dividends on earlier investments. The matter is discussed in the next chapter, but it needs to be mentioned here that a Dominion cannot fill its wide open spaces without expenditure

on capital equipment to make its land and population fruitful. There is now a tendency for them to emphasize industrial development rather than agricultural production, and this would require even larger capital sums.

The fourth requirement is a market; and it is here that most of the migration schemes have broken down. As has been said above, wireless sets could be made in Central Australia, but not at a price at which they could be sold. As the population of Europe grew apace after the Industrial Revolution it needed more and more imported food and raw material. It thus became possible to fill the wide open spaces with cattle ranches, wheat farms and sheep runs, all supplying the vast European population. All went well until the European development came to a stop and was, in fact, reversed by trade depression. It is, of course, true that an expanding population produces its own market. The world lives by taking in each other's washing. An increase of population on the Canadian prairies produces a demand for textiles, building materials, automobiles, agricultural machinery, radio sets, and the rest, which can be supplied by Eastern Canada behind the tariff wall. The increased prosperity of Eastern Canada creates an internal demand for wheat, which in turn is met by the prairies. However, wheat production on so vast a scale cannot be satisfied with a Canadian market, and the prairies are essentially dependent upon a demand for wheat outside Canada. In other words, the Canadian wheat belt cannot expand unless the demand for Canadian wheat expands; and to settle immigrants on the prairies without such a demand is to invite disaster.

It is no doubt true that wheat farming is not the only means for developing the prairies: but the climate is too harsh for much of the peasant farming typical of Eastern Canada and costs of transport are too high to make industrialization possible in competition with Eastern Canada and the United States. Much the same problem applies to the grass lands of Australia, while the Australian Desert is as likely to be populated as the Arabian Desert or the Sahara. Many of the wide open spaces are just too open.

The result of these factors is that optimistic forecasts have not always been fulfilled and some bad blunders have been committed. There was a vast movement of population in the boom period of the nineteenth century, a movement which peopled Ontario, established British Columbia, gave South Africa its "English" population, and peopled Australia and New Zealand. In the early years of the present century the discovery of hard wheat which would grow on the prairies and of the means for milling it produced the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta. In 1870 the prairies contained 12,000 people, mostly trappers; in 1901 there were 420,000 people in the Province of Manitoba, which was not divided until 1907; but in 1911 there were 1,328,000 people in the three Provinces. Since then there has been a halt, and indeed in some years a definite movement back to the United Kingdom. This was not due to any lack of encouragement from Britain, for British statesmen saw in emigration a partial solution of the unemployment problem, perhaps forgetting that it is in time of boom, when Europe demands food and raw material, and not in time of depression, when that demand falls off, that emigration becomes popular.

The Oversea Settlement Committee appointed by the British Government in 1918 rejected the idea of subsidized emigration because such emigration might be inconveniently large, but it was prepared for subsidies to demobilized service men and to women and children. With the coming of the post-war depression the Committee changed its views, and in 1921 an agreement was reached between the British Government and the Governments of Canada, Australia and New Zealand for subsidized emigration. A sum up to £3,000,000 a year was provided under the Empire Settlement Act, 1922, it being anticipated that the first £1,000,000 would create an annual migration of 60,000 to 80,000 settlers. Australia also worked out a scheme, under which Western Australia alone was to receive 75,000 settlers in three years. When the Imperial Economic Conference met in 1923, however, it was found that the results were meagre. Except in 1920 and again in 1923, the net annual emigration from the United Kingdom

to the rest of the British Empire never exceeded 100,000, and from 1931 to the outbreak of the war there was actually a net migration *to* the United Kingdom. Between 1922 and 1931, about one million people left the United Kingdom for the rest of the Empire, and of these only 400,000 were assisted financially. Of those who were assisted financially a large number were "nominated", i.e. went out to join relatives or friends. Most of the schemes organized by the Dominions for settling families on the land were dismal failures. What is more, the scientific study of population showed after 1930 that Great Britain could not afford to lose population by emigration. With the coming of the depression, too, the demand for primary products fell heavily and the Dominions had their own unemployment problems. They did not want immigrants who would add to them.

All the white Dominions could carry larger populations if they could become industrialized, and the developments of the war of 1939-45 added enormously to their industrial potential. With small internal markets for manufactured goods, however, their industries must depend on overseas markets where they must compete with the products of Europe, the United States and South America. Asia and Africa no doubt contain vast potential markets, but it is unlikely that any really substantial increase in the standard of living of the Asiatic and African populations could be brought about except by industrialization. India, for instance, is a vast potential market, but it will be developed by the industrialization of India herself, and that process has already proceeded far. It is certain, too, that independent India, whether within or without the Commonwealth, will do all in her power to protect her own industries from foreign competition.

Nor can the Dominions increase their population rapidly through an excess of births over deaths. Social conditions have changed among the white peoples since Europe was industrialized. The birth-rate is high among the French-Canadians, but Canada every year loses a substantial section of Canadian-born to the United States. It has been estimated that one-third of the Canadian-born people are below the line.

In Australia and New Zealand the net reproduction rate is very low and seems likely to go lower. In South Africa the Afrikaner population is expanding and the coloured population even more rapidly.

From whatever angle the problem be studied, the conclusion is that the Dominions cannot have large increases of population unless they admit Asiatic immigrants. Even then the wide open spaces of Canada and Australia will not be filled, for they are determined primarily by climatic conditions which even the persistent and hard-working Asiatics could not fill any more easily than they can fill the waterless tracts of India and China.

CHAPTER NINE

IMPERIALISM

THAT few emigrants left the shores of Great Britain for the sake of their health or to look at the scenery is evident enough. Some went because they were sent as convicts; some wished to convert the heathen; many were moved by a sense of adventure. Most, probably, went "to better their prospects". Out of this fact various theories have developed, seldom precisely formulated, which have helped to convert "Empire" and "imperial" into terms of abuse. The phrase most commonly used is that of "imperialist exploitation" and it is based on the assumption that British people, above all those who direct their country's policy, are far cleverer than they are.

It is not easy to discuss a phrase which so often lacks precision, but it appears that "imperialist exploitation" is used in several different senses. First, it is assumed that the colonies were acquired in order to provide for Britain's surplus population. Whether Britain ever had a surplus population is a question which might be the subject of argument. In any event, twice as many British emigrants went to the United States as went to the overseas Empire. The great emigration of the nineteenth century was not stimulated by the British Government at all. The most that can be said is that when British capital built railways it was often paid for partly by free land, and that it then stimulated emigration in order to make the land and the railways profitable.

Secondly, it is said that colonies were acquired in order to provide raw materials for British industry. It is true enough that the colonies were peopled because it was profitable to provide food and raw materials to Europe, and especially to Britain. There was, however, little or no policy in the matter. British people as individuals found it more profitable to become cultivators in the colonies than to remain as wage-

slaves at home. The British Government had nothing to do with it. Also, the greatest developments occurred not in the British Empire but in the United States, which provided not only the food but also cotton, tobacco and newsprint. What is more, during the period of rapid development the official British policy was that of "the open door", which allowed anybody to purchase; and when the colonies obtained self-government they were anxious to sell to everyone. They were, of course, eager for Great Britain to give a preference to colonial goods, because such preference would enable them to undercut their competitors; but during the nineteenth century Britain refused to do so.

Thirdly, it is said that Great Britain wanted markets for her manufactured articles. Again it is necessary to distinguish between the British Government and British people. It is true enough that British manufacturers wanted markets but they were willing to sell wherever they could find buyers, and there is no evidence that they stimulated a demand for colonies in the belief that the colonists would buy British goods. The self-governing colonies, in fact, put tariffs against British goods in order to protect their own industries. It was only in the present century that they began to give a preference, and that preference was more an embarrassment than anything else to the British free-trade Governments. The British Government itself did little or nothing to help British manufacturers. On the contrary, it gradually relaxed the Navigation Acts and finally repealed them, thus allowing foreign countries to buy and sell on equal terms.

Fourthly, it is said that Great Britain wanted outlets for her surplus capital. Undoubtedly there was surplus capital in Britain, and undoubtedly much of it went to the Colonies. Even so, when estimates of overseas investments were compiled in 1913, it was found that as against roughly £1,780 millions invested in the British Empire, £1,934 millions were invested outside. The investment in the United States was half as large again as that in Canada and Newfoundland; the investment in Argentina was almost as large as that in Australia; the investment in Mexico was larger than that in New Zealand. It is

significant, too, that of the £1,780 millions invested in the British Empire, over £1,300 millions were in the Dominions, which could of course prevent such investment had they wished it. Actually, they were extremely anxious to encourage the importation of capital, which was necessary for their development, while the Dominions were attractive to lenders because their investments were considered safer than foreign investments outside the United States. The British Government itself did nothing to encourage investment within the Empire, save to make arrangements by which the Dominion Governments could, if they wished, borrow in the form of trustee securities, an arrangement which gave them loans at perhaps one-half per cent. lower interest.

It cannot be doubted that economic factors were at work, though during most of the nineteenth century they were neither stimulated nor inspired by the British Government. Late in the century, however, a section of opinion became definitely "imperialist" in outlook, and it was during this period that "imperialism" came to have its sinister connotation. From about 1870 the nationalism of Europe began to wear a more aggressive guise, and this aggressive nationalism began to affect Great Britain. During most of the century British nationality was regarded as a privilege, like Roman citizenship, to be conferred with discrimination. British Governments were reluctant to acquire new colonies because they compelled increased expenditure on defence and especially on the Royal Navy. Under the influence of new ideas, however, a "forward" policy was adopted. Mr. J. A. Hobson¹ estimated in 1902 that, including Egypt and the Sudan, 4,754,000 square miles of territory, containing eighty-eight million people, were added to the British Empire between 1870 and 1900. This represented about one-third of the Empire in area and one-quarter in population.

Except for a substantial expansion in South Africa due to the annexation of Griqualand, the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, this increase was wholly outside the Dominions; and it may be noted that the Dominions played a larger part

¹ *Imperialism*

in the national economy than India and the dependent colonies. They took almost all the emigrants who remained within the British Empire. In 1913 India and the Colonies sent imports to the United Kingdom to the value of £90 millions, while the Dominions sent £113 millions; and all the imports from the Empire were only one-quarter of British imports. In the same year India and the Colonies took British exports to the value of £104 millions, while the Dominions took exports to the value of £91 millions; and all the exports to the British Empire were only one-third of British exports. We have already seen that in 1913 £1,300 millions out of the £1,780 millions invested in the Empire were in the Dominions; and that all the British investments in the Empire were less than the British investments in foreign countries.

These figures do not disprove Mr. Hobson's contention that there were strong economic motives behind the "imperialism" which developed in Great Britain about 1870 and became emphatic in the 'eighties. It is clear enough in the history of British politics that, while the main support of the Conservative party in 1846 was among the landowners, by 1886 the bankers, stockbrokers and other financial interests, as well as many of the manufacturing interests, were supporting it. It was among these classes that imperialist sentiment became strongest. It must be noted, though, that by 1886 the peoples of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland and Cape Colony had complete control of their economic policy. The financial interests might influence that policy, as they did in Great Britain; but they could equally influence the policy of the United States of America, where, in fact, British interests were more important than in any of the colonies. When Lenin, in 1916, used Mr. Hobson's figures to prove his own theory about imperialism, he did not distinguish the Dominions from the dependent Empire. He included them among the "colonial possessions" of Great Britain. His conclusions from British experience may be criticized on other grounds; he had a thesis to prove and like a good advocate he produced arguments to prove his case; but it is his process of lumping the whole Empire together which interests us at the moment.

Many of those who are quite unable to accept his thesis have nevertheless drawn from his pamphlet, directly or indirectly, the assumption that the British Empire is an instrument by which Great Britain "exploits" the colonial peoples. Whether this is true of the dependent Empire we need not now consider. The Dominions were economically more important to Great Britain than India and the dependent Empire: and with India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon obtaining independence, within or without the Empire, the economic importance of the dependent Empire is proportionately extremely small. One can be a perfectly good "imperialist" without supporting "economic exploitation". The word has become such a term of abuse, however, that it can no longer be used; and we have to speak not of the British Empire but of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

CHAPTER TEN

EMPIRE TRADE

IT is true in some measure that "trade follows the flag", i.e. that when Great Britain has acquired territory it has soon become a market for British goods. Other colonial powers have adopted policies giving heavy preferences to goods from the mother country; but after the end of the mercantilist system British policy was that of "the open door", which implied no preference for British goods. What is more, though there have been exceptions, the tariff policy of even a dependent colony has generally been conducted in the interests of the colonial producers, even when, in the later stages, imperial preference was introduced. Finally, it has to be remembered that the economic policy of the Dominions has been under Dominion control almost since the conferment of self-government. Until recently the preferences granted by them were neither requested nor even encouraged. Even so, trade has followed the flag because of consumers' preference; and British producers have, of course, encouraged this preference by advertisement, including the use of such slogans as "Buy British", "Britain delivers the goods", and "Britain can make it". The British Government itself has stimulated this propaganda since 1920.

Empire trade has been far more important to the Dominions than to Great Britain. Before the first world war, Great Britain took about 25 per cent. of her imports from the Empire and sent about 33 per cent. of her exports to the Empire, which in both cases includes India and the colonies. After the war the figures rose to about 30 per cent. and 40 per cent. respectively. Before the first world war the Dominions took about 40 per cent. of their imports from the United Kingdom and sent her about 55 per cent. of their exports, while after the war the figures became about 42 per cent. and 50 per cent.

respectively. Few of the self-governing colonies adopted free trade principles and the Dominions have tended to increase protection rather than to reduce it. Consequently, the Dominions, not Great Britain, produced (or, strictly speaking, revived) imperial preference.

Though the Marxist will no doubt deny the assertion, the policy followed by British politicians is often very different from the policy followed by British capital. British official policy since the establishment of the Empire has passed through three stages. Throughout the eighteenth century a mercantilist policy was followed, a policy of restricting colonial trade as far as possible to the mother country. Its foundation was not economics but politics, though economics played an important part in politics. Its essential purpose was to strengthen England economically in order to strengthen it politically. English statesmen were concerned not so much to increase the profits of English traders as to increase the power of the English king. The English merchant in Virginia or Massachusetts might gain more profit by trade with France, but such trade was thought to enrich the French and not the English king and so was in principle objectionable. Whatever trade there was had to be carried in English ships because such ships added to the potential resources of the Royal Navy.

Adam Smith proved, just as the American Declaration of Independence was being issued, that however desirable mercantilism might be for defensive purposes, it could not be justified economically. It did not enrich either the colonies or Great Britain: on the contrary, it tended to impoverish both. It would be better to treat the Americans as equals, to trade with the whole world and let the colonies trade with the whole world. As the industrial system of Great Britain expanded, so the ideas of the *Wealth of Nations* became more acceptable. Huskisson began the process of clearing the obstacles to free trade, Peel continued it, and Gladstone completed it, though not until 1860: and by that time Canada had already begun to protect her own nascent manufactures, and not long afterwards most of the Australian colonies followed suit. This, then, was the second period, with Great Britain

tending towards and eventually adopting free trade and the self-governing colonies tending towards and eventually adopting protection. The judgments of history are always contentions, but the majority opinion will almost certainly assert that both were right. Great Britain prospered under free trade as the workshop of the world; but she prospered so much that other countries, including the Dominions, found it necessary to protect their own industries by imposing tariffs on British goods.

The result of the protective system, adopted almost everywhere except in Great Britain and her dependencies, was an increasing competition for world trade which led a substantial section of opinion in Great Britain to the conclusion that she, too, must abandon free trade. It did not secure its way until 1932, when in the midst of depression a "National" Government, without a specific mandate from the electorate, but with a general mandate to take all such steps as it considered necessary, introduced a general tariff not for revenue but for protection. With it was associated the idea of an Imperial preference—a lower tariff for Empire produce which necessarily included the produce of the Dominions. This was an old idea derived from the mercantilist system, but it was revived by Canada in 1897, which decided to give British goods a lower tariff than she imposed on goods from foreign countries. It was not exactly manna from Heaven, for the protectionists had already discovered the British Empire. It could not be claimed that the United Kingdom should be "self-sufficient"; but it could be claimed that most of what the United Kingdom needed could be found within the Empire, though Empire trade was (until 1914) only about one-quarter of the trade of the United Kingdom. The self-governing colonies, for their part, were more than anxious to be given advantages in the British market. They were not prepared for free trade within the Empire, for that would have left their industries unprotected against competition from the United Kingdom. They wanted the United Kingdom to impose tariffs against foreign produce. At the conference at Ottawa which discussed the matter in 1894 they offered to Great Britain not

free trade but preferences, an offer which Britain necessarily refused because it implied tariffs in the United Kingdom.

Free trade within the Empire was advocated by Joseph Chamberlain and has been advocated from time to time since then, but even when Britain went protectionist in 1932 it had not the slightest chance of success because the Dominions were quite unwilling to merge their economic nationalism into an economic imperialism of which Britain would be the principal beneficiary. Canada gave Britain a preference in 1897, and by 1908 all the other Dominions (except, of course, Eire) had followed her example. The value of these preferences was not very considerable, for high tariff walls were erected, and they were only slightly lower for Britain than for foreign countries, but they enabled the Dominion leaders to press for tariffs in Britain which favoured Dominion produce. Actually, it was found by a Royal Commission appointed in 1912 that the Dominions were selling to the United Kingdom £52,000,000 more than they were buying, and were buying from foreigners £61,000,000 more than they were selling to them, though it must be remembered that Britain had large "invisible" exports to the Dominions which did not appear in these figures.

At the Imperial War Conference of 1917, however, Great Britain agreed to the principle of preferences, and in 1919 preferences were given to tea, coffee and cocoa from the Empire, goods not produced in the United Kingdom and therefore taxed for revenue, not protection. The Safeguarding of Industries Act, 1921, was, however, intended to protect British industries against "dumping", and again imperial preferences were given. What the Dominions wanted, however, was a tariff on food and raw material, with substantial preferences for Dominion produce, and such tariffs were decisively rejected at the general election of 1924 which brought in the first Labour Government.

The Conservative Government which followed at the end of that year considered itself bound by the apparent decision of the electors, but set up the Empire Marketing Board as a sop to the Dominions. Its functions were mainly propagandist,

and it did no more than popularize imperial products. Indeed, it was probably more successful in popularizing the Empire, for pure sentiment has little to do with buying and selling. It also stimulated, or tried to stimulate, much research. The fact that the Dominions were not willing to contribute to its cost is perhaps an assessment of its value to them, and after 1932 it died.

In the end it was the depression of 1930 and the political alignment which followed that gave the Dominions more or less what they wanted. Great Britain went moderately protectionist overnight, and Neville Chamberlain had the privilege of carrying out in some degree the ideas of Joseph Chamberlain. "Empire Free Trade" was Joseph's mantle, but though Lord Beaverbrook continued to agitate for it through his newspapers it was likely to cover as little as a gauze *saree*, for the protectionist Dominions would not wear it. Instead, there was hard bargaining at the Ottawa Conference of 1932 which would have reminded one of an oriental bazaar if the parties had had that sense of humour which is forbidden to politicians. Besides, the conference was held while the British nations, like the rest of the world, were trying desperately to pass on the depression to somebody else. It was haunted by the spectre of mass unemployment which the politicians were expected to exorcise.

Under the Ottawa agreements Great Britain gave the Dominions free entry for Dominion produce for five years, except in respect of eggs and dairy produce, where the period was three years, while increased tariffs were placed on foreign produce. What was perhaps more objectionable was that Great Britain undertook that the dependent colonies would grant the same concessions. What the Dominions gave in return was generally a raising of barriers against foreign produce, though lip-service was paid to the principle of lowering such barriers. In short, the result was not Empire Free Trade but more restricted foreign trade. After Ottawa the proportion of Empire trade went up; but here, as elsewhere, statistics can be very misleading. The proportion went up with a jump before Ottawa and went up only slowly

after 1932. There are, however, too many factors to enable conclusions to be drawn—the slow recovery from the depression, currency manipulation, changes in domestic economy all over the world, etc. Just before the war the dominant factor was the rearmament programme.

Since the war there has been too little experience to justify conclusions. The demands of the war caused the balance of economy to shift. Canada, Australia, South Africa and India have made substantial strides towards industrialization, and the argument for Empire Free Trade or a co-operative economic Commonwealth looks even thinner than it did before 1939. In the United Nations Organization the Dominions are behaving, not as neophytes under the tutelage and protection of Great Britain, but as mature and influential nations of the second rank. It can hardly be doubted that they will behave similarly when economic questions come under discussion.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE EAST

India and Pakistan

INDIA, like Europe, was peopled through waves of invasion. There are in many parts of the sub-continent primitive tribes which may be survivors of indigenous inhabitants. The oldest living civilization, however, goes back beyond the beginning of recorded history. It is that of the Dravidian-speaking peoples, the Tamils, Malayalis, Kanarese and Telugus, of the southern tip. It is possible that they were spread throughout the peninsula before the Aryan invasions which apparently came through the passes of the North-West Frontier. These invasions began before recorded history and continued long afterwards, but they appear generally to have stopped at or before the Kistna River. Even the Empire of Asoka, who ascended the throne of Magadha (south Bihar) about 274 B.C. went no further south than the northern parts of what are now the State of Mysore and the Province of Madras. The Dravidian civilization has been profoundly influenced by Aryan ideas, especially through Hinduism, but it remains distinct. The remainder of Hindu civilization is based essentially on the Aryan or Indo-European languages, but these languages, though closely associated with Sanskrit and less closely with the classical languages of Europe, are as diverse as the modern European languages.

Language is, however, only one element in diversity. Religion is another. The later invaders over the North-West Frontier were followers of Islam. Indeed, the Muslims entered Baluchistan only eighteen years after the death of the Prophet in 632 A.D. and continued at intervals until the Moghul invasion of 1526. At its zenith under Akbar (1556-1605) the Moghul Empire covered the greater part of the peninsula.

Meanwhile, the Europeans had begun to arrive by sea, and the Portuguese, the Dutch, the French, and the British all gained a footing. Unlike the earlier invasions, however, these were not mass movements and they had little influence on the composition of the population. There are few domiciled Europeans and the Eurasians form but an infinitesimal portion of the people. Except for a few Portuguese and French pockets on the coast, British rule or jurisdiction was spread throughout the peninsula in the course of the nineteenth century, but there is no part of India which is specifically British. The chief effect of British rule was to create an English-educated middle class among whom the democratic ideas of Europe were spread and by whom India and Pakistan will now be governed.

Under British rule, too, the population increased at a rapid and indeed alarming rate. In the fifty years from 1891 to 1941 it expanded from two hundred and eighty million to three hundred and eighty-nine million, an increase of nearly 40 per cent.; and in the decade between 1931 and 1941 the increase was 15 per cent. Every year there are over five million more people to be fed, clothed and housed.

Though the whole of India came under British rule or jurisdiction, it was not a political unit. Many of the States, resulting from the break-up of the Moghul Empire, were left independent, subject to elements of British control, particularly in respect of external affairs. In 1941 they contained ninety-three million people, though they varied in population from the sixteen million of Hyderabad to a few thousand in some of the central Indian States. Their future is uncertain. With the creation of the Dominions of India and Pakistan, the King has surrendered his powers; and though most of the States have agreed to discuss relationships with the Dominions of India or Pakistan some, including Hyderabad and Kashmir, have chosen to become independent. Subject to such agreements as may be made, India and Pakistan will divide up what was formerly British India, 55 per cent. of the area and 76 per cent. of the population of the peninsula.

As the population figures indicate, the fundamental

problem of British India was economic. India was and is a land of cultivators, some holding land from zamindars possessing estates which may be as large as thousands of acres, and some holding as ryots direct from the State. The area of British India under cultivation was, however, only two hundred and sixty million acres, or less than one acre per person. Rice, wheat and cotton were the main crops, in that order. The only really large industries were cotton and jute, which employed (in registered factories) little more than one million people. There were also about 230,000 people engaged in coal mining.

Though India was primarily an agricultural country, even before the war it imported more food than it exported. Thus, in 1941-42 it exported grains and pulses to the value of rather more than 10 crores of rupees¹, while its imports of grains and pulses were over 15 crores. In post-war conditions it has been compelled to prohibit the export of most foodstuffs and to rely on other countries, especially Australia, to feed its population even at the very low standard of living to which the greater part of it is accustomed. Its food production is in fact not keeping pace with its population. There is very little cultivable land not under cultivation, and not much more can be made cultivable even by expensive irrigation works. Something can be done, and indeed is being done, by the use of improved strains of seed and improved methods of cultivation; but improved cultivation is virtually impossible where, as in many parts of India, the land is already divided into plots too small for efficient production.

It is indeed plain that India cannot support its population even at the present low level of subsistence, and still less raise that level, unless there is rapid industrialization. The needs of war and the shortage of manufactured goods after the war have done something to bring this about. Probably India will gain most as a result of the war. It can replace Japan as a source of production for Asia and perhaps for Europe also. In 1940 Japan exported goods to the value of nearly 4,000 million yen or £400 million. India alone imported goods to the value of

¹ 1 crore = 100 lakhs = Rs.10,000,000 = £750,000.

nearly 22 crores (=£16 million) and exported only 9 crores to Japan. An additional export trade of even £200 million (=257 crores) would do much to find employment for India's teeming millions, since already in 1940 its exports (in large measure of raw materials) had reached 200 crores.

India's best customer, before the war, was the United Kingdom. In 1940-41 goods worth 65 crores were exported to that country and goods worth 36 crores imported from it. Australia took 7 crores and sent 2 crores, while Burma, Ceylon and Malaya sent 36 crores and took 27 crores. East African trade also is important to India. These portions of the Commonwealth, taken together, made up over one-half of Indian trade.

Hitherto, though, the economic problem has been submerged in the political problem. Indeed, the economic problem has been seen from the political angle. The Indian economy has been in the hands of the Government of India, a vast bureaucracy composed mainly of Indians but essentially under British control. What is more, a large part of the capital employed in India has been provided by British investors, who have drawn a dividend, which could be described as a tribute, out of the export surplus. The appalling conditions under which so many Indians have had to live, the extraordinarily low level of subsistence, the prevalence of eradicable diseases (such as cholera, small-pox, leprosy and tuberculosis), the very high death-rate (24 per 1,000 population in 1938), the low level of literacy (12.2 per cent. in 1941) and the many other very obvious social ills, have naturally and properly troubled the consciences and even raised the anger of English-educated Indians. It was implicit in the conditions that British rule and British capitalists should not be praised for what they had done but should be blamed for what they had not done. In the emotional environment thus created the inherent difficulties were minimized if not ignored; and in the opinions of the great mass of English-educated Indians the conditions supplied an irrefutable argument for the transfer of power to Indian hands.

The argument was, however, based mainly on political grounds. The political philosophy taught in the schools and

universities was derived not from Sanskrit texts or the Quran but from Great Britain. Until 1835 the East India Company had subsidized education in Sanskrit; but there was already a demand for English education which Macaulay's famous Minute of that year had clinched. Thenceforth English education proceeded apace. The constitutional history taught in India was that of England, the country in which representative and responsible government had been developed. If it was good for Englishmen to govern themselves—and Whig history suggested that it was—it was equally good for Indians to govern themselves. When the British had refused to allow self-government to the American colonies the colonists had rebelled; and the language of Chatham and Burke, as studied in India, seemed to imply that Indians also should govern themselves. In the nineteenth century the colonies of North America, Australasia and South Africa had obtained self-government and British publicists appeared to rejoice in the fact; but there was no self-government for India.

Another set of publicists provided the reason. J. A. Hobson showed in his *Imperialism* the connection between Empire and profits, colonies and investments. It became an axiom of Radical thought that the Conservative interest in the Empire was based on economic motives; and the products of the Radical presses were read in India. India, it was believed, was the brightest jewel in the Crown because her toiling millions provided with the sweat of their emaciated bodies the means for all the glory of Empire. With the dawn of the twentieth century, too, came the Labour Movement with its theory of equality of opportunity. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, George Bernard Shaw, Harold Laski and G. D. H. Cole were among the prophets; and at a later stage the yellow covers of the publishing house of Victor Gollancz held a prominent place in every bookstall in India. In short, English education spelled Indian independence. The British could maintain autocracy in India, while democracy and equality were being advocated in Britain, only by closing the schools and universities and forbidding the spread of the English language.

Already, in 1820, there were schools or colleges in Calcutta

Bombay, Madras and Agra. Until Macaulay's Minute of 1835, however, the Company gave no assistance towards English education. In 1854 a general policy for elementary education in the vernacular, higher education in English, and university education as then organized in London, was laid down in a despatch from the Board of Control. There was, however, little money available, with the result that the main development was in fee-levying schools and colleges using English as medium. The fees were necessarily low and the education correspondingly poor. Quality was sacrificed to quantity. Also, the three universities of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras which were founded in 1857 were mere examining bodies like their prototype, the University of London. Nor was there an Oxford or a Cambridge to set a standard. Their students came from poorly staffed and poorly equipped secondary schools in which emphasis was laid, not on education, but on the passing of public examinations. They proceeded to poorly staffed and poorly equipped colleges, where again the emphasis was upon public examinations.

The most serious complaint against British rule, apart from the delay in conferring self-government, was that insufficient attention was paid to the education of the masses through the vernaculars and that the English education provided was of a poor quality. The comparatively few who could overcome the defects of their earlier education were as good as, if not better than, the scholars of the West, but even in the present century, when the defects were realized by the Indians themselves and efforts made to overcome them, the proportion of real scholars has been distressingly small. The defects of the system of public examinations are evident enough in Britain, but they were multiplied a hundredfold in a country whose ancient tradition of learning had virtually disappeared and had been replaced not by the best type of English education but by its worst. Indian students, especially Hindu students, proved adept at passing examinations, though even examination standards were kept low by the need for fees; but their knowledge tended to be as superficial as all mere examination knowledge must be; and few were given

the opportunity to obtain that broad training of mind and character which the best English education could have provided.

This educational problem is fundamental to the political problem of India and to the relations between India and the Commonwealth, for it has several aspects. The Indian leaders from Ram Mohan Roy to Jawaharlal Nehru and M. A. Jinnah have been men of sterling character and outstanding ability, but they have lacked a sufficient following of men of the same quality. Much of the political propaganda spread over India for half a century has defeated its own aim by repeating stale and superficial slogans in which the element of truth has been swamped and therefore nullified by the larger element of obvious falsehood. Indian students and graduates have had an admirable patriotic zeal and an intensity of endeavour which, founded on a more secure basis of knowledge, would have made India pre-eminent among the nations; but in many cases their superficial education has given them a glib self-assurance without the depth of understanding which a broader and more intensive training would have given them. Those who governed from Calcutta, New Delhi or Simla tended, like all rulers, to be satisfied with their own endeavour; in so far as it appeared that the demands of nationalist India were the products of half-educated or superficially educated youths they were confirmed in their belief that the movement was irresponsible and the result of "agitation" which could be dealt with by "firmness" where it exceeded bounds and by ignoring it where it did not. The aloof bureaucracy of the Government of India thus became more and more aloof.

It has also to be noticed that the Hindus took more readily to English education than the Muslims. Islam is essentially conservative. Purdah, though widely practised among the Hindus, has for them no religious sanction; it was, therefore, more easily given up. The boy who starts with a deficient home education, however, suffers from a handicap which he cannot easily overcome. Also, the task of learning to recite the Quran in Arabic occupies much of his time and energy and places a great strain upon his intellect at an age when he ought to be laying the foundation of his education in his vernacular.

These difficulties multiply in geometrical progression; for those who sought English education were often the sons and daughters of public servants and others who had already some measure of English education. The result was that the Muslims, who under the Mughals had governed India, became a backward community. The tensions which this differentiation set up are in some measure responsible for the communal problem. Among Hindus in 1931 the literates were 8.4 per cent., while among Mussulmans the percentage was only 6.4 per cent.; and these figures give little indication of the distribution of English education.

The communal problem is, however, essentially religious or economic, not "racial". The several "races" created by the successive invasions and by the survival of different languages manage to live together in harmony. The Dravidian-speaking peoples of the south have no conflict with the Aryan peoples of the north. There are, it is true, occasional demands for a "Dravidistan", and the recent development of racial theories has also tended both towards a provincial particularism—which would divide Dravidistan into four parts—and towards a system of preferences based on language or even caste. The separation of the Muslim provinces into Pakistan may possibly cause these elements of differentiation to become more important; also, there is danger inherent in the growing use of the vernaculars for higher education, for it implies the disintegration of the English-educated middle class which has done so much to unify Indian opinion. On the other hand, the Mussulmans are not a separate "race". Though many of them had Arab, Turk or Mughal ancestors, the invaders married Indian wives and their progeny differ only in religion from their Hindu compatriots. What is more, Islam achieved its usual success as a proselytizing religion, so that many Mussulmans are the descendants of converted Hindus. The principal language of the Muslims, Urdu, is merely a variety of Hindi, using Arabic script and being somewhat more impregnated by Arabic and Persian borrowings.

To describe the Hindu-Muslim conflict as a conflict of religions is not, however, wholly accurate. Both Hinduism and

Islam are ways of life prescribing not merely forms of worship and moral behaviour but family relationships and wider social relationships, including legal relationships. Neither knows the distinction between the religious and the secular which is common form in the West. It is therefore not practicable to keep religion out of politics, for in large measure both are concerned with the same problems.

The origin of Hinduism is obscure because it preceded recorded history. The fact that it is Dravidian as well as Aryan may lead to the surmise that the whole of India was once Dravidian and that the Aryan invaders adopted Hinduism when they settled down in India. On the other hand, the sacred texts are in Sanskrit and most of the holy places in the north. The caste system was recognized in the earliest texts, though it was neither so complex nor so rigid as it became in later generations. At one stage Hinduism seemed likely to be superseded by Buddhism, whose origin we may place at the traditional (though probably incorrect) date of 543 B.C.; but when Buddhism ceased to enjoy royal patronage it decayed, no doubt mainly because it would have compelled a reorganization of Hindu social life; and for our present purposes the most significant historical factor is that it spread to, and remained in, Burma and Ceylon.

The Hindu way of life or *dharma* is laid down in the sacred texts, which perhaps begin about 800 B.C. and continued for at least 2,000 years. Its theological and philosophical aspects we need not attempt to summarize, though it must be emphasized that the social system which results is dependent on them. The two fundamental and peculiar characteristics of Hindu social life are the joint family and the caste system.

The joint family is a system whereby the land is vested not in one person but in the whole family, which includes sons and their families (or, in some areas where matriarchy prevails, daughters and their families). It has some admirable features in that it provides for the maintenance of the sick, the lame, the blind, the mentally deficient, the aged and the unemployed without the intervention of the State. These obligations continue, as moral obligations, even

where the joint family system as a form of landholding has ceased to operate and the sons (or daughters) have set up house for themselves. What is more, there is a social obligation to help in the education of nephews if not of nieces also: and this has done much for the spread of English education because, when one member of the family has reached the economic level at which the cost of fees and maintenance can be borne, he may be the means of bringing the whole family to that level. If the uncles can find the fees and the eldest son can pass the necessary examinations, he can hope for a place in the public service or elsewhere where his income will be large enough to educate his brothers and perhaps even his cousins. To this end the family will incur hardships and mortgage its lands. On the other hand, this emphasis in the family converts nepotism from a vice to a virtue. The family obligation is the social obligation which takes precedence over all others. Combined with the caste system, it has made extremely difficult the development of a social conscience or a sense of social solidarity.

The caste system may be a development from the joint family system, like the clan, but clearly other ideas have been at work. In its fully developed form it has four aspects. First, it is a rule about marriage. A person may not marry outside his caste or, where the caste has been subdivided, outside his sub-caste. This rule is still broken but rarely. Secondly, the castes and sub-castes have generally been associated with particular classes of employment, so that sons follow the occupations of their fathers. This rule has never been absolute and has completely broken down among the English-educated classes. Thirdly, there are customs relating to the preparation and use of food and drink which compel social segregation for these purposes. This rule also has broken down in the educated classes, except among the more conservative Brahmins. Finally, there is in theory at least a sense of fellowship among members of the same caste, though more often it operates to segregate the castes so that, for instance, a man of one caste will not go to live in a village where there are no other members of his caste.

The caste system operates most harshly in relation to what used to be called the untouchables and are now known as the scheduled castes. Of these there are some sixty millions throughout India. Until recently they were not allowed to use the same roads, draw water from the same wells, worship in the same temples, send their children to the same schools, or be cremated in the same cemeteries, as those of the higher castes. They were thus completely segregated from the rest of Hindu civilization, and only the Christians and the Mussulmans, who denied the whole theory of caste, offered the Harijans relief from their disabilities. This fact, and the fact that they have become politically important, has given added strength to the case which the socially conscious caste Hindus had already made against the whole caste system. The abolition of the disabilities of the Harijans had been one of Mahatma Gandhi's major objectives; and his campaign, which was generally supported by the Indian National Congress, achieved a large measure of success.

The comparison which educated Hindus sometimes make between the caste system and the class system is not accurate. It is true that in the West people do not usually marry outside their own class; but nobody is "declassed" if he does. It is true, too, that there are differences of costume and accent; but a person can change both. The classes are in a constant state of flux. Economic and educational opportunities are available for those at the lowest economic levels to rise to the top, while those at the top can sink to the bottom either slowly or rapidly. Actually, India has a class system, more pronounced than that of Europe, superimposed on the caste system. The range of incomes in Government service, industry or commerce is wider in India than in England, while knowledge of English is a class distinction which creates a formidable barrier. It is more difficult to rise in the social scale in India than in England because it is more difficult to obtain educational qualifications; but it is of course happening constantly, whereas no person can rise out of his caste.

Since there are some 3,000 castes and sub-castes, the general effect of the Hindu social system is fragmentation. In one

aspect this minimizes the religious conflict; for while (as will be seen) Islam tends to unite the Mussulmans, Hinduism does not unite the Hindus. On the other hand, it prevents the growth of the sense of solidarity which is the foundation of citizenship. The Indian National Congress and other social reformers have done much to diminish caste differences and integrate the people, though they have been more successful in creating Hindu opinion than in creating Indian opinion.

Islam like Christianity is a religion which in theory accepts the equality of all true believers. Mussulmans, as the phrase goes, are brothers in Islam. Like early Christianity, too, Islam had difficulty in accepting the principle of toleration. If there is one God and Muhammed is his Prophet, how can believers tolerate the many gods of Hinduism?

It is clear enough that in the invasions of the seventh and eighth centuries, when the Arabs conquered Baluchistan, Sind and the Punjab in the name of Allah and on behalf of the Khalifa of Baghdad, there was little toleration. The men among the conquered people either accepted Islam or were destroyed, while the women and children were booty of war. In course of time, however, the Mussulmans extended to Hindus the toleration shown to Jews and Christians: they were allowed to retain their religion provided that they paid poll-tax. At a later stage, indeed, Hindu kingdoms could remain in being provided that tribute was paid. It thus became possible for Hinduism to retain its strength even in the Mogul Empire and for Hindus and Mussulmans to live side by side.

Even when forced conversion virtually disappeared, however, voluntary conversions were numerous, particularly in the Indus Plain where Muslim influence was greatest and in Eastern Bengal. These are the areas which have now become Pakistan; and though it is true that the ancestry of the people of Western Pakistan is even more mixed than that of the rest of India, there is no fundamental ethnological difference. Moreover, conversion whether forced or voluntary did not produce a fundamental change from the Hindu to the Muslim way of life. Whole families and even castes were converted without any genuine understanding of the Islamic faith and the con-

verts carried with their new faith some of the social ideas of Hinduism. These ideas include those of caste; and though there are no untouchables in Islam many uneducated Mussulmans maintain the same caste divisions as their Hindu neighbours. To some extent, therefore, the brotherhood of Islam was long ago broken up.

The differences between Islam and Hinduism are therefore not so great as to prevent Mussulmans and Hindus from living in close proximity. On the other hand, they are sufficiently great to be obvious. The Mussulmans are indeed brothers in Islam, ready to help each other in trouble and in some measure looking down on their Hindu neighbours whose close family and caste organization impels segregation. The purdah system of Islam has indeed been adopted by many Hindus and adds to the difficulty of intercourse caused by caste observances. Disputes generally arise through quite trivial causes. To the Hindu the cow is sacred. For the Mussulmans there are occasions when religion is thought to require the sacrifice of a cow. Again, Hindus and Muslims generally enjoy each others' festivals; but there are occasions when Hindu and Muslim festivals coincide and when Hindu music is played outside a mosque in such a manner as to rouse antagonism among the Muslims. If for either of these or for any other reason, passions are stirred, the differentiation in the way of life and the segregation which social practices produce may result in a trivial dispute becoming a flaming controversy in which blood is shed. Adequate precautions are usually taken; but if they are not large-scale rioting may result.

Rioting of this character has been, so to speak, endemic, though it has sometimes been instigated by designing politicians; but it need not have resulted in communal controversy at a political level, for it has always occurred among the uneducated. The communal rivalry is founded on the different social conventions of Islam and Hinduism, but it has been built up among the educated classes through different causes arising out of the political development of the Indian peoples.

When Macaulay, as Secretary to the Board of Control,

spoke on the Indian Councils Bill of 1833, he expressed the hope that one day India would have "European institutions". Whenever that day came, he added, "it will be the proudest day for English history". The proudest day, on this computation, was August 15, 1947, when the Dominions of India and Pakistan were created. It cannot be alleged, however, that the efforts of Great Britain were concentrated on achieving this consummation. Even as late as 1909 it was doubted whether the structure of Indian society would ever permit of responsible government. Lord Kimberley, who had been Secretary of State for India, called the idea "one of the wildest imaginations that ever entered the minds of men". Lord Morley, who was responsible for the reforms of 1909, said much the same in public. In private, as was his way, he hedged a little. He was prepared to agree that the ultimate hope and design was for India to be a self-governing colony, but for many a day to come it was "a mere dream". It was not until 1917 that His Majesty's Government laid down as its policy that of "the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire".

The policy of responsible government by evolution was thus adopted only in 1917; but it had been implicit in the conditions of government since 1835. The introduction of Western education and the English language, the removal of all restrictions on the Press save the ordinary laws of sedition and libel, the establishment of the right of public meeting, and generally the creation of a free environment such as Great Britain and the Dominions enjoyed, necessarily produced a demand, which could not be refused, for the other half of freedom, self-government. The peculiar conditions of Indian social life, and especially the fragmentation of her peoples by religion, race, caste and language, did no more than retard the development; the fundamental decisions were taken in 1835 and 1854 when Western education and the English language were introduced.

The fundamental problem, indeed, was not the objective but the rate of evolution. On this point the Government of India and the new English-educated middle class necessarily differed. The Government of India was conscious of the difficulties in a country where the great mass of the population had an abominably low economic level, was completely illiterate, steeped in superstition (for the philosophies of Hinduism and Islam did not touch the mass of the people), and capable of upsetting law and order for causes which seemed trivial. To the English-educated Indians, on the other hand, these facts tended to prove that government should be in the hands of those who understood the people and had every incentive to remove these distressing conditions. The policy of self-government by evolution inevitably aroused an antagonism between those who governed and those who wanted to govern and who thought, indeed, that they had the right to govern.

Since 1885 the most prominent organ of Indian opinion has been the Indian National Congress. At first it was a patriotic organization of the English-educated, working for constitutional reforms by legal means. It asked for no more than higher Indian representation in the Legislative Councils and the public services, but from 1904 to 1916 it adopted the policy of Dominion status by evolution. In its earlier phase it contained members of all communities, and at no stage has it been an exclusively Hindu body. Nevertheless, it was suspected by many Muslims from the beginning. In its early years Sir Seyed Ahmad Khan warned the Mussulmans that majority rule in any form meant, in Indian conditions, Hindu rule. The leftward swing of the Congress in the early years of the present century induced a number of Muslim leaders to form, in 1906, the All-India Muslim League, which occasionally reached agreement with the Congress but generally was opposed to it.

At the beginning of the present century the younger men, especially in the universities, became impatient with the reformism of the Congress and, led by B. G. Tilak, began to demand action instead of what Tilak called "mendicancy",

the begging of reforms from the Raj. The Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 strengthened the hands of the older men, but they were defeated by the militancy inspired by the war of 1914-18, and in 1916 the left wing gained control while the older leaders resigned to form a new organization, the National Liberal Party, a small but influential body.

The war with Turkey, whose Sultan was Caliph of Islam, and the influence of the younger men also changed the policy of the Muslim League. In 1916 an agreement was reached between the Congress and the League by which the Congress conceded the principle of seats reserved for minorities (communal representation) and the League accepted a large instalment of self-government. This provided a favourable environment for the announcement of 1917: but whereas the Raj assumed the development of responsible government by slow stages, the Congress expected a rapid transfer of power. In 1918 the Congress asked for a statutory guarantee that full responsible government would be accorded within fifteen years.

Meanwhile Mr. M. K. Gandhi, usually known as Mahatma Gandhi, had returned from South Africa. After practising as a barrister in India he had gone to South Africa in 1893 in connection with a lawsuit, and had been so affected by the colour prejudice of that country that he had remained to fight the battles of the Indian community. Early in his stay he had been profoundly influenced by religious studies, Christian and Muslim as well as Hindu, and made it his ideal to live "like a bare spirit in its low prison of flesh". He thus became a fighting politician who scorned to fight; and in his final battle, which lasted eight years, against the humiliating restrictions of the South African Asiatic Act he developed the technique of *satyagraha*, passive resistance or "non-violent non-co-operation". His campaign being successful in 1914, he returned to India famous both as a saint and as a politician.

In the troubles of the war and the post-war period, the Mahatma preached and practised his own solutions, and by 1920 his ideas dominated the Congress. In 1921 the objective of Dominion status was rejected and the new aim was declared

to be "the attainment of *Swarajya* by the people of India by all legitimate and peaceful means". "Legitimate", in practice usually meant passive resistance to the law; and though the actions of the Mahatma and the Congress leaders were peaceful, or at least passive, they generally resulted in disorder and violence. The Congress had in fact become a revolutionary body, conducting its revolution by passive disobedience. What is more, it had ceased to be an organization only of the English-educated and was based essentially on the mass support of millions of Hindus.

The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms which took effect in 1921 were at first welcomed by the Mahatma, but very soon he changed his mind and under his influence the Congress boycotted the elections. The Liberals accepted office in the new semi-self-governing Provincial legislatures and the new Constitution worked reasonably well except where, in and after 1923, the Congress fought and won the elections in order to prevent it from working. The Muslim League, now led by M. A. Jinnah, followed a policy in general agreement with that of the Congress, and indeed the Mahatma made every effort to persuade the Congress and the League to come to terms. In fact, however, there was throughout the parts of India where the Muslims were strong, a struggle for power between Muslims and Hindus and there were frequent communal riots. The communal situation was worse in 1928 than in 1918. Civil disobedience proved once more that if some parts of the law are not observed the basis of law and order disappears.

Even so, the position was not quite hopeless. A small but representative committee under Pundit Motilal Nehru produced, in 1928, a report which went near to securing agreement. Eventually, however, the Congress hedged and the Muslim League then rejected it. It is possible, though improbable, that if at this stage the Government of India had acted as mediator an agreed scheme might have proved acceptable. At this time, however, neither the Government of India nor the Imperial Government had decided that the time for complete, or almost complete, self-government had arrived. The Act of 1919 had prescribed that after ten

years the constitutional problem should be re-examined by a statutory commission. In 1927 it was decided to appoint the commission immediately. Its members were drawn entirely from the Imperial Parliament, and the appointment thus gave renewed offence. The publication of the report of the Simon Commission was followed by a Round Table Conference in London, and the Congress was represented by Mahatma Gandhi at the second session. He failed to secure agreement with the minorities on the communal question, which was settled for the time being by an award of the Prime Minister. On it and on the discussions of the Conference was based the Act of 1935, which gave self-government subject to safeguards in the Provinces and a division of power between Ministers and officials at the centre. The federal scheme was, however, subject to acceptance by the States; and, since they did not accede, it never came into operation.

In August, 1940, just before the Battle of Britain, a new offer was made to India through the Viceroy. It offered a constituent assembly, but on such conditions that it was immediately repudiated by the Congress and was not welcomed by anybody, though the Muslim League welcomed the declaration about minorities which was especially objectionable to the Congress. In October, while London was being bombed, *satyagraha* was begun again under the Mahatma's direction, though it was kept within narrow limits so as not to embarrass the war effort, and in fact did not embarrass anybody except the *satyagrahis*.

On the Japanese approach to India in 1942 a new effort was made. Four days after the fall of Rangoon, Mr. Winston Churchill announced that the War Cabinet had reached a unanimous decision on India and that Sir Stafford Cripps would leave for India to negotiate personally. The offer made was that an Indian Union should be formed with full Dominion status, including power to secede from the Commonwealth; that a constituent assembly should be set up immediately on the cessation of hostilities; that the British Government would accept the constitution so drafted on two conditions; first that any Provinces not willing to accept the Constitution should

have power to form a Dominion of their own, and secondly that a treaty for the transfer of power and the protection of minorities should be settled; and that while defence would remain in the hands of the United Kingdom until the Constitution came into operation the co-operation of the leaders of opinion would be sought.

It is necessary at this stage to leave the Congress and to look at the attitude of the Muslim League. The Congress had become a party based on the support of the masses. At the elections under the Act of 1935 it had obtained a majority in seven of the Provinces. It was convinced that it represented the nation. It was therefore little inclined to compromise on the communal issue. Communalism would disappear once British rule was ended, for it was the product of the British plan to "divide and rule". This attitude naturally brought the Muslim League into opposition; what is more, Muslim opinion was consolidated and the League became the Islamic bulwark against the "Congress Raj", which was alleged to be much the same as a Hindu Raj. By 1938 the League was strong enough to claim that it alone represented Muslim India. At the end of the year Mr. Jinnah claimed that there was a worse enemy than British imperialism—Congress fascism. What is more, the League began to complain of Muslim grievances in Congress Provinces. It was now alleged that "divide and rule" was Congress policy.

Simultaneously, the Congress was being attacked from the other side. The Hindu Mahasabha had been founded in 1928 as a purely cultural organization. By 1937 it had become a political body and was attacking the Congress because it was trying to be a non-communal body. The Mahasabha agreed with the League that a united bi-communal India was a figment of the imagination. India was Hindustan, a Hindu country in which the Muslims and other minorities should be treated justly.

It was in this atmosphere that the idea of Pakistan was adopted as official League policy. The idea of separating the Muslim Provinces of the North-West had been developed in 1930. The idea of federating the Punjab, the North-West

Frontier Province (or Afghan Province), Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan had been elaborated by a group of young Indians in England during the Round Table Conference. It was based on the assumption that India contained not one nation but two nations, the one Hindu, the other Muslim. Accordingly, the Pakistan Provinces should form a separate independent State. There was much literary discussion in the next decade. The doctrine of the "two nations" was gradually accepted by League opinion and in 1940 a somewhat vague League resolution used the phrase "independent States" for North-West and North-East India, though it was clear that some organic connection with Hindustan was contemplated. At this stage, therefore, the "two nation" theory and Pakistan became the official policy of the League, though its meaning was deliberately left vague.

To meet this demand, the Cripps offer provided for any Province or Provinces to secede from the Dominion of India and form a separate Dominion. This provision and the provision relating to the states gave reason to the Congress to reject the offer. Thereupon the League also rejected the offer because, though Pakistan was accepted by implication, its primary object was to create an India Union. It is however, reasonably certain that agreement could have been reached if the Congress had been willing to accept the Cripps plan of an interim National Government. What they wanted was an immediate constitutional change, conferring full responsible government by law, a change which, in the opinion of the British Government, was impracticable at that stage of the war. The Congress was perhaps true to its ideology in asking for everything at once; but in fact it would have had long before 1947 a scheme more favourable to the Congress point of view than that ultimately adopted by agreement.

The immediate result of the rejection of the Cripps offer was an intensification of controversy. The League attacked the Congress and the Congress defended itself by attacking the British. The All-India Congress Committee flatly repudiated "any proposal to disintegrate India by giving liberty to any

component State or territorial unit to secede from the Indian Union or Federation". Later the Working Committee, under Mahatma Gandhi's influence, demanded British withdrawal, since it was the presence of the British which frustrated communal agreement. A provisional Government would then be formed to evolve a scheme for a Constituent Assembly. Representatives of free India would negotiate with Great Britain, would adjust future relations and enable the two countries to co-operate as allies. If this "very reasonable and just proposal" was not accepted the Congress would have to have recourse to non-violence under the Mahatma's leadership. The resolution having been approved by the All-India Congress Committee, the Mahatma and many other Congress leaders were arrested, but the "rebellion" had been organized in depth and disorder broke out simultaneously, in accordance with a coherent plan, in many parts of India. It was put down with a loss of 940 lives. There was fortunately no communal trouble. Mahatma Gandhi had tried to persuade the Muslim League to combine with the Congress in his attack on British rule. The League's response was to declare that the Congress aim was to coerce the British Government into handing power to a Hindu oligarchy and to compel the Mussulmans to submit to Congress dictation. Accordingly, Muslims were enjoined to take no part in the Congress movement but to pursue their normal peaceful life. The instruction was observed.

It was now clear that the Congress plan of a united India was impracticable unless agreement with the Muslim League could be reached. In 1944 there were long but fruitless negotiations between Mahatma Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah. In 1945 an unofficial committee under Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, a Liberal leader of long experience and considerable popularity, produced an interesting but still-born report. In 1945 the new Viceroy, Lord Wavell, produced a new interim plan for a "balanced" central Cabinet containing equal representation for Muslims and "caste" Hindus. A conference was summoned to Simla to work out the details, but it broke down because the League insisted that all the Muslim members should be

nominated by the League. Soon afterwards the war in Europe ended and the Labour Government made another effort. In March, 1946, a Cabinet Mission was sent to India with the intention of securing an agreement "upon the fundamental issue of the unity or division of India". Both sides agreed to concessions, but it was impossible to bridge the gap. The League insisted that the six "Muslim Provinces" (Punjab, North-West Frontier, Baluchistan, Sind, Bengal and Assam) be grouped together under one constituent assembly and the "Hindu Provinces" under another and that the two bodies sit together for dealing with Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications necessary for Defence. The Congress wanted a single constituent assembly to deal with Foreign Affairs, Defence, Communications, Fundamental Rights, Customs, and Planning. All remaining powers were to be vested in Provinces which might for this purpose combine in groups. The Cabinet mission then put forward its own scheme, which was rejected by both sides.

Finally, in 1947, an interim Government was formed, with Lord Mountbatten as Viceroy and titular President. A complicated scheme was agreed whereby Sind, Baluchistan, North-East Bengal (with the Sylhet District of Assam) became "Pakistan" and the remainder became "India", each under separate constituent assemblies and within governments. Power was transferred by the India Independence Act, 1947, which created the Dominions of India and Pakistan. There was, of course, implied in this Dominion status, a right of secession from the British Commonwealth.

The Congress thus accepted in 1947 a scheme which was less favourable to the Congress thesis than the "August offer" of 1940, the Cripps plan of 1942, and the Cabinet Mission's proposals of 1946. The British Government, after seven years of intensive effort, had produced an acceptable plan to "quit India". Whether, after the thirty years of controversy and propaganda, the psychological foundations necessary for continued membership of the Commonwealth by India and Pakistan exist, is one of those problems whose solution requires the gift of prophecy.

Ceylon

Ceylon is separated from India by the Palk Strait, some 40 miles wide. Though the northern tip, the Jaffna Peninsula, is much like the Province of Madras and, indeed, occupied by hard-working Tamils, the remainder of the Island is a green and pleasant land, enjoying an equable climate tempered by the seas that wash her palm-fringed coasts. The west coast and the western slopes of the central hills receive rain by both monsoons, so that paddy, fruit, vegetables and coconuts flourish in the lowlands, rubber in the steamy valleys, and tea on the hill-sides. Much of the rest of the Island is jungle, though in the great days of Sinhalese civilization much of it was cultivated under vast "tanks" or reservoirs which impounded the rain of the north-east monsoon and the water of the Mahaweli-ganga, the great river that rises near Adam's Peak and pours into the Bay of Bengal at Trincomalee.

The people of the coastal belt and the villagers of the hills are Sinhalese. Their language is Aryan and the tradition that they came from the Ganges valley by way of the sea is probably correct. Almost certainly, however, their Aryan ancestors intermarried with earlier inhabitants, represented until recently by the Veddahs or hunters of the jungle and possibly there were Dravidians before them. There is also a considerable Dravidian strain due to invasions from south India and numerous more peaceful contacts. The people of the coastal belt, too, have been subjected to the influence of all the maritime nations who have left their impress not only on the language but also on the biological inheritance of the Sinhalese. In short, the Sinhalese "race" is as mixed as the English, if not more so. Any difficulties that this mixture might cause is overcome by the polite fiction that if the father is Sinhalese the offspring are Sinhalese whatever the mother may be. Since the Ceylon Tamils, the Moors and the Malays, though not the Europeans, follow the same rule, the "racial" division is maintained; the only people of "mixed blood" are those resulting from intermarriage between European males and Sinhalese or Tamil females, and their number is small.

The Arabs came as traders and settled down in the Island, so creating the Muslim community of the "Moors", though there has also been a considerable infiltration from the west coast of India which has made Tamil their usual language. The Malays are descended from the men who came in Dutch and British Malay regiments. Both Moors and Malays follow the social system as well as the religion of Islam, but since they number only half-a-million they have necessarily been able to adapt themselves more readily to their environment. The Ceylon Tamils have kept their Dravidian language and (except in so far as they have become Christians) their Hindu religion and social system, though the caste divisions are less numerous than in India. The Sinhalese are Buddhists except where, as on the coast, they have become Christian. Buddhism does not recognize caste in principle, but does in practice. There is very little left of ancient Sinhalese culture, but it was essentially Indian in texture, and the Sinhalese way of life is not essentially different from the Hindu. Consequently, Ceylon has not the fundamental social division which has been so troublesome in India. The communities are very distinct because language causes a barrier and intermarriage (except among Burghers or Eurasians) is rare.

Also, Ceylon is much more Westernized than India. English is the spoken and written language of the whole of the middle class, though most can also speak (if not read and write) either Sinhalese or Tamil. The earliest "English" schools still in existence were founded in 1822 and there has been a rapid increase in "English education" in the last fifty years. These schools are "English" not only in language but also in organization and curriculum. The London and Cambridge examinations dominated the teaching until 1943. Since the early years of the century London external degree examinations have been held in the island. A University College, teaching on the London syllabuses, was founded in 1921. The establishment of a University was delayed by controversies over its nature and site. Though the delay had some serious consequences, it resulted in the adoption by Ceylon of modern English standards, and indeed its organization is much like

that of the modern English universities. It follows that educational standards are higher in Ceylon than in India. The standard of literacy also is much higher, being about 60 per cent. as compared with India's $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

This is partly a reflection of the higher standard of living due mainly to heavy investment in tea, rubber and coconuts, the Island's main products. Eighty per cent. of the tea industry and about 50 per cent. of the rubber industry is in non-Ceylonese hands, while much of the labour employed in those industries was drawn from south India. Some of this has become domiciled, while the remainder has maintained its relations with south India. A distinction is, however, still drawn between the Ceylon Tamils of Jaffna and the Indian Tamils of the estates and Colombo.

The population is approaching seven millions, the great majority being engaged in agriculture on the coastal belt and in Jaffna. Two-thirds are Sinhalese, the remainder being divided almost equally among the Ceylon Tamils, the Indian Tamils and the Muslims. The Ceylon Tamils are, however, concentrated mainly in the Northern and Eastern Provinces; the Indian Tamils are mainly on the estates, among which are interspersed Sinhalese villages; and the Muslims are scattered all over the island.

In the ferment of Asia of the past fifty years, Ceylon has been singularly peaceful. This is partly a reflection of better economic conditions; partly, too, it may be the product of an equable climate; in the main, though, it is a consequence of tradition which the tolerance of Buddhism and Hinduism have helped to maintain. The riots of 1915, which would long ago have been forgotten in India as a very trumpery affair, stand out in Ceylon history as the only example of civil strife since the Kandyan rebellions.

The Portuguese arrived in Ceylon in 1505 and extended their jurisdiction over the whole of the low-country, including the Jaffna Peninsula. As in India they intermarried with, and in many respects adopted the ways of, the Ceylonese. In consequence a large number of Portuguese words were adopted into colloquial Sinhalese; and it is probable that some of the

differences between the low-country Sinhalese and the Kandyan Sinhalese (who maintained their independence in the hills), are due to the stimulus of intermarriage. The wide prevalence of Portuguese names is due in the main, however, to deliberate adoption on baptism into the Christian faith. Even in living memory there were villages, now described as Sinhalese, in which a corrupt Portuguese was spoken. In spite of persecution under the Dutch, too, the Roman Catholics are the most numerous of the Christians both among the Sinhalese and among the Tamils.

As in India, the Portuguese came to rely more and more on the Eurasian population for the government of the Island, and the Dutch had little difficulty in taking over all the Portuguese possessions after the fall of Colombo in 1656. The Dutch were interested primarily in trade and made no attempt to capture the Kandyan kingdom. As in Java, however, their officials were encouraged to settle in the island. In many cases, though not in all, they intermarried with the Sinhalese, so that it is not possible to draw a clear distinction between the Burghers and the Eurasians. Indeed, the phrase "Portuguese Burgher" is sometimes used to describe a Eurasian of Portuguese ancestry. The Dutch also left behind a system of canals in the low-country and the Roman-Dutch Law, which has been extended to the Kandyan Provinces under British rule but much modified all over the island by English law.

During the war with France, while the Netherlands were under French control, there was a fear that Trincomalee would be occupied as a base by the French fleet and used for attacks on British commerce with India. In 1795 it was occupied by the British, and by 1796 all the Dutch possessions in Ceylon had passed into British hands. They were at first attached to the Madras Presidency, but after the Treaty of Amiens had confirmed British rule in 1802, Ceylon became a Crown colony. There were early troubles with Kandy and in 1815, when a British force was sent there, the Nayakkar King of Kandy was captured and sent to India. The Kandyan Convention of that year, made with the Kandyan chiefs, vested the Kandyan Territory in His Britannic Majesty. The country

was not immediately pacified, and there was a rebellion in 1817 and minor disturbances in the years following. In 1833 the Kandyan territory was amalgamated with the rest of the Island. The assimilation of the Kandyan Provinces was, however, brought about mainly by the building of roads to replace the jungle tracks and the planting of coffee and tea.

Ceylon was at first governed from Madras, but as soon as British sovereignty was ratified by the Treaty of Amiens it was converted into a Crown Colony with wholly official Legislature and Executive Councils. In 1837 two unofficial members were appointed to the former; by 1845 the number had increased to four, and by 1865 to eight, though an official majority was retained. With the spread of English education a demand arose, especially in the twentieth century, for better representation. In 1910 the Legislative Council was reformed to contain eleven officials and ten unofficial members, of whom four were elected. The riots of 1915 intensified the demand, and in 1919 the nationalist organizations were fused into the Ceylon National Congress. This body, unlike its Indian prototype, used only constitutional means to attain its ends. In 1921 the Legislative Council was given an unofficial majority, though the number of officials was greater than the number of elected members and the franchise was very restricted. In 1924, however, the elected members were given a majority in the Legislative Council, while the Executive Council still contained an official majority. The island thus had representative government with an irresponsible executive.

Nationalist opinion was still not satisfied, and in 1927 a Commission with Lord Donoughmore as chairman was appointed to examine the working of the Constitution and to report what amendments should be made¹. The Commission found, like Lord Durham in 1840, that the most striking characteristic of the Constitution was "the divorce of power from responsibility". The elected members were placed on the horns of a dilemma. The Constitution could not be worked harmoniously save by co-operation between officials and elected members; if they co-operated, however, the elected members

¹ Cmd. 3131 (1928).

might be regarded as having abandoned their claim to self-government. In practice the unofficial members regarded themselves as the permanent Opposition—an Opposition, too, which had a majority.

Denied all prospects of office, the unofficial members were in no danger of being called upon to translate their criticisms into action and to execute in practice the measures which they advocated. They were free therefore from the deterrent which is usually present to the Opposition in countries where parliamentary government obtains. Apart from their responsibility to their constituencies, in which the bulk of the people were debarred from the franchise, they were free agents who, while able by their slightest actions to affect the fortunes of their country, possessed, if called to account for those actions, a convenient scapegoat ready to hand. It is then no matter for surprise that the launching of continuous and irresponsible attacks on the members of the Government collectively and individually became the distinctive feature of their policy.¹

The Government decided to adopt a conciliatory attitude in the hope of achieving co-operation; but their success induced the elected members to redouble their attacks. The Governor could intervene only in matters of "paramount importance" and had to acquiesce in the devitalization of his Executive Council. Though technically President of the Legislative Council, it had been ruled that he should so act only on formal occasions. His position resembled that of a Prime Minister whose duty it was to carry on the Government with a minority in the House, but who was denied entrance to the House and had to work through a Deputy.

The Ceylon National Congress had asked for full responsible government immediately; but the Commission did not recommend that solution because (*a*) the Ceylonese politicians had had no experience of government, (*b*) there was need for a greater measure of unity and corporate spirit:

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

If the claims for full responsible government be subjected to examination . . . it will be found that its advocates are always to be numbered among those who form the larger communities¹ and who, if freed from external control, would be able to impose their will on all who dissented from them. Those on the other hand who form the minority communities, though united in no other respect, are solid in their opposition to the proposal. A condition precedent to the grant of full responsible government must be the growth of a public opinion which will make that grant acceptable, not only to one section, but to all sections of the people; such a development will only be possible if under a new constitution the members of the larger communities so conduct themselves in the reformed Council as to impose universal confidence in their desire to act justly, even at a sacrifice to themselves.²

The scheme recommended by the Commission was a sort of dyarchy. There was to be a State Council elected on adult male franchise, women over thirty being also enfranchised. The Legislative Council, when it debated the matter, asked that all women of twenty-one and over be enfranchised and this modification was approved. The State Council was to divide itself into seven executive committees, each of which would elect a chairman, who would be appointed by the Governor as Minister. The executive committee would be charged with the general direction and control of a group of Departments. The Departments dealing with the public service, law and finance, however, were placed under senior officials, the Officers of State, who were responsible to the Governor and who were also to be members of the State Council without votes. The three Officers of State and the seven Ministers were to be members of the Board of Ministers and, as such, collectively responsible to the State Council for finance but not for other matters, which might go direct to the State Council from the Officers of State or the executive committees.

The new Constitution was accepted by the Legislative

¹ *i.e.* the Sinhalese.

² Cmd. 3131, p. 31.

Council by the narrow majority of two votes and came into operation in 1931. It was a complicated and difficult Constitution; and when, at a later stage, the Ministers asked for full self-government their most telling argument was that they had successfully worked the Donoughmore Constitution. One of its defects was that, far from encouraging the formation of parties, it actually discouraged them because it gave the independent member a substantial power as a member of an executive committee and so split up the functions of government that a party policy was impracticable. On the other hand, it gave members of the State Council some familiarity with the problems of government and, in spite of its defects, enabled the State Council to bring about many valuable reforms.

No party organization was developed to fight the State Council elections and the only possible classification of members is the communal, though in fact divisions were rarely on communal lines. Of the fifty-eight elected and nominated members, thirty-eight in the first Council and thirty-nine in the second were Sinhalese. In the former two minority members were elected Ministers; but in 1936 all the Ministers were Sinhalese, this having been arranged mainly to secure a "united front" for further reforms. Immediately after its creation the State Council began to press for more self-government and this pressure continued until 1943. The lead was invariably taken by the Sinhalese and it became clear that the fundamental issue was that of representation. The Donoughmore Commission had rejected communal representation and the Sinhalese insisted on territorial election—which would, of course, give them a large majority. The minorities, on the other hand, demanded communal representation. The Sinhalese might have been willing to compromise by weighting territorial representation; but the Tamils demanded "fifty-fifty" or equal representation of majority and minorities by means of communal seats.

In 1941 His Majesty's Government announced that the constitutional problem would be discussed by a commission or conference after the war. The Ministers rejected this as

inadequate and continued to press for a decision. In 1942, on the occasion of the Cripps Mission to India the State Council demanded Dominion status. In May, 1943, the British Government announced that the post-war examination of the problem would be directed towards the conferment of full self-government in matters of internal civil administration and authorized the Ministers to draft proposals subject to certain conditions. The Ministers gave their own interpretation of those conditions and proceeded to draft a Constitution.

Towards the end of 1944 a Commission under Lord Soulbury was appointed to consider the Ministers' Draft and any other proposals that might be made. The Commission approved the draft subject to minor amendments and to the addition of a Senate. There were discussions between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and Mr. D. S. Senanayake, Leader of the State Council, in July, 1945. Mr. Senanayake asked for full Dominion status; but the White Paper issued in October, 1945, while containing a contingent promise of Dominion status, provided for the time being minor modifications of the Ministers' Draft as amended by the Soulbury Report. The White Paper was accepted by the State Council by fifty-one votes to three, two Indians and a Sinhalese voting against. In February, 1947, while steps were being taken to bring the new Constitution into operation, Mr. Senanayake again raised the question of Dominion status, and in July, 1947, it was announced that as soon as the new Constitution was in operation and agreements for the transfer of power had been reached, Dominion status would be conferred.

It is thus unnecessary to discuss the limitations in the Constitution of 1946. The problem of representation was met by granting weightage according to sparsity of population. Since the minorities—Tamils, Muslims and Indians—were mainly in the more sparsely-populated Provinces, the effect was to give them higher proportional representation without modifying the principle of territorial election. The executive committee system of the Donoughmore Constitution was replaced by a Cabinet system. The immediate effect of the Constitution was to stimulate a demand for party government.

The Ministers and the majority of the State Councillors, including the Muslims and some of the Tamils, organized the United National Party. The dissident Tamils, however, put up candidates in the Tamil areas through their own organization, the Tamil Congress. Elsewhere the opposition to the United National Party was furnished by the left-wing groups—the Sama Samaj party (Trotskyite), the Bolshevik-Leninist party (Trotskyite), and the Communist party. There were 186 independent candidates for ninety-five seats, but the feature of the elections was the slaughter of these independents, many of whom forfeited their deposits. The elections resulted as follows:

<i>Party</i>	<i>Sinhalese</i>	<i>Tamil</i>	<i>Indian</i>	<i>Muslim</i>	<i>Burgher</i>	<i>Total</i>
United National	37	—	—	5	—	42
Sama Samaj	10	—	—	—	—	10
Bolshevik-Leninist	5	—	—	—	—	5
Communist	2	—	—	—	1	3
Tamil Congress	—	7	—	—	—	7
Indian Congress	—	—	7	—	—	7
Minor Groups	1	—	—	—	—	1
Independents	13	6	—	1	—	20
	68	13	7	6	1	95

It will be seen that India and Pakistan obtained Dominion status in 1947 after a generation of passive resistance and civil strife, while a few months later Ceylon achieved the same status by peaceful persuasion. The two events are not unconnected. The case for India was also the case for Ceylon and whatever was gained in India would probably be gained in Ceylon also. Those whose reading of history is that Dominion status was forced from a reluctant Britain by civil disobedience are therefore entitled to say that the Indian National Congress helped to obtain Dominion status for Ceylon. It may be, though, that that reading of history is false and that India would have attained the status earlier had the constitutional methods of

Ceylon been followed. It is certainly true that after 1940 Great Britain produced the plans to solve India's difficulties, while Ceylon produced and secured virtual unanimity for its own plan. It must, however, be realized that in Ceylon the communal problem has been pitched on a much lower key. Except in the otherwise insignificant riots of 1915 not a drop of blood has been shed in communal strife. The difference was exhibited in September, 1947. While there were riots in Bengal and the Punjab, Ceylon was going to the polls in a peace as profound as that of a general election in Britain.

Burma

The British who infiltrated into and ultimately annexed Burma in the name of Her Britannic Majesty came from India, and Burma thus became one of the responsibilities of the Government of India. Geographically and ethnologically, however, it was always an utterly distinct country. It is almost true to say, with the Simon Commission, that it became part of India "by accident". It is significant that the British approached Burma, not over the frontier, but by sea. The Western Hills which divide the two countries are not utterly impassable, as the refugees from Rangoon discovered in 1942; but they are a sufficient barrier to make Burma look East instead of West. It is not that they are very high, for the highest hills have valleys between, but that the approaches are covered with dense jungle and guarded by the malarial mosquito. Nor is the journey a short one, like that which separates Ceylon from India. Rangoon is 700 miles from Calcutta and 1,000 miles from Madras. There are nearly a million Indians in Burma, but they came by sea in British ships and under British rule and were only 7 per cent. of the population before the war. What is more, two-thirds of them were males. Many of them returned to India when their work was done; many more married Burmese women and their children became Burmese.

The Burmese are not racially homogeneous. They are the descendants of waves of invaders who came, not like the

Indians and the Sinhalese from the North-West, but from the North. They are all of the Mongoloid physical type and their social system bears no relation to that of India. Of the fifteen million inhabitants in 1931, nine million were Burmese, over one million were Karens, one million were Shans, 300,000 were Chins and 150,000 Kachins. These are regarded as indigenous people because, though probably invaders, they have been settled so long that they have to be distinguished from the 900,000 Indians, the 150,000 Chinese, and the 120,000 Indo-Burmese who result from recent immigration. This enumeration gives a false idea of diversity, however. Apart from the immigrants, the people of the central plains are either Burmese or Karens. Seven-tenths of the population speak either Burmese or an allied language. The caste system, too, is quite unknown. The standard of living is higher in Burma than in India and literacy is about 60 per cent., as in Ceylon.

The greatest debt which Burma owes to India is its religion. Though Burma (unlike Ceylon) is not mentioned in the Edict in which Asoka's missionary efforts were recorded, tradition has it that the Emperor sent monks by sea to convert Burma; and this tradition is likely to be founded on truth. It is the Hinayana or Southern variety to be found in Ceylon and Siam also. Indeed, Burma in 1071 sent monks to Ceylon to take a set of the scriptures and to revive the priesthood there. In return the Tooth Relic was asked for. The request was refused, but a duplicate was sent and is retained in the Shwe Dagon pagoda at Rangoon, while the original (or what is believed by Buddhists to be the original) is in the Dalada Maligawa at Kandy. On several subsequent occasions Ceylon repaid the courtesy by sending monks to maintain the succession of the priesthood in Burma.

The Burmese appear to have migrated down the Irrawaddy River during the ninth century and to have absorbed the earlier inhabitants. In the middle of the eleventh century Burma was formed into a single Kingdom, based on Pagan, under Anawrahta, who reigned from 1044 to 1077. His kingdom survived for two centuries, when it was overthrown by the Tartars. It was replaced by a number of Shan states, the Shans (who are

also known as Tais) occupying Siam (or Thailand) as well as Burma and paying tribute to the Emperor of China. It was not reunited until the sixteenth century when, for a time, the Burmese ruled Siam and what is now the Indian State of Manipur.

During the seventeenth century the Europeans began to take a hand. There were Portuguese adventurers with the Thai forces in the sixteenth century, while during the seventeenth the English and Dutch East India Companies established trading posts and the French also gained a footing. The conquest of Arakan, on the borders of Bengal, by Bodapaya in 1784 began a series of frontier troubles in which the English East India Company was necessarily concerned. During the French war, too, Burmese ports were used by French privateers as bases for raiding British commerce. In 1795 the Company sent a mission to Ava, then the Burmese capital. The first Anglo-Burmese war in 1824 was, however, due to frontier troubles: for several years there were Burmese forces raiding Indian territory in search of Arakanese rebels, and the Company retaliated by sending a force to Rangoon by sea. As a result, the Burmese surrendered Manipur, Assam and Cachar and ceded Arakan and Tenasserim, while a Resident was installed at Ava.

The Burmese retained the Irrawaddy delta and therefore Rangoon which was, however, becoming a cosmopolitan city. Complaints by British traders resulted in a British mission at Ava in 1851, both conducted and met tactlessly. The result of an open conflict was the outbreak of the second Burmese War in 1852. The delta was annexed as the Province of Pegu, and in 1862 the three Provinces of Arakan, Pegu, and Tenasserim were formed into the Province of British Burma, which grew rapidly to prosperity under British rule. Upper Burma remained an independent kingdom, its capital being moved to Mandalay. Relations were on the whole good until 1878, when Thibaw came to the throne of Burma. The barbarity of the court and the ill-treatment of British subjects began to arouse concern. Also, the French from Indo-China began to take an interest in Burma. In 1885 an expedition was sent from Rangoon to Mandalay and in the following year

Upper Burma was annexed and Burma became, for administrative purposes, a Province of India. In 1897 a Legislative Council, with an unofficial but nominated majority, was set up. Under the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 a small elective element was introduced; and in 1919 the dyarchy of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms was extended to Burma.

The incorporation of Burma in India was administratively convenient so long as India was governed autocratically, but an obvious mistake as soon as the elements of representative government were established. The handful of Burmese in New Delhi could have no influence on the policy of the Government of India. Nor were they in any way concerned in the communal problems or even the social problems of India. They knew nothing of the Hindu-Muslim conflict, and the social problems of Hinduism have never arisen in Burma, where there is no caste and the women are as free as the men. In some respects, indeed, Indian policy ran counter to Burmese interests. A tariff policy designed to protect Indian industries, for instance, was a hindrance to Burma, which had none of those industries.

Finally, the progressive self-government of India brought no pleasure to Burma. The Burmese did not wish to be governed by Indians; on the contrary, they were concerned with the growth of the Indian population in Burma and its virtual monopoly (with the Europeans) of its trade and commerce. When the Simon Commission was in Rangoon in 1929 a motion for the separation of Burma from India was carried in the Legislative Council without a division. After considering the military and economic arguments against the separation, the Commission reached a definite conclusion that it should be brought about immediately. Accordingly, the Government of India Act, 1935, gave Burma a separate Constitution under a separate Burma Office, and the Burmese provisions of the Act were re-enacted as a separate Act, the Government of Burma Act, 1935. It was given a two-Chamber legislature, the House of Representatives being based on a wide franchise and the Senate half elected by the House of Representatives and half nominated by the Governor. A council of ten Ministers, responsible to the lower house, was created, but the Governor

was given special powers in respect of defence, finance, and the scheduled or tribal areas. For the few years between 1937 and the Japanese invasion in 1942, Burma thus enjoyed a greater measure of self-government than India or Ceylon, or indeed any part of the British Commonwealth outside the Dominions and Southern Rhodesia.

This period of five years was too short to judge of the success of the system of semi-self-government. It had not been possible for well-organized parties to develop, and the Burmese majority in the first and only legislature was split into groups which made a stable government difficult to attain. There were frequent changes of Cabinets and Ministers, but the King's Government was carried on in Burma while it was breaking down in India. Nor were the Burmans satisfied with semi-self-government. There was indeed a small but influential revolutionary party, the Thakin Party, some of whose members went to Japan and formed the nucleus of the so-called "Burma Independence Army" which entered Burma with the Japanese Army in 1942. Another of Burma's problems then became more evident. Under King Thibaw Upper Burma had contained a substantial criminal or semi-criminal element which took to the hills and lived as dacoits or bandits even after the annexation. These criminal elements, with some genuine but misguided nationalists, joined the Burmese Independence Army, which, however, never mustered more than 4,000 men. The Japanese soon showed that they were conquerors and not liberators, and the patriotic elements gradually formed themselves into a Resistance Movement which did much to help the recapture of Burma in 1945. The continued existence of bands armed with Japanese or British weapons, however, is likely to disturb the peace of Burma for at least a decade.

Meanwhile the Government of Burma was set up in India to plan the rehabilitation of the country. In April, 1943, the Secretary of State announced that it was the aim of His Majesty's Government to assist Burma to attain complete self-government within the British Commonwealth as soon as circumstances permitted. In May, 1945, while Burma was being liberated, a more comprehensive statement of policy

was issued as a White Paper in London. Until elections could be held and a new Government established under the Act of 1935, the Governor would govern with the help of a nominated Executive Council. As soon as elections could be held the Constitution of 1935 would be brought into operation and the Burmese would be asked to fashion their own Constitution. As soon as it was clear that this was acceptable to the Burmese people, discussions would be held to settle by agreement the questions involved in the transfer of power. The Governor would, however, control the Shan States and the tribal areas until they expressed a wish to amalgamate their territories with Burma proper.

Civil government was restored in Burma on the 1st January, 1946, the Governor appointing Executive and Legislative Councils to assist him. The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) which claimed to represent all Burmese political parties, refused to collaborate unless it was allowed to nominate the whole Legislative Council, which the Governor refused. At its first congress in January, 1946, the AFPFL rejected the White Paper and demanded complete independence. The Myochit Party, led by U Saw, at first collaborated, but withdrew its members in May, 1946. Meanwhile, the Legislative Council had asked that a new House of Representatives be elected on adult franchise, excluding Buddhist monks and nuns. An Act of Parliament was passed for this purpose, but not excluding monks and nuns. A new Executive Council, excluding the AFPFL and the Myochit Party, was formed in August. In December, 1946, the British Government decided to transfer full power to the Burmese Government so formed, to give Burma the option of remaining within or without the Commonwealth, and to invite the Burmese leaders to London for discussions. These discussions, held in January, 1947, resulted in an agreement that the machinery of the Act of 1935 should be used for the election of a constituent assembly in April, 1947. The Executive Council would form an Interim Government, which would be treated as a Dominion Government, and there would be an Interim Legislature formed by nomination from the constituent assembly.

Temporarily, therefore, Burma is a Dominion; but the indications are that it will soon decide to leave the Commonwealth. Culturally it is distinct. No doubt that culture owes something to India because of the very early influence of Hinduism and the subsequent adoption of Buddhism. Since the country has been Buddhist for over two thousand years, however, the culture may be regarded as indigenous. Its high standard of literacy is due, not to the adoption of English, but to the fact that Burma, unlike Ceylon, retained an educational system attached to its religious institutions. In respect of secondary and higher education, indeed, Burma was one of the more backward Provinces of British India, and the University of Rangoon was not established until 1920. Though founded on the enlightened policy of the Calcutta University Commission and free from the communal troubles of the Indian universities, the University has had troubles of its own due, it appears, to a lack of self-discipline among its students and their absorption in immature politics.

Burma is essentially a producer of food and raw materials and is otherwise dependent in large measure on overseas trade. Its exports in 1938-39 amounted to Rs. 48.52 crores, of which rice accounted for Rs. 20.69 crores. It was indeed the granary of the East, feeding India, Ceylon and Malaya as well as itself; and until Burma again takes its place as a great exporting country the food problem in South-East Asia will remain acute. Among the other exports were timber (especially teak), petroleum, lead, tin, tungsten, silver and gems. India was by far her best customer, buying 50 per cent. more than she sold.

Trade touches few of the Burmese directly, for it has fallen mainly into Indian and European hands. The economic arguments for remaining within the Commonwealth therefore have very little appeal. Nor is there any sentiment to add force to them. Burma was an independent country until 1886 and for the next fifty years it was a Province of British India, a country for which the Burmese cared little and which cared little for Burma. The devastation caused by the war has compelled the Burmese to call for British assistance, but it will create no sense of gratitude, for Britain having assumed the

defence of the country failed to carry out its responsible task and was compelled ignominiously to evacuate the country, leaving the Burmese to the tender mercies of the Japanese. They had no wish to be part of "Greater East Asia" as the Japanese conceived it, but they see no reason why they should be part of the British Commonwealth of Nations either. It may be possible to create some special relationship from which Burma will gain more than Britain; but at the moment of writing it appears certain that Burma will leave the Commonwealth.

CHAPTER TWELVE

AN ASSESSMENT

AN analysis rests on facts even if the selection be a matter of opinion; an assessment is necessarily subjective. Yet one cannot avoid asking, and at least attempting to answer, the question whether the British Commonwealth of Nations has proved to be a valuable institution not merely to the peoples who compose it, but to the world at large. The advantages to the British nations themselves have been discussed in Chapter IV.

The British Commonwealth of Nations is a collection of nine or ten (according as Newfoundland is or is not included) sovereign and, in the sense in which the term is generally used, independent States. Great Britain, aided by the Dominions themselves, has performed the remarkable feat of converting a large section of her colonial Empire into independent nations without losing their collaboration or even their esteem. She has not always acted wisely. In the opinion of most she acted unwisely in North America and lost the opportunity of creating a great British nation from the Gulf of Mexico to the frozen North. The United States of America would not necessarily have been a better or more useful country if it had become a Dominion. It is impossible to rewrite history, to forecast what sort of world there would be if somebody had acted differently: yet the imagination suggests that the great American nation would have been greater still if it had never had any conflicts with England and could have exploited Canada without the enormous effort and expense involved in creating a separate Canadian nation.

It may be said, too, that Great Britain acted unwisely in South Africa on several occasions which were turning points in the history of that country. The situation was retrieved by the great gesture of 1906, when the victor in a war which perhaps she ought not to have fought gave back to two small

countries the liberty for which they had contended and so enabled the South African nation to be born. In Eire it will be said with almost complete unanimity that British policy had been for generations, even for centuries, a series of blunders. Eire hangs to the British Commonwealth by the skin of her teeth, or perhaps it is the skin of Britain's teeth. Some at least, will say that Mr. Gladstone was right in 1885. It would, however, be even more controversial to say that in India, Burma, and perhaps even Ceylon, Britain offered too little and too late.

It might even be said that the very idea of self-government and Dominion status was a blunder. The world has suffered too much from nationalist aggression to want more nations. The task of the future, a task which two world wars have failed to effect, will be to suppress national sovereignty; and the more nations there are, the more difficult it will be. The French have a different method for satisfying the aspirations of their colonial peoples, a method which derives from the Roman Empire and has not this defect, and which consists in incorporating the colonies in France herself. It is a method which has yet to prove its success in North Africa and appears to have failed in the Near East and Indo-China. It seems probable that there is no alternative to the British method save complete separation. Colonial peoples will not be satisfied with less than independence, and the only question may be whether it shall be independence inside or outside the British Commonwealth. Even to-day, when the opinion which thinks itself enlightened is critical of the whole concept of national sovereignty, most of Asia is on the march with national sovereignty on its banner. Syria, the Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq have attained it as surely as Iran. Palestine would have attained it if there had been no Jews or no Arabs. India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Indo-China and Indonesia want to have sovereign status. Nationalist opinion in all these countries uses language which, to an Englishman, is oddly Victorian; it may not be what grandpapa said to grandmama in the second minuet, but it is much like what Garibaldi said to the people of Italy. The pessimist will see in this move-

ment the source of future world wars; the optimist will claim that the liquidation of colonies, as colonies, is the necessary preliminary to the liquidation of national sovereignty, and that the colonies have to become nations before they learn how futile it is to be nations.

If the phase of national sovereignty be inevitable, the British Empire has solved part of its problem admirably. It has converted its white colonies into sovereign States and yet kept them closely entwined—for “associated”, though used in the Balfour Declaration, is too weak a word—in a co-operative Commonwealth. Its dose of aggressive nationalism was a mild one; it produced a few minor but no major conflicts. The neo-Marxist will, of course, insist with Lenin that the war of 1914-18 was a conflict of rival imperialisms; but this is because history has to justify Marx. The British Commonwealth is not an imperialist super-State; it is not a super-State at all. The British Empire is not “imperialist” in the derogatory sense in which that word is now used. The British Commonwealth is basically a collection of nations in close sympathy with each other, a sympathy based not on the formal protestations of the politicians but on a sentiment prevailing among the peoples. Public opinion in Great Britain does not regard a Dominion citizen—not even an Irishman—as a “foreigner”. Public opinion in the Dominions—except perhaps among some sections in Eire and in the East—does not regard the “Britisher” as a “foreigner”. There is something self-conscious about international collaboration at unofficial levels, through professional, academic, ecclesiastical and trade-union contacts. There is nothing self-conscious about those contacts where Great Britain and the white Dominions are concerned. The churches are separately organized and yet they are one. The universities are not all of the same pattern but they share common ideals and traditions. A doctor thinks it natural that he should have liberty to practise throughout the Commonwealth, a lawyer that he can be called to any Bar in the Commonwealth. Art follows a common tradition with local variations; literature, so far as it is in English, is a unit; even the newspapers are not “foreign”.

Of particular importance is the professional literature, for it sets a common professional standard and produces common traditions. In Great Britain a Dominion citizen can take any job or live in any community and be accepted by his colleagues and neighbours with no greater differentiation than his accent and other peculiar habits makes essential. In the white Dominions an Englishman or a Scot soon finds himself at home. These informal contacts are far more important than such self-conscious activities as those of the Royal Empire Society, though the fact that there is such a body is in itself significant.

It would require the gift of prophecy to assess the position East of Suez and North of the Equator. If India and Pakistan remain as Dominions their relationship to the rest of the Commonwealth will necessarily be different from that of the white Dominions. Indian nationalism has been revolutionary for a generation, though of the peculiar type patented by Mahatma Gandhi. The long contest with the Raj has left an inheritance of bitterness whose consequences will be evident for at least a generation. India has learned much from Western culture, but is intensely conscious of her own proud history and self-conscious about her languages and religions. Her relationships with the United Kingdom, whether they are those of an independent nation within the Commonwealth or those of an independent nation outside, will not be patterned on those of Canada and Australia. Fortunately, the British Commonwealth has no immutable doctrines; the British tradition has always been one of improvisation; and if India is willing to adapt herself to the odd ways of those who have governed her and who have tried, however imperfectly they may have succeeded, to understand her sharp lights and deep shadows, she will find Britain to be even more adaptable.

Pakistan starts with less bitterness but with more dogmatism; for Islam even more than Christianity imposes a way of life upon true believers. That way of life is more Western than the Hindu because its effects on Western civilization have been profound. Christianity is a Semitic religion and shares a tradition with Islam which might have been dangerous while

the Mussulmans were a minority in a Hindu country but may prove helpful now that they have a country of their own. Moreover, Pakistan will have problems of economics and defence which Britain may help to solve. As a primary producer she will require markets for her produce and finance for her prosperity. The ancient road to India, the Khyber Pass, is not the less dangerous in modern times than it has been for centuries past, and the nation that has to defend it must either be strong herself or have powerful friends; the distant friend, having command of the sea routes to Karachi, may be a less dangerous friend than those near at hand.

Burma seems likely to choose independence outside the Commonwealth. It is, however, so dependent on overseas trade and in such confusion through the Japanese occupation that close relations with Great Britain seem to be inevitable. Ceylon, for the time being, has chosen independence within the Commonwealth; but the elections of 1947 showed a remarkable trend towards the left-wing parties, whose propaganda has included violent attacks on the "economic imperialism" which they profess to find in the policy of Britain's Socialist Government.

Finally, there is a rising tide of nationalism in Malaya which will soon be at the flood. The peace and harmony of the peninsula were shattered in 1941 by the Japanese occupation; and though the Japanese demonstrated the advantages of the Commonwealth so effectively that the British troops were received as deliverers, the consequences remain. The Malays have been impressed by the revolution of their brothers-in-Islam in Indonesia and by the establishment of Pakistan. The Chinese have been profoundly influenced by the nationalism of China and her long and, ultimately, successful defence against the Japanese. The fact that the divisions of China are repeated in Malaya and the fact that the Malays, like the Mussulmans in India, have cause to complain of their social and educational backwardness are not likely to obstruct the demand for self-government. They may in fact lead to the same kind of abuse of "the third party" as has been common form in India for a generation. The lesson learned in India, Burma and Ceylon was that,

once the demand for self-government arises it must be given rapid satisfaction. Dominion status by evolution, the doctrine followed in India since 1917, works satisfactorily only if the evolution be very rapid. The small Malayan intelligentsia, the product mainly of Raffles College and the College of Medicine, is at present both liberal and reasonable. With the establishment of the University of Malaya it will grow in size and importance. An attempt must be made to prevent the development of the feeling of frustration which has poisoned relationships in India and Burma and, in some degree, in Ceylon also.

The problem in the West Indies and in Africa is not fundamentally different from that in Asia. Economically and educationally the people are more backward, but there is the same phenomenon of a small, self-conscious middle class stressing a demand for more self-government. As soon as he has acquired a sufficient knowledge and experience of European technique, the African like the Asiatic finds that he is no less able than his European colleague; and the theory of the inevitability of gradualism so frequently proclaimed by British statesmen and officials appears to him to be an insult. A promise of self-government when his people are fit for it is not a cause for gratitude; it is an accusation that his people are unfit. In the public services and the professions he finds Europeans preferred, not because they are more highly qualified, but because they are Europeans; and even if it be true, as it often is, that they possess, through their education and training, qualities which examinations do not test but which are essential for honest and efficient administration, he cannot admit the fact publicly or even, without qualification, to himself. An official majority in the legislature, and even an official minority, appears to him to be a device to enable the interests of the Europeans to over-ride those of his own people. The result is that the theory of self-government by slow evolution produces an antagonism the reverse of the sympathy upon which the Dominion relationship is founded.

This antagonism is often strengthened by the sense of frustration due to internal conflicts. Great Britain felt virtuous in holding the balance between Hindus and Muslims, Indians

and Burmese, Sinhalese and Tamils, Arabs and Jews; but neither side was conscious of the virtue. On the contrary, Great Britain appeared to the majority to be a supporter of the minority and to the minority to be a supporter of the majority. Since the continuation of the conflict implied a continuation of British control, it was often assumed by both sides, but especially by the majority, that the conflict was due to Britain, who followed the Roman principle of "divide and rule". There is hardly a politician in India who did not claim this to be British policy. His view could be supported by references to despatches where British officials, anxious to secure the adoption of a policy, have played off one community against another. It could also be supported, though less cogently, by cases in which Britain in protecting minorities has given an impetus to minority movements, for instance by creating communal electorates.

To these considerations must be added that of colour prejudice, a prejudice exhibited more emphatically locally than in Great Britain herself, though occasional exhibitions in London receive far more publicity than the facts warrant and help to increase local distrust. The European community has social conventions different from those of the local population and does in fact form itself into a "community". Social differentiation is increased by political antagonism and may become social antagonism.

It must not be thought, however, that progress towards self-government depends wholly on attitudes of mind. The fundamental difficulty in the West Indies and in Africa is not political but economic. The doctrine that colonies must pay their way has no doubt many advantages; but it leaves the colonies open to exploitation by trading companies anxious for raw materials and quick profits. Economic development requires capital which cannot be obtained from local resources and will not be spent by private enterprise unless it offers a rapid return. Since the Royal Commission on the West Indies pointed out the fallacy in 1939, however, British policy has changed and substantial sums are being poured into the colonies under the Colonial Welfare and Development Act.

Further, progress towards self-government depends on progress in education. This is indeed an aspect of economic policy, for what was lacking was not the will but the money. Some of the money is now forthcoming from the Colonial Welfare and Development Fund, though much larger sums could be spent with advantage. The Colonial Office, too, has a policy developed by its Advisory Committee on Education. Since education even at the primary level depends in the last resort on education at the university level, it is significant that university institutions are now being founded on the lines recommended by the Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies in 1945; and soon we may have universities in Malaya, the West Indies, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and East Africa in addition to the existing universities in Malta, Hong Kong and Ceylon.

Finally, it appears to be realized that Dominion Status by slow evolution is not feasible. This is indeed the lesson to be drawn from India, Burma and Ceylon; and the recent pronouncements of the Secretary of State for the Colonies have shown that the lesson has been learned. As he has said, risks must be taken, for the alternative is bitterness and frustration which takes years to eradicate. It follows that the British Commonwealth may soon expand from nine or ten independent countries to fifteen or more, more than half of them not merely non-British but even non-European in composition.

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